JAIN, J. - (1.) THIS miscellaneous appeal has been filed against the order of the learned Additional District Judge No. 1, Udaipur dated October 25,1993 by which he has allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment of the learned Additional Civil Judge No. 3, Udaipur dated November 9, 1989, decreeing the suit for arrears of rent @ Rs. 165/- per month with effect from October 15,1975 with interest @ 6% p. a. and directing the adjustment of the amounts deposited in the court and the amount of Rs. 16,439. 05 spent in construction by the defendant-appellants.
(2.) THE facts of the case giving rise to this appeal may be summarised thus. On October 4, 1977, the plaintiff-respondent filed a suit for the recovery of arrears of rent and ejectment against the defendant in respect of the suit shop situated in the town of Salumbar (Udaipur) with the averments, in short, that the suit shop is in possession and tenancy of the defendants on monthly rent of Rs 265/-, they have not paid rent from October 15, 1975, their tenancy has been terminated by means of a registered notice of ejectment and the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act,1950 (hereinafter called the 'act') is not applicable. In their joint written statement, the defendants admit that suit shop is in their possession and tenancy and notice of ejectment has been received by the defendant No. 2 Ganga Ram. THEy denied that the agreed rent was @ Rs. 265/- per month but say that it was @ Rs. 165/- per month only. THEy have further averred that it was agreed in between the parties that the rooms would be constructed on the open land annexed to the suit shop on its back side, amount required in construction would be spent by the defendants and would be adjusted towards the rent and accordingly rooms were constructed by the defendants and rent was not paid. After the receipt of the notice, demand was raised for the balance of the amount spent in construction after adjusting towards the rent acctued so far. In his replication, the plaintiff has averred that amount was spent by him for raising construction behind the suit shop and it was agreed in between the parties that the rent would be payable at the enhanced rate of Rs. 265/- per month w. e. f. October 15, 1975. It was never agreed that the construction would be raised by the defendants and the amount spent would be adjusted towards rent. The trial court framed the following four issues: K;K oKn ifjlj fnuKad 15-10-75 esa :ih;K 265@& izfreKg fdjK;s ij gs\ 2 vK;K izfroKnhx. K us fnuKad 15-10-75 ls oKn ifjlj ds fdjK;K lanr ugha fd;K\ 3 vK;K izfroKn i= dh pj. K la[;K 4 esa of. Kzr dh HKKfr izfroKnhx. K us :ih;K 16]439-05 oKn ifjlj ds fueKz. K esa O;; fd;K] o O;;fur jde ds ,ot leK;Kstu djK iKus ds vf/KdKjh gsa 4 izfrdKja** After recording the evidence of the parties and hearing them, the trial court held that the rent was not enhanced from Rs. 165/- per month to Rs. 265/. Rs. 16,439. 05 were spent by the defendants for raising construction behind the suit shop and rent was not paid as the same was to be adjusted towards the amount spent in construction. It decreed the suit as said above. The plaintiff-appellant filed appeal in the court of the District Judge. It was heard by the Additional District Judge No. 1, Udaipur. He set aside the judgement and remanded the case to the trial court as said above by his judgement dated October 25, 1993. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the learned Additional District Judge No. 1, Udaipur has seriously erred to allow the amendment of the plaint totally ignoring the fact of delay in moving the amendment application and the established law that court has no power to allow an amendment of plaint to include a cause of action which accrued after its institution. After the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court given in V. Dhanpal Chattiar V. Yeshodai Ammal (1), cause of action for filing a suit for ejectment is not termination of tenancy but it is the accrual of the ground of ejectment and as such Prem Lal V. Jadav Chand (2), overruling Rajeshwar Dayal V. Padam Kumar Kothari (3), is no more a good law as has been held in Lallu Narayan V. Ratan Chand Lunia (4) He also contended that the learned appellate court has seriously erred to set aside the judgement and decree of the trial court in toto and to remand the case wholesome without recording any contrary finding on any issue.
(3.) IN reply, it has been contended by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent that the learned appellate court has rightly allowed the application for the amendment of the plaint as the need of the suit premises has arisen in the year 1992 and to avoid multiplicity of suit and technicalities. He placed reliance on Raj. Narayan V. INdira Gandhi, He also contended that the findings of the trial court on the issues No. 1 and 3 were perverse and they should have been set aside. He contended that it is the case of the defendant himself that the rent was earlier enhanced from Rs. 100/- to Rs. 133/- when adjacent smaller shop was also let out to him by the plaintiff, it seemed highly improbable that rent was not enhanced when sufficient additional accommodation after construction was provided particularly when the Act was not applicable in Salumbar. He lastly contended that the trial court and appellate court did not at all consider as to why the plaintiff-respondent would have agreed for the adjustment of the entire amount spent in construction towards the rent without any gain to him in any way and it is highly improbable that the rent was to remain the same i. e. Rs. 165/- even after the adjustment of Rs. 16,439. 05. The reported decisions, relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants, are not applicable in this case. Admittedly, the suit was filed on October 4, 1977. It is clearly stated in para no. ' 8' of the plaint that the Act is not applicable to the suit premises. In the corresponding para no. 8 of the written statement, it has been stated that this para involves legal question, no reply is needed and the court may consider it. Para No. 2 of memo of anise. appeal filed in this Court states "that a look at the plaint would show that the suit for eviction was filed by the respondent on the ground of termination of tenancy as the defendant had committed breach of the terms of the tenancy by committing default in payment of rent. However, after the Rent Control Act becoming applicable to the area the grounds of eviction were added". The suit peremises are situated in the town of Salumber. By Government Notification No. F. l (6) (3) Home/v (77) dated May 18, 1979, the provisions of Sections 5 to 26 of the Act were extended to all the Municipal townes in Rajasthan w. e. f. May 18, 1979. It is thus clear that when the suit was filed on October 4, 1977, the Act was not applicable to the suit premises. As such V. Dhanpal Chattiar V. Yeshodai Ammal (Supra), had no application in this case and the laaw laid down in Prem Lal V. Jadav Chand (Supra), would be still applicable in the present case, laying down that grounds in Section 13 of the Act do not form cause of action. There is yet another aspect of the matter. It is well settled law that as far as possible courts must avoid multiplicity of litigation and shorten it. It has been observed in famous case of K. Banerjee V. Anita Pan, (6) at pages 1156 and 1157 paras 28, 29, 30 and 31, as follows :- " 28. A just resolutibn of the complex of this complex situation was put by us to counsel on both sides and the learned Advocate representing the State readily agreed that the policy of the Legislation and the conditions in the Amendment Act would be fulfilled if the interpretation we proposed were to be accepted. We are satisfied that as far as possible courts must avoid multiplicity of litigation. Any interpretation of a statute which will ,obviate purposeless proliferation of litigation, without whittling down the effectiveness of the protection for the parties sought to be helped by the legislation, should be preferred to any literal, pedantic, legalistic or technically correct alternative. On this footing we are prepared to interpret section 13 of the Amendment Act and give effect to s. 4 of that Act. How do we work it out? We do it by directing the plaintiffs in the two cases to file fresh pleadings setting out their grounds under els. (f) and/or (ff) of sub-s (1) if they so, wish. On such pleading being filed we may legitimately hold that the transferee landlord institutes his suit on grounds mentioned in cls. (f) or (ff) of sub-sec. (1) on that date. It is only when he puts in such a pleading setting out the specific ground covered by sub-sec. (3a) of Sec. 13 that we can say he has begun or instituted a suit for the recovery of possession of the premises on that ground. Institution of a suit earlier has to be ignored for this purpose since that was not based on grounds covered by cls. (f) and/or (ff) and is not attracted by sub-section (3a ). He begins proceedings on these new grounds only when he puts in his pleading setting out these grounds. In spirit and in letter he institutes his suit for recovery on the new grounds only on the date on which he puts in his new pleading. We cannot be ritualistic in insisting that a return of the plaint and a representation thereof incorporating amendments is the sacred requirement of the law. On the other hand social justice and the substance of the matter find fulfilment when the fresh pleadings are put in, subject of course to the three-year interval between the transfer and the filing of the additional pleading. Section 13 of the Amendment Act speaks of suits including appeals. It thus follows that these fresh pleadings can be put in by the plaintiff either in the suit, if that is pending, or in appeal or second appeal, if that is pending. Thereupon the opposite party, tenant, will be given an opportunity to file his written statement and the Court will dispose of it after evidence both sides the right to lead additional evidence. It may certainly be open to the appellate Court either to take evidence directly or to call for a finding. Expeditious disposal of the belated litigation will undoubtedly be a consideration with the court in exercising this discretion. The proviso to sub-sec. (3a) can also be complied with if the plaintiff gets the permission of the Rent Controller in the manner laid sown therein before filing his fresh pleading. 29. We are conscious that to shorten litigation we are straining language to the little extent of interpreting the expression "institution of the suit' as amounting to filing of fresh pleading. By this construction we do not violence to language but, on the other hand, promote public justice and social gain, without in the peast imperilling the protection conferred by the Amendment Act. 30. Ruinous protraction of litigation, whoever may temporarily seem to benefit by delay, bankrupts both in the end and inflicts wounds on society by sterile misuse of money. Tenant passengers who prolong their expensive flight on the litigation rocket, are buying tickets for financial crash, drugged though they be by the seeming blessings of law's delays. Courts, by interpreting the expression "institution of suits' cannot authorise reincarnation, all over again, of litigation for eviction. We save the tenant by applying it to pending cases and save him also from litigative waste. 31. This consideration is itself germane to the larger concept of justice which it is the duty of Courts to promote. Law finds its finest hour when it speaks to justice in on fair terms. In the present case our interpretative endeavour has been imbude with this spirit. In the process of interpretation where alternatives are possible, the man in the law influences the law in the man may be and the construction on Ss. 4 and 13 of the Amendment Act herein adopted, we admit, appeals to us as humane. The calculus of statutory construction relating to complex problems of the community cannot be hide-bound for orthodox text book canons. " ;