YADAV, J. - (1.) THE instant criminal miscellaneous petition under section 482 Cr. P. C has been filed against the order dated 3. 11. 1989 passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-cum-Civil Judge, Salumber in criminal case No. 618/89 by means of which cognizance has been taken against the petitioner under sections 409, 467 and 468 I. P. C. THE present petition has been filed by the accused petitioner Ravindra Nath @ Virendranath claiming speedy trial emanating from Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
(2.) THE facts giving rise to the claim to speedy trial by the accused petitioner briefly stated are as follows; It is alleged by the prosecution that on 25. 3. 1974, one Khubi Lal son of Shri Meghraj Sharma, resident of Udaipur , who was Assistant Engineer, Public Works Department, Salumber,filed a written report to the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Rishabhdeo, which was sent to the Police Station, Salumber, to the effect that one L. D. C. Ravindranath [accused-petitioner ] working in his office prepared feoged vouchers No. 1676 dated 10. 1. 1973, No. 2012 dated 27. 2. 1973, No. 130 dated 4. 5. 1973, No,683 dated 9. 10. 1973 and No. 68a dated 9. 10. 1973 for a total amount of Rs. 3381. 12 and after putting his forged signatures, withdrew the amount from the State Bank, Salumber, but he did not credit the same in the cash book of the office and put the same with himself. After receipt of the aforesaid information, a crime case No, 20/74 was registered against the petitioner under section 409, 467 and 468 I. P. C. and the police started investigation. The petitioner was arrested on 27. 3. 1974 and was enlarged on bail. During the investigation ,the statements of only few witnesses were recorded under section 161 Cr. P. C and the last statement is alleged to have been recorded on 10. 3. 1976 but then thereafter the investigation did not proceed at all. The learned Additional Munsiff and Judicial Magistrate-cum- Civil Judge, Salumber vide his order dated 4. 6. 1976 was not satisfied with the slow speed of investigation , therefore, he discharged the accused petitioner on the said date. It is strange to note that irrespective of the fact that the learned Magistrate, vide his order dated 4. 6. 1976 had arrived at a conclusion that since the investigation is not speedily proceeding for a long time and there is no fault of the accused petitioner in completing the investigation therefore, he discharged him, but for the reasons best known to learned Magistrate, after lapse of nine years, vide his order dated 19. 8. 1985 ordered for re-investigation against the accused petitioner. I am constrained to observe that after the order of re-investigation against the accused petitioner, the investigation agency remained idle and no further effective investigation was conducted and from the stage where it was left earlier and the accused was discharged by the court vide order dated 4. 6. 1976 on the same material in the garb of re-investigation challan was filed before the court by the prosecution agency on 3. 11. 1989 against the accused petitioner under sections 409,467 and 468 I. P. C.
(3.) ON the basis of the aforesaid challan submitted by the investigating agency, the learned Additinal Chief Judicial Magistrate-cum-Civil Judge Salumber vide his order dated 3. 11. 1989, took cognizance against the accused petitioner under sections 409, 467 and 468 I. P. C. From the aforesaid narration of facts, it is apparent on the face of record that in the present case, FIR was lodged against the accused petitioner on 25. 3. 1974, charge-sheet was filed against the accused petitioner before the court on 3. 11. 1989 and the cognizance was taken against the accused petitioner under sections 409, 467 and 468 I. P. C. on the same day by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-cum-Civil Judge, Salumber. I have heard the learned counsel for the accused petitioner as well as the learned public prosecutor at length. The learned counsel for the accused petitioner submitted that in the instant case, the prosecution was initiated against the petitioner on 25. 3. 1974 and now we are running in 1994. Thus, according to him, more than 20 years have elapsed, but the trial against the accused petitioner has not been completed for the offence under section 409, 467 and 468 I. P. C as such, the accused petitioner is entitled to get the benefit of speedy trial as contemplated under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The second submission of the learned counsel for the accused petitioner is that after submission of challan on the basis of reinvestigation, the learned Magistrate had taken cognizance on 3. 11. 1989, but up-till-now i. e 12. 1. 1994 only complete challan papers have been handed over to the counsel for the accused petitioner. The last submission of the learned counsel for the accused petitioner is that the instant case is a glaring case of negligence and inordinate delay on the part of prosecution to complete the trial against the accused petitioner under sections 409,467, and 468 I. P. C. In support of his aforesaid submission the learned counsel for the accused petitioner placed before me a decision of the apex court reported in Abdul Rehman Antulay V/s R. S. Nayak (1) and unreported decision in Ganga Ram V/s The State of Rajasthan (2) rendered by Hon'ble Rajesh Balia, J on 26. 08. 1993. The learned counsel for the accused petitioner has also invited my attention towards the unreporeted decision given by me on April 28, 1994 in Smt. Kesar and others V/s Smt. Anshumala The learned public prosecutor has refuted the aforesaid contentions raised on behalf of the accused petitioner and has submitted that the present case is not covered under the norms formulated by Hon'ble Supreme court in paragraph 54 in the case of Abdul Rehman Antulay [supra], therefore the benefit of speedy trial cannot be extended in the present case to the accused petitioner. The second submission of the learned public prosecutor is that in the aforesaid judgment rendered by the apex court, no outer limit is specified for extending the benefit of speedy trial. ;