- (1.) The petitioner has sought the review of the order dated 30-8-1993, passed by this Court, on the ground that at the time of argument in the writ petition, his counsel could not point-out the important provisions of law on the subject, which have a material bearing on the question, which has resulted in failure of justice. The order has, also, been sought to be reviewed on the ground that the relevant case-law on the subject, laid down by the Supreme Court as well as the High Court, could not be brought to the notice of the Court which have a binding nature.
(2.) It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that a combined reading of the Statutes 9B and 7 makes it clear that the Academic Council requires jurisdiction to legislation the subject only when there is a recommendation of the Equivallence Committee and the Statutes are always subject to the provisions of the Act and the Ordinances are subject to the Act and the Statutes and, therefore, the Statutes override the Ordinance because the Ordinances are promulgated under Sections 23 and 24 and as these relevant provisions could not be brought to the notice of the Court at the time of deciding the writ petition, the controversy in the matter could not be properly adjudicated. It has, also been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner passed the concerned examination with four subjects from the concerned Institute, which was recognised by the respondents at the time when the petitioner took admission, which is clear from Annexure. 1 and when at the time of taking the admission the recognition was accorded to the (sic) the withdrawal of the recognition later on by the respondents will not disentitle the petitioner from being admitted in the course. In support of its contention, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance over the judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in: Suresh Pal v. State of Haryana, 1987 (2) SCC 445. It is, also, contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that at the time of arguments, the Resolution dated 3-41993, was placed on record and as the petitioner had not seen the Resolution earlier, he could not make the submission in right perspective which amounts to discovery of new document and, therefore, the law relating to the point could not be brought to the notice of the Court. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the Court is not precluded from recalling or reviewing its order if it is satisfied that it is necessary to do so in order to give justice to the parties concerned and to avoid the abuse of the process of the Court. 2A. In support of its contention, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance over: Gulam lbbas v, Adbul Kaddar (deceased) through his executors, 1970 (3) SCC 643, O. N. Mohindroo v. The District Judge, Delhi, AIR 1971 SC 107, M/s. Northen India Catering (India) v. Lt. Governor of Delhi, AIR 1980 SC 674: (1980 Tax LR 1657) the State of Rajasthan v. Mehta Chetan Das Kishan Das, 1980 WLN 13 Durga Singh v. The State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1991 HP 1 and S. Nagaraj v. The State of Karnataka, 1993 (5) JT 27. I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties.
(3.) The writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is founded on equity and if the Court finds that the order was passed under a mistake which has resulted in miscarriage of justice then the Courts are not precluded from rectifying its own mistake and can review its own order. It is the constitutional obligation on the Courts to set its mistake right by recalling or reviewing its earlier order which was passed on account of some mistake, but while reviewing the order the Court must, also, not overlook the fact that the decision, once given by the Court, is final and normally it should not be set at naught by the same Court but the Court can correct the accidental mistake or miscarriage of justice. Finality of the judgment will not be reconsidered where an error has been committed in a judicial decision. While exercising the power for reviewing a judgment the Court must not overlook the fact and the finality of the judgment, delivered by the Court, should not be re-considered unless there is a glaring mistake or omission crept-in in the earlier order. The powers of review cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case and the judgment should not be reviewed merely on the asking of the party when there is no error apparent on the face of the record.;