MILAP CHANDRA JAIN, J. - (1.) THIS second appeal has been filed against the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge No. 3, Jodhpur dated February 1, 1993 by which the defendant's first appeal has been dismissed and the judgment of the learned Civil Judge, Jodhpur dated June 1, 1991, decreeing the suit for the recovery of arrears of rent and mesne profits and ejectment of the defendants has been confirmed.
(2.) THE facts of the case giving rise to this second appeal may be summarised thus. On September 27, 1982, the plaintiff-respondent filed a suit for the recovery of arrears of rent and memo profica and ejectment of the defendants with the allegations, in short, that his mother Mst. Chhota Devi let out the suit premises on monthly rent of Rs. 150/-, rent was paid by the defendants upto August 31, 1979 and his mother Chhota Devi has died on April 12, 1980. It has further been averred that the suit premises are reasonable and bonafide required by him for the resident of the members of his family. The defendants filed their written-statement admitting that the Government Upper Primary School is being run in it, it is on rent, rent has been paid @ Rs. 150/- per month upto August 31, 1979 and Mst. Chhota Devi died on April 12, 1980. It has also been averred that the plaintiff Narain Singh was repeatedly requested to produce succession certificate entitling him to recover rent from them but he failed to do so. The remaining averments have been denied. After framing necessary issues and recording the evidence of the parties, the trial court held that the defendants have committed default in payment of rent of more than six months, the suit premises is reasonably and bonafide required by the plaintiff for the residence of the members of his family which includes two married sons and one grown up son and accordingly decreed the suit. The appellate court confirmed these findings and dismissed the appeal. It has been contended by the learned Government Advocate that the lower courts have seriously erred to decree the suit without succession certificate. There is no force in this contention. Section 214, Indian Succession Act, 1975 runs as under :- "214. Proof of representative title a condition precedent to recovery through the Courts of debts from debtors of deceased persons. - (1) No Courts shall - (a) pass a decree against a debtor of a deceased person for payment of his debt to a person claiming on succession to be entitled to the effects of the deceased person or to any part thereof, or (b) proceed, upon an application of a person claiming to be so entitled, to execute against such a debtor a decree or order for the payment of his debt, except on the production by person so claiming of, (i) a probate or letters of administration evidencing the grant of him of administration to the estate of the deceased, or (ii) a certificate granted under Section 31 or Section 32 of the Administrator-General's Act, 1913, and having the debt mentioned therein, or (iii) a succession cerfificate granted under part X and having the debt specified therein, or (iv) a certificate granted under the Succession Certificate Act, 1889, or (v) a certificate granted under Bombay Regulation No. VIII of 1827, and, if granted after the first day of May, 1889, having the debt specified therein. 2. The word "debt" in sub-section (1) includes any debt except rent, revenue or profits payable in respect of land used for agricultural purposes." It is clear from the above quoted provisions that they are not applicable in suits in respect of ejectment or recovery of possession of immovable properties. It is also clear that these provisions apply to suit claiming amounts which were payable to the deceased and the same are claimed in the suits by the plaintiffs on the basis of succession. The rent of the suit premises accruing after the death of Mst. Chhota Devi was payable to the plaintiff in his own right as the adopted son of Mst. Chhota Devi. He became the owner of the suit premises after the death of Mst. Chhota Devi under Section 15, Hindu succession Act. The defendants have admitted in their letters Ex. 10 dated July 27, 1982 (also Ex. A/1), Ex. 9 dated August 14, 1982 and Ex. 11 dated July 27, 1982 that the plaintiff Narain Singh is the adopted son of their landlord Mst. Chhota Devi. When this fact was admitted by them, they were bound to pay the rent of the suit premises to him (Narain Singh) after the death of Mst. Chhota Devi. It is not in dispute that the rent from the month of May, 1980 was not paid by the defendant to the plaintiff Narain Singh and the suit was filed on September 27, 1982. Both the lower courts have correctly held that the defendants have committed default in payment of rent of more than six months. It may also be mentioned are that by order dated April 1, 1983, rent was determined under section 13(3), Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter to be called 'the Act'). There is nothing on the record to indicated that the amount so determined was deposited in the court or paid to the plaintiff.
(3.) IT was next contended by the learned Government Advocate that both the lower courts have seriously erred to hold that the suit premises is reasonably and bonafide required by the plaintiff for the residence of the members of his family. This contention has no force. Both the lower courts have rightly held that the suit premises is reasonably and bonafide required by the plaintiff for the residence of his family consisting of 3 married sons and that children besides the plaintiff and his wife particularly when the present accommodation at the disposal of the plaintiff is one room and one 'ora' only. It is a finding of fact. It is not open to challenge in second appeal. Reference of Mattulal v. Radhe Lal, AIR 1974 SC 1596, Bhairab Chandra Nandan v. Randhir Chandra Dutta, 1988(1) RCR 48(Cal.) : AIR 1988 SC 396, Pal Singh v. Sunder Singh, 1989(2) RCR 331 (SC) : AIR 1989 SC 396 and E. Mehboob Saheb v. N. Subbarayan Choudhary, AIR 1982 SC 679 may be made here. It has also been held in Ranappa v. Bajjappa, AIR 1963 SC 1633 that sufficiency or adequacy of evidence to support a finding of fact cannot be a ground for interference in second appeal. Gross error cannot also be a ground for interference. Reference of Shanker Gopinath Apthe v. Gangabai, AIR 1976 SC 2507 may be made here.;