SHINGHAL, J. - (1.) THIS revision petition of the defendants is directed against the finding of Additional Munsiff No. 2, Bhilwara, dated May 22, 1973, by which he rejected their plea regarding mis-joindar of parties and causes of action. The controversy centres round the following facts.
(2.) ONE Lal Mohammad, who is not a partv to this case, was the owner of a plot of land which he let out to the defendants on a rent of Rs. 50/- per mensem, with effect from October 1, 1968. The four plaintiffs (who joined in the suit) alleged that the said Lal Mohammad sold four different portions of that plot to them, by four separate sale-deeds dated April, 1, 1971, and asked the defendants, by a registered notice dated April 7, 1971, to attorn to them. The plaintiffs thereafter instituted the suit, which has given rise to the present petition, on August 3, 1971, for the eviction of the defendants, on the ground that they required their respective portions of the plot for their reasonable and bonafide use. They also prayed for the recovery of Rs. 150/-on account of arrears of rent, for a period of three months, and damages. The defendants raised a number of pleas one of which was a plea relating to mis-joinder of parties and causes of action which gave rise to issue No. 8. As that issue has been found by the trial court against the defendants, they have approached this court by why of the present revision petition. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the learned Munsiff has acted illegally in the exercise of his jurisdiction in deciding issue No. 8 against the petitioners by his impugned order dated May 22, 1973, because the suit suffered from the defect of mis-joinder of causes of action within the meaning of Order II rule 3 C. P. C. Reference in this connection has been made to the decisions in Hadu Sahu vs. State of Orissa (l), Haru Bapari vs. Roy Kahitish Bhusan Roy Bahadur (2), and Mansukh Lal Dhanji Vora vs. Jupiter Airways Ltd. (3 ). As has been stated, four persons have joined in this suit as plaintiffs and the question at the threshold is whether that could be said to be permissible? Rule 1 of O. 1, I. P. C. , which deals with the question of joinder of plaintiffs, provides as follows: "all persons may be joined in one suit as plaintiffs in whom any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same act or transaction or series of acts or transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally or in the alternative, where, if such persons brought separate suits, any common question of law or fact would arise. " Before any persons may join as plaintiffs, it is thus necessary that a relief in respect of or arising out of the "same act" or "transaction or series of acts or transaction" should be alleged to exist. This requirement has obviously been fulfilled in the present case as the "same act" is that relating to the lease of the premises by Lal Mahammad, to the defendants, on October 1, 1968, on a rent of Rs 50/- per mensem. The relief which the plaintiffs have claimed, jointly, against the defendants thus arises out of that basic fact, not only in regard to that part of the suit which relates to the recovery of the arrears of rent and damages, but also the other part relating to eviction from the suit premises. One essential requirement of Order I rule 1 C. P. C. has therefore been fulfilled in this case. According to the other requirement of the rule, joinder of plaintiffs would be permissible if it could be shown that "any common question of law or fact" would arise if they brought their suits separately. It is quite obvious in this case that the common questions of fact which would arise on the filing of separate suits would be those relating to the existence of the tenancy granted by Lal Mohammad and the non-payment of rent by the defendants at the rate of Rs. 50/- per mensem. It is therefore clear that both the essential requirements of Order I rule 1 C. P. C. have been fulfilled and there is no reason why the four plaintiffs should not have joined in their suit against the defendants. I am fortified in this view by the decision in Sitaram Agarwalla vs. Rajendra chandrapal (4), which has been noticed in Shambhoo Dayal vs. Chandra Kali Devi (5 ). The question, nonetheless, remains whether joinder of causes of action could be said to be permissible on fulfilment of the requirement of Order I rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure? Rule 3 (1) of Order II bears on the point and provides as follows: "3. Joinder of causes of action - (1) Save as otherwise provided, a plaintiff may unite in the same suit several causes of action against the same defendant, or the same defendants jointly; and any plaintiffs having causes of action in which they are jointly interested against the same defendant or the same defendants jointly may unite such causes of action in the same unit. " It has been urged by Mr. Mathur, on behalf of the non-petitioners, that Order I rule 2 C. P. C. applies to question of joinder of parties as also of causes of action, and he has supported his argument by a reference to Ramendra Nath Ray vs. Brojendra Nath Dass (6 ). It has been observed by Mookerjee J. in that case that order I rule 1 C. P. C. applies to the question of joinder of parties as also of causes of action and in taking that view the learned Judge did not feel pressed by the phrase "save as otherwise provided" occurring in Order II rule 3 (1 ). That view has been followed in Monindra Lal Chatterjee vs. Hari Pada Ghose (7) which has been approved by this court in Thakurji Shriji vs. Jagannath Das (8 ). It may also be mentioned that the same view has been noticed and approved in Shew Narayan Singh vs. Brahmanand Singh (9 ). I have therefore no hesitation in taking the view that as the suit conforms to the requirements of Order I rule 1 C. P. C. that by itself is quite sufficient to justify he finding of the trial court against the defendants on the issue under consideration. I have gone through Madu Sahu vs. State of Orissa (l) on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners. In that case, no common question of fact or law was involved, so that it could not be said that the requirement of O. 1, r. 1 C. P. C. was complied with. I have gone through Haru Bepari vs. Roy Kahitish Bhusan Roy Bahadur (2) also, but it cannot avail the defendants because it has been held there that the conditions which rendered the joinder of several plaintiffs permissible under O. 1 r. 1 C. P. C. do not necessarily imply that there can be only one cause of action in the suit in which the several plaintiffs join. Mansukhlal Dhanji Vora vs. Jupiter Airways Ltd. (3) was quite a different case which depended on different facts and different conduct of parties where the fact of each case required a different approach and analysis. It could not therefore be said to be a case in accordance with the provisions of Order 1, rule 1, C. P. C. For the reasons mentioned above, there is no force in the first argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners. It has next been argued that the learned Munsiff failed to take notice of the provisions of 0. 11 r. 6 C. P. C. provides that where it appears to the court that any causes of action joined in one suit cannot be conveniently tried or disposed of together, the court may order separate trials or make such other order as may be expedient. Reference in this connection has been made to the decisions in Haridas Narayandas Koshti vs. Jagennath Das (10) and Hardwarilal etc. vs. Naraindas (ll ). There is a two-fold answer to this argument. Firstly, the question of convenience in the trial or disposal of the suit was not raised in the court below, and is apparently an afterthought. Secondly, even if it is assumed that the trial court did not follow the provisions O. II r. 6 C. P. C. this court cannot be expected to interfere with that discretion. This is the view taken in Hardwarilal etc. vs. Naraindas etc. (11) and in Haru Bepari vs. Roy Kehitish Bhussn Roy Bahadur (2), on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners. As I do not find any force in this revision petition, it is dismissed with costs. The parties are directed to appear in the trial court on August 25, 1974. . ;