CHAUHAN, J. - (1.) HEARD learned counsel for the parties.
(2.) THIS appeal is barred by 83 days. The order under appeal is dated 19. 12. 2003. The memo of appeal was presented on 21. 5. 2004. The period for filing the Special Appeal from the date of the order of the learned Single Judge to the Division Bench is 30 days excluding the period spent in receiving the certified copy of the order under appeal. The office pointed out that the appeal is barred by 83 days and not accompanied with application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay. The application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act has been filed finally on 21. 12. 2004 after taking number of adjournments including two from Court on 30. 11. 2004 and 9. 12. 2004. The fact which has not been disputed is that on 21. 5. 2004, the memo of appeal was filed. Hence, without furnishing any reason which prevailed with any of the authorities taking decision for filing of appeal within limitation, the delay cannot be condoned. The vague assertion that after receipt of the copy of order, it was sent in the office for legal opinion to Executive Officer, Municipal Board, Balotra on 19. 1. 2004, who in turn sent the matter to the Director, Local Self Bodies, Jaipur and thereafter the matter was also moved to the Additional Commissioner, Jodhpur. Thereafter, after receiving the matter in the office of the Director, Local Self Bodies, Jaipur, the same was processed at different levels, and ultimately the appeal was filed on 21. 5. 2004, cannot be a good ground for condoning delay. Taking liberal view does not mean that law of limitation is to be given an complete go bye by resorting to the vague assertions and vague reasons given by the appellants without giving any semblance of reason which could have delayed taking decision within period of limitation to file an appeal or not which could constitute sufficient cause, therefore, we are of the opinion that the appellant was not prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within limitation and, therefore, the appeal deserves to be dismissed on the ground that it is barred by time. Even assuming that taking most liberal view in favour of the appellant, the delay caused in filing the appeal is condoned, still on merit, there is no substance in this appeal.
(3.) THE undisputed facts which emerge from the pleadings are as follows: The petitioner-respondent was initially employed as Naka Guard (Tax Jamadar) in Municipal Board, Balotra on 16. 9. 71. He was, thereafter, promoted on the recommendation of the administrative committee of the said Board on the post of Sub- Nakedar vide order dated 31. 7. 82. The petitioner was confirmed on the post of Sub-Nakedar w. e. f. 5. 8. 1982. Vide order dated 6. 4. 92 based on the resolution of the Board Committee dated 17. 2. 92. In 1998, the levy of Octroi duty by the various municipalities in the State was abolished by the State Government w. e. f. 1. 8. 98. As a result, the petitioner-respondent was declared surplus and was absorbed on the post of Fireman vide order dated 11. 12. 2001 in his parent Municipality, Balotra. The petitioner was assigned the duties of building Fireman on 12. 8. 2002 and so also he was given additional duties of the Establishment. Vide order dated 7. 11. 2002, the petitioner who was posted as building fireman was also given additional duties to look after the duty arrangement of Chowkidar working in the office of the Municipal Board, Balotra. The petitioner made a complaint on 20. 2. 2003 against two Members of the Municipal Board namely Madan Lal Chopra and Misra Ram Bheel alleging that they have demanded illegal gratification from him. Thereafter, on 29. 3. 2003, the Municipal Board, Balotra relieved the petitioner of the duties and directed him to report to the Director, Local Self Government, Jaipur. This led to filing of S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1501/2003. In the said petition, the order relieving the petitioner from the duties at Balotra Municipal Board and directing him to report at Director, Local Self Government was stayed by the Court. ;