B.R. Arora, J. - (1.) This case has come-up on an application under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, filed on behalf of the petitioner.
(2.) The petitioner-complainant filed this revision petition against the judgment dated 30-8-89, passed by the Munsif and Judicial Magistrate, First Class. Gulabpura, by which the learned Magistrate, who tried accused Shiv Dutt for the offence under Section 408 IPC, acquitted him of this offence and, also, observed that it is only on account of negligence on the part of the bank Auditors and the Investigating Officer that the accused could not be convicted and has to be acquitted. It was, also, observed that the case was not properly presented by the prosecution during the trial and, therefore, the charge against the accused could not be proved. The learned Magistrate, also, directed that the copies of the judgment be sent to the Secretary, Bhumi Vikas Bank, Bhilwara, the District Superintendent of Police, Bhilwara, and to the Director, Prosecution, Rajasthan, Jaipur. After filing of the revision petition against the order of acquittal, the Office pointed out that the revision petition has been filed after 173 days of delivering the judgment of acquittal and it is, therefore, barred by eighty-three days. Along with the revision petition, an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was also, filed. It was alleged in the application that the copy of the judgment was received by the petitioner on 6-11-89, and thereafter the matter was processed in the bank and the consultations were got done, necessary sanction was obtained from the Board of Directors and immediately thereafter, without any further loss of time, the revision petition was filed in the Court. It was, also, stated in the application that there is no deliberate delay on the part of the bank and by causing delay, the petitioner did not stand to gain anything and, therefore, the. delay in, filing the revision petition may be condoned. Notices of this application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act were issued to the accused-respondent, who filed the reply to the application and stated therein that there is no provision in the law which requires that the copy of the judgment should be sent to the complainant. it has, also, been stated in the .reply that the petitioner bank applied for the certified copy of the judgment and obtained the same but has not filed the same along with the revision petition and has filed a copy which was received by the bank in pursuance to the directions issued by the Court. It has, also, been stated that no sufficient cause has been shown by the petitioner for condonation of the delay in filing the revision petition.
(3.) It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that though the judgment was passed on 30-8-89 but the copy of this judgment was received by the petitioner only on 6-11-89, and thereafter steps were taken, the matter was processed in the Office and after obtaining the sanction, the revision petition was filed in the Court on 19-2-90, and there is only delay of fifteen days in filing the revision petition and not that of eighty-three days, as pointed out by the Office. It has further been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that it is not necessary for the petitioner to explain each and every days delay and the Court should adopt a liberal approach in condoning the delay and the delay in the present case has not occasioned on account of any deliberate or mala fide act on the part of the Officers of the Bank and the petitioner is not going to earn anything by this delay. It was. therefore, prayed, that the delay in filing the revision petition may be condoned and it may be treated as filed within the time. In support of its contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance over: Naubat Ram Sharma v. The Additional District Judge II, Moradabad, AIR 1987 SC 1352. It has, also, been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the delay in filing the revision petition will not come in the way of the petitioner as the Court suo motu can call for the record and exercise its power of revision under Section 397 Cr. PC. The learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, has submitted that no sufficient cause has been shown by the petitioner for condoning the delay and the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, therefore, deserves to be quashed and set aside. It is, also, contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that no case for suo moto exercise of the power by the Court is made out and, therefore, the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act as well as the revision petition itself, therefore, deserve to be quashed and set aside.;