- (1.) Civil Revision No. 53/1985, was decided by this Court vide its order dated 16-10-1984. Against this order, the petitioner filed a Review Application No. 62/89. That was listed for admission on 9-4-1993. None was present on behalf of petitioner and under these circumstances, the review application was dismissed in default. Later on the petitioner filed an application for restoring the said review application to its original number on the ground that on 9-4-1994, the Advocates were on strike and as such the counsel for the petitioner could not attend the Court. The absence of the counsel for the petitioner was neither deliberate nor intentional. The petitioner should not suffer on account of absence of his counsel. Counsel for the petitioner submits that on account of resolution passed by the Bar Association, he could not attend the Court on 9-4-1993, when the case was called for admission. This was sufficient reason for his absence and under these circumstances, the order dated 9-41993, dismissing the review-application in default deserves to be recalled. In support of his arguments, counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on AIR 1981 SC 1400 (Rafiq v. Munshi Lal), 1994 (1) WLC 383 (Raj) (Shyam Das v. Praveen Kumar) and another case of this Court passed in Civil Restoration Application No. 219/1993, Prahlad Kumar Pareek v. Rajasthan Co-operative Dairy Federation Ltd., Jaipur, decided on 4-3-1994.
(2.) I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner. The judgments cited by the counsel for petitioner and reported in AIR 1981 SC 1400 and 1994 (1) WLC 383 (Raj) (supra) are totally distinguishable and are not relevant to the facts of the present case. The judgment passed by this Court in Prahlad Kumar's case (supra) is though relevant but in this case the learned single Judge did not consider the judgment passed by Division Bench of this Court in Hari Ram Sharma v. Rajasthan State Electricity Board, reported in (1992) 1 Rajasthan LR 523. In this case, D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) No. 411 of 1991 and D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2928/89 were dismissed in default on 16-9-1991, as the counsel engaged in the aforesaid cases did not appear in the Court on account of strike when the cases were called for hearing. Later on, restoration applications were submitted before this Court and this Court rejected the restoration applications. Para No. 5 of the judgment reads as below :- "5. The question that arises for decision is as to whether the lawyers can be allowed to hold the courts at ransom and put their working out of gear by taking a decision to boycott the courts at any time according to their wishes and convenience without caring for their duty not only towards the courts but also towards the clients who had engaged them and whether such absence on their part at the time of hearing of cases can be considered to be a sufficient cause for restoration of the matters dismissed in default. Our answer to this question is early in the negative."
(3.) Similar view was taken by this Court in Maula Bux (deceased) represented by his L.Rs. v. Sohan Lal, reported in (1991) 1 Rajasthan LR 616, in which it has been held as under :- "It has been contended that the applicant cannot be made to suffer due to the fault of his lawyers and, as such, the appeal should be restored. Reliance has been placed on the decisions of the Hon. Supreme Court in cases Rafiq v. Munshi Lal and Smt. Lachhi Tiwari v. Director of Land Records, reported in AIR 1981 SC 1400 and AIR 1984 SC 41, I have gone through the said authorities. They are the authorities on their own facts and in these cases the Hon. Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the appellants concerned had done all that was required to be done for being represented and should not be made to suffer for the fault of their lawyers. The above said authorities do not lay down that the matters dismissed in default should be restored as a matter of course to give liberty to the parties or their Advocates to appear or not to appear in the Court according to their wish, desire and convenience. If this interpretation is given to the above said authorities it would mean that the parties and their learned counsel can put the working of the court out of gear at any time and, in my view, no such intention can be impugned to the Hon. Supreme Court." ;