LODHA, J. - (1.) THIS is a defendant-tenant's second appeal arising out of a suit for ejectment from bungalow No. B-6 situated in the campus of the Mayo College, Ajmer and also for arrears of rent and future rent mesne profits as also for water charges.
(2.) THE plaintiff, Secretary, Mayo College, General Council, Ajmer, filed the suit on 4th September, 1967 alleging that by resolution No. 14 dated 25th February, 1967 the General Council had decided to start a Preparatory School, and also to take steps to get the Staff Quarters at Alwar Gate, Ajmer, vacated from the present occupants for the said purpose. It was alleged that the bungalow No. B-6, which was in occupation of the defendant, as tenant of the plaintiff, was reasonably and bona fide required for educational purposes by the plantiff. Besides the agreed rent at the rate of Rs. 75/- per month, water charges at the rate of Rs. 8/- per month were also claimed. So far as the claim for rent is concerned, there is no dispute. THE two points of dispute between the parties are: (1) that the premises are not required reasonably and bona fide by the plaintiff and in any case, under the law, the plaintiff in not entitled to get a decree for ejectment; and (2) that the plaintiff is not entitled to get any decree for water charges. After recording the evidence produced by the parties, the learned Munsiff, Ajmer City (East), Ajmer, by his judgment dated April 13, 1971, decreed the plaintiff's suit and the appeal filed by the defendant was dismissed by the Additional Civil Judge, Ajmer. Hence, this second appeal. So far as the water charges at the rate of Rs. 8/- per month are concerned, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that looking to the petty amount, he would not oppose the appellant's request for setting aside the decree for water charges at the rate of Rs. 8/- per month. The question of requirement of the premises in question by the landlord has been argued on behalf of the appellant, mainly from two points of view. It has been urged in the first instance that the plaintiff has failed to establish reasonable and bona fide requirement for the premises in question and then it has been argued that the requirement pleaded by the plaintiff does not fall within the four corners of sec. 13 (1) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950, which will hereinafter referred to as the Act; and, therefore, no decree for ejectment can be passed. At this stage, I may deal with the application filed by the appellant under O. 41 R 27, C. P. C. dated Jannuary 27, 1974, wherein it has been prayed that the respondent may be directed to admit or deny the facts stated in the Memorandum of Appeal, and in case of denial of any of the facts stated therein, the appellant may be permitted to adduce evidence to establish the facts alleged. In my opinion, this application has no merit. It does not satisfy any of the requirements of O. 41 R. 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the prayer made therein is of a very unusual type. It is not open to any of the parties at the stage of second appeal to make fresh allegation of fact in the Memo of Appeal, and call upon the opposite party to admit or deny the same. In this connection, I may also state that the appellant has filed three affidavits making some fresh allegations of fact, and the respondents have also submitted counter affidavit in reply. I do not feel inclined to admit these affidavits in evidence at this stage, and would confine myself only to the evidence which was produced by the parties in the trial Court. Learned counsel for the appellant has urged that in the notice of ejectment Ex. A/1, dated 26th August, 1965 the plaintiff called upon the defendant to pay increased rent for the premises in question, and after two years having not succeeded in persuading the defendant to pay increased rent, the plaintiff hit upon the plan of making out a case for the necessity of the premises in question for Preparatory School and served another notice dated 25th July, 1967 (Ex. 4) calling upon the defendant to vacate the premises in question. In this connection, it has also been submitted that Resolution No. 14 dated 25th February, 1967 (Ex. 2) is highly vague, and has been manoeuvred and anipulated to make out a case of need for the College. It has also been argued that there is no provision for running a Preparatory School for boys below 9 years in the Prospectus of the Mayo College, Ajmer and that the Mamoran-dum of Association, which was registered under the Societies Registration Act had not been amended or altered so as to make provision for running a Preparatory School for boys below 9 years. It is submitted that the scheme, Ex. 3, for running of a Preparatory School has also been framed after filing of the suit. Lastly, it is argued that the oral evidence led by the plantiff does not establish the alleged need for the premises in question. It is contended that the need, if any, had disappeared during the pendency of this litigation. In support of his contention, learned counsel has placed reliance on Neta Ram vs. Jiwanlal (l), Bhagwandas vs. L. Pyarelal (2), Shah Bhoj Raj Murarji Oil Mills and Ginning Factory vs. Subhash Chandra Yograj Sinha (3); and Govind Ram vs. Abdul Wahab (4 ).
(3.) IT is true that in the notice Ex. A/1 of 1965 the plaintiff has called upon the defendant to pay enhanced rent from 1st October, 1965 at the rate of Rs. 1112. 50 per month. However, from this fact alone, it cannot be inferred, unless there are strong circumstances pointing to the contrary that in 1967 the authorities concerned manoeuvred and manipulated the scheme for the sole purpose of ousting the defendant. There is no denying the fact that the Resolution dated 25th February, 1967 (Ex. 2) was passed by the General Council of the Mayo College, Ajmer. This resolution was pleaded in para No. 2 of the plaint. The defendant pleaded want of knowledge and put the plaintiff to proof and pleaded in the alternative that even if such a resolution had been passed, it was against the interest of the college. PW1 Nand Kishore. who is the Estate Officer of the Mayo College, Ajmer, has stated that the Mayo College, Ajmer, General Council is a registered body and that the Resolution has been passed by the General Council for starting a Preparatory School. PW 2 Shantilal brought the original minute book of the Mayo College, General Council, Ajmer, and stated that Resolution No. 14 dated 25th February, 1967 was contained in it, and the same had been signed by Bhim Singh, and STM Gibson, with whose signatures he is acquainted. No evidence has been led by the defendant on this point. IT must, therefore be accepted that the resolution Ex. 2 is a genuine document. Another argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that starting of a Preparatory School for boys below the age of 9 years fell outside the aims of the institution as contained in the prospectus, is also untenable, inasmuch as, there is no prohibition even in the prospectus regarding running a Preparatory School. What has been mentioned regarding the aims, in the Prospectus of Mayo College, Ajmer, of July, 1968 is: "the aim is to provide a thorough general education from the age of 9 to 17 years. " In the first place the aims, as mentioned in the prospectus do not constitute the objects of the Society and, therefore, there was no question for getting the Memorandum of Association amended under the provisions of the Societies Registration Act. The object of the institution was obviously to provide educational facilities and, therefore, if in the scheme, as framed in pursuance of the resolution, it was mentioned that boys to the Preparatory School would be admitted from the age of 6 years onwards upto 10, it cannot be said that the society namely, the plaintiff, had committed any illegality. Be that as it may, so far as the defendant is concerned, it is not his concern how far the Society has kept up or transgressed the aims and objects with which it was formed. All that he is concerned is whether the requirement pleaded by the plaintiff is genuine, reasonable and bona fide. I am, therefore, of the opinion that passing the resolution for starting a Preparatory School and framing a scheme in pursuance of it cannot be said to be beyond the scope of the aims and objects of the plaintiff society. Now, it may be noted that the allegation in the plaint is that the premises in the defendant's occupation are required reasonably and bona fide by the plaintiff for educational purposes and for providing residential accommodation to the students and the staff of the Preparatory School. The Resolution Ex. 2 provides that the principal be directed to draw at once a scheme for a new Preparatory School which would use the existing Staff Quarters near Alwar Gate as dormitories, messes, class-rooms and for housing the Preparatory School itself. In the scheme Ex. 3 prepared in pursuance of the resolution, details of the Preparatory School had been worked out and it is provided therein that in the various classes proposed to be started for Preparatory School, boys of the age group from 6 to 10 years have been included. In the prospectus, under the head "aims" it has been mentioned that the aim was to provide thorough general education from the age of 9 to 17 years. An argument is sought to be raised for the first time in this Court without laying any foundation for the same and without there being any material in support of it that there was no necessity for providing education to boys above nine years in the Preparatory School. If the authorities concerned while preparing the scheme thought it fit of making a particular group of students to be taught in the Preparatory Section of the school, it cannot be said that the scheme is fake, or that the accommodation, as pleaded by the plaintiff, would not be required on account of this grouping. ;