BALI, J. - (1.) THIS appeal under clause 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 has been filed against the order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 2. 2. 2001 vide which the appeal preferred by the appellant National Insurance Co. against the award passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal dated 1. 12. 2000 was dismissed.
(2.) THE claimant, in a motor accident that took place on 30. 11. 1984, suffered fracture of back-bone. He was awarded compensation to the tune of Rs. 8,05,000/- vide award passed by the Tribunal dated 1. 12. 2000. THE learned Single Judge before whom the appeal came to be placed, held that since only quantum of compensation was in question and the Insurance Co. had failed to obtain permission as required under Sec. 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the appeal was not maintainable. While so holding, learned Single Judge, besides placing reliance upon Sec. 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act, also relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shankarayya and Another vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and Another (1998 ACJ 513) = (RLW 1998 (3) SC 407 ). Learned Single Judge also took into consideration the effect of cross-summoning the witnesses on the question of quantum and while placing reliance upon the judgment of this Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Tulsi Devi and Others (1988 ACJ 962) = (1988 (1) RLW 391) held that even though the witnesses were cross-examined on the question of quantum, the same would be of no avail as permission required u/s 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act was not granted by the court. Learned counsel for the appellant is unable to distinguish the judgments on which learned Single Judge placed reliance. He, however, contends that an application seeking permission under Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act was indeed filed but no orders were passed thereon. Under the circumstances aforesaid, the impugned orders under appeal should be set aside and the case should be remanded to the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal directing it to pass orders on the application aforesaid and then hold de novo trial. In support of his contention, he places reliance upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Jyotsnaben Sudhirbhai Patel and Others (2003 ACJ 2107) = (RLW 2004 (1) SC 1 ). Counsel for the appellant also contends that grant of interest @ 12% is on higher side. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and with their assistance, examined records of the case. In the context of the facts of the present case, we, however, find no merit in the two fold contentions of the learned counsel for the appellant. The application filed by the appellant Insurance Co. under Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act was never pressed at any stage. At no given time, the attention of the Tribunal was drawn to the application and as mentioned above, orders were not passed. The conduct of the appellant would clearly manifest that it might have thought to contest quantum of compensation at the initial stage but the same for whatever reasons, appears to have been abandoned. We are so observing as during the course of trial, as mentioned above, at no given time, attention of the Tribunal was drawn to the application that was filed u/s 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act. No effort was made and thus no orders were sought from the Tribunal on the application u/s 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act. In so far as reliance placed upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Jyotsnaben Sudhirbhai Patel (supra), is concerned, facts of this case are distinguishable from the one which were available in Shankarayya and Another vs. United India Insurance Co. (supra ). Facts of the said case reveal that an application u/s 170 of the Act was filed by the concerned Insurance Co. and order was invited on the same and in fact, the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal had passed order. The order granting permission was however not a speaking one. Merely because no reasons were recorded in granting permission to the Insurance Co. the Tribunal as well as the High Court did not permit the Insurance Co. to raise point with regard to the quantum of compensation. In the case in hand, no orders at all were passed granting permission to the appellant insurance company whereas in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Jyotsnaben Sudhirbhai Patel and Others (supra), the order was passed and the Insurance Co. was granted permission to raise question of compensation. If permission was sought and granted but merely because the order granting permission was not a speaking one, surely, the Insurance Co. could not be faulted on that count. It was not the fault of the Insurance Co. if the said order was not a speaking one. It is on that premise that the Supreme Court held that the Insurance Company should have been permitted to raise the point of quantum of compensation. In the present case, no orders have been passed by the Tribunal and all the while the matter remained pending before the Tribunal, its attention was not drawn to the application filed u/s 170 of the Act. As mentioned above, the appellant Insurance Co. might have initially thought of seeking permission to raise the question with regard to quantum of compensation but the same, in the course of the case, appears to have been abandoned. Even otherwise, it would be too inequitous at this stage to remand the case in a matter that pertains to the year 1984 and have a de novo trial as is being suggested by the learned counsel for the appellant. In so far as interest at the rate of 12 per cent is concerned, we may only mention that the accident had taken place in 1984 and at that time, the rate of interest prevalent in market was 12%. If the rate of interest has come down now, it does not become a ground to reduce the rate of interest.
(3.) FINDING no merit in the appeal, the same is dismissed without any order as to costs. .;