TIBREWAL, J. - (1.) THIS application under section 482 Cr. P. C. has been filed by the accused-petitioners who are facing trial in Criminal Case No. 573/83 (State v. Dwarka Prasad and another) pending in the Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Neem ka Thana, under sections 323, 324, 325, 147, 148 and 149 IPC. The prayer for quashing the proceedings is based on inordinate delay in the trial and consequently, to be violative of Art. 21 of the Constitution of India.
(2.) THE incident is alleged to have taken place on 7. 6. 81 and crime No. 40/81 was registered at Police Station, Khandela under sections 147 and 323 I. P. C. at the initial stage. Charge-sheet was submitted on 23. 11. 91 under various offences including under section 307 I. P. C. However, the learned Sessions Judge did not find a prima facie case under section 307 I. P. C. and remanded the case to the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sikar and now it is pending in the Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Neemka Thana for trial. Charges under sections 148, 324, 325/149 and 323/149 were framed against Madan Lal, accused while against rest of the accused charges were framed under sections 147, 325/149, 324/149 and 323 I. P. C. It is contended by the learned counsel that more than 13 years have passed since the occurrence and more than 11-1/2 years have passed since the framing of the charges, but still not a single witness has been examined by the prosecution. Learned counsel contends that justice delayed is justice denied and it is a fundamental right of the accused to have a speedy trial. A delayed trial without any fault on the part of the accused is unreasonable and is violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Learned counsel placed reliance on a number of judgments of the Apex Court right from Maneka Gandhi's case to A. R. Antuley's case. He also placed reliance on the decision in Chhote Lal Jain v. State of Rajasthan (1), delivered by me on the question, as to when the criminal proceedings should be quashed on the ground of delay. After considering the various judgments of the Apex Court as well as of other High Courts and this Court, the proposition of law laid down in the above case is as under : (i) A speedy trial is fundamental right of the accused within the ambit of Art. 21 of the Constitution of India is no more in dispute. But, the question whether this fundamental right has been violated or is likely to be violated on account of the delay in the trial will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no outer limit can be fixed in a general way for all the cases; (ii) While considering the length of delay, the Court will take into account the period consumed in the investigation of the case and the delay caused in actual proceedings in Court after filing of the chargesheet. A speedy investigation and a trial are equally mandated both by the letter and spirit of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; (iii) While deciding such question, the Court shall take into account the working of the judicial system in India and the lack of satisfactory working conditions in judicial courts, including large pendency and institution of the cases, inadequacy of Judge strength and under-staffing etc. (iv) In a pending case to decide the question whether the criminal proceedings should be quashed or any other appropriate direction be given to the trial court to secure the ends of justice will depend on seriousness of the offence, whether the delay was occasioned by the tactic or conduct of the accused himself, whether the accused objected at any stage when such delay occasioned and whether the accused is prejudiced in his defence on account of the delay? (v) If the delay has caused prejudice to the accused in the conduct and his defence, the pending criminal proceedings should be normally quashed as in that situation it could be said that the accused has been denied an adequate opportunity to defend himself and the trial is not fair and reasonable; (vi) In grave and serious offences against the society or in relation to Nation's economy, defence or security, the criminal proceedings should not be normally quashed on the ground of delay simpliciter without anything further, (vii) In trivial offences having no or very little impact on the society, quashing of criminal proceedings on the ground of delay simpliciter shall be in the interest of justice as it will provide a room for serious and grave offences and will lessen the burden of the Court with heavy workload. In the light of the above propositions, I have considered the prayer made by the petitioner. The incident is of 7. 6. 81. The accused persons were arrested and were sent to judicial custody. They were produced in the Court of the learned Munsiff and Judicial Magistrate, Srimadhopur on 8. 7. 81. Thereafter, the accused persons were appearing in the Court of the concerned Magistrate and the charge-sheet was filed on 28. 11. 81. Then, after several adjournments, charge-sheet was filed against co-accused Vidhyadhar on 21. 8. 82. Arguments were heard on framing of charges on 11. 8. 82 and charges were framed on 13. 12. 82. The various order-sheets of the trial court show that the appellant had been appearing in the Court, but still not a single witness has been examined. The witnesses either did not appear after service or some of them were not served. In any case, there was no fault on the part of the accused for causing delay in the trial. As stated above, the charges were framed on 13. 12. 92 and in a period of 11-1/2 years not a single witness is examined by the prosecution while the accused persons had been appearing in the court on all the dates of hearing, it can hardly be disputed that such criminal trial is unfair and unreasonable towards the accused persons. 13 years have passed since the offences are alleged to have been committed and the accused persons have sufficiently suffered on account of this delay. The Apex Court of the country has repeated again and again that if an accused is not tried speedily and his case remains pending before the Magistrate or before the Sessions Court for an unreasonable length of time, it is clear that his fundamental right of speedy trial is violated. The consequence of violation of fundamental right to speedy trial would be that the prosecution would be itself liable to be quashed on the ground that it is in the breach of the fundamental right. I am convinced that the present case is clearly covered by the law laid down by this Court in various judgments including that of Chhotelal Jain (supra) as well as by the Apex Court of the country.
(3.) CONSEQUENTLY, I find that it is a fit case in which the criminal proceedings be quashed in exercise of powers under section 482 Cr. P. C. It is ordered accordingly and the petition is allowed. .;