LODHA, J. - (1.) -
(2.) THIS is an appeal by the State of Rajasthan from the judgment and decree passed by the Senior Civil Judge, Bundi dated 27th September, 1966, by which the learned Judge set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court and decreed the plaintiff-respondents' suit for Rs. 1,500/-. The plaintiff-respondents used to perform 'Sewa Puja' of the idol of Jagan-nathji Maharaj installed in the temple of puri and in lieu of that the former State of Kota granted Muafi land to the ancestors of the plaintiff-respondents. The land granted in Muafi, however, was resumed by the former State of Kota on 9-10-47 and an annual cash grant of Rs 500/- was made in its place. The plaintiffs' case is that they performed the 'Seva Puja' of the idol by burning oil lamp and offering 'Prashad' to the deity for three years (1956-57, 1957-58 and 1958-59), but they were not paid the amount for these years, which comes to Rs. 1,500/. They, therefore, brought the present suit for recovery of Rs. 1,500/-against the State of Rajasthan, which is the successor of the former State of Kota. The claim was denied by the State of Rajasthan, which pleaded inter alia that the suit was not maintainable. The trial court dismissed the suit and, as already stated above, on appeal by the plaintiff, the learned Senior Civil Judge, Bundi decreed the claim as prayed. Hence this second appeal. The only point canvassed before me is whether the suit is maintainable? The contention raised on behalf of the appellant is that the claim is for grant of money made by the ruler of the conventing State, for charitable or religious purposes for which no suit can lie under the provisions of the Rajasthan Pensions Act, 1958 (Act No. 27 of 1957) (which will hereinafter be referred to as "the Pensions Act)". There is no denying the fact that the cash jagirs were abolished by the Rajasthan Cash Jagirs Abolition Act, 1958 (Act No. 29 of 1958) (which will herein after be referred to as "the Abolition Act"). Sec. 3 of the Abolition Act provide as follows: Sec. 3 - Abolition of Gash Jagirs - (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law, sanad, order, custom or usage in force in any part of the State, all payments of money on account of cash jagirs to which this Act applies, that were being made or enforced at the commencement of this Act, shall be discontinued on and from the 1st day of April, 1958 and all such cash jagirs shall stand abolished as from that day. (2) Notwithstanding such discontinuance and abolition the State Government shall continue to make payment by way of compensation in accordance with the scale laid down in the Second Schedule, and the provisions of the Rajasthan Pensions Act, 1958, shall apply to such payments. 4. Section 6 of the same Act, however, makes exception with respect to the grants of money for charitable or religious purposes. It provides inter alia that nothing in this Act or in the rules made thereunder shall affect grants of money made or recognised to have been made by the Government in any part of the State or by the Ruler of a convenating State for charitable or religious purposes or partly for charitable and partly for religious purposes. It is further provided therein that the provisions of the Rajasthan Pensions Act, 1958, shall apply to such exempted grants of money. From the aforesaid provisions it necessarily follows that even though the grants of money for charitable or religious purposes were not abolished, yet the provisions of the Pensions Act would govern such grants. Sec. 3 of the Pensions Act on which strong reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the appellant, reads as under: "3. Bar of suits relating to pensions and grants - No civil court shall, except as hereinafter provided, entertain any suit relating to any pension or grant of money conferred or made by the State Government or by any of its predecessor Governments, whatever may have been the consideration for such pension or grant and whatever may have been the nature of the payment, claim or right for which such pension or grant may have been substituted." In this connection it would be relevant to refer also to sec. 4 and 5 of the Pensions Act. They read as under: "4. Claims to be made to Collector or other authorised officer - Any person having a claim relating to any such pension or grant may prefer such claim to the Collector of the district or other officer authorised in this behalf by the State Government; and such Collector or other officer shall dispose of such claim in accordance with such rules as the State Government may from time to time prescribe in this behalf." "5. When civil court competent to take cognizance of such claims - A Civil Court, otherwise competent to try the same, shall take cognizance of any such claim upon receiving a certifi-cate from the Collector of the district, or other officer authorised in that behalf by the State Government, to the effect that the case may be so tried but shall not make any order or decree in any suit whatever, by which the liability of the State Government to pay any such pension or grant as aforesaid is affected directly or indirectly." The aforesaid provisions, in my view, make it amply clear that no civil suit can be instituted after coming into force of the Pensions Act in respect of grants of money made for charitable or religious purposes. It is not denied before me that the present suit is with respect to grant of money for charitable or religious purposes.
(3.) BUT an argument has been raised by Mr. Soral that the suit would lie in respect of the money which had become due before coming into force of the Pensions Act, that is, 22nd May, 1958. It is argued that the right to sue is a vested right and sec. 3 cannot be construed as retrospective. In support of his contention learned counsel has relied upon Henshall vs. Porter (l), Samdukhan vs. Madanlal (2) and Brojendralal vs. Mubeswar Ali (3). Samdukhan's case (2) deals with the right of appeal. It has been observed therein that the right of appeal is a vested right and it cannot be taken away retrospectively except by an express provision to that effect or by distinct and necessary intendment. It has been further observed that where a statute governing a right of appeal or for that matter any vested right, is in its dominant intention and effect plainly retrospective, then it has to be accorded a retrospective effect, and the objection that such operation takes away a vested right is of little consequence. In Henshall vs. Porter (l) Jac Cardie, J., held that in accordance with well established rules of construction as well as by virtue of sec. 38(2) of the Interpretation Act 1889, the Gaming Act of 1922 did not prevent the bringing of an action under the repealed sec. 2 of the Gaming Act 1835 after the date when the repealing Act came into force in respect of a cause of action which had arisen before that date. In that case the plaintiff made bets with the defendant on horse races and paid up the amount by cheques. Thereafter the Gaming Act, 1922, came into force, which provided that no action for recovery of money in respect of any claim under the old Gaming Act, 1835, shall be entertained in any court. On the basis of this provision the plaintiff filed an action for recovery of the losses paid by him. It was observed that there was nothing in the Gaming Act, 1922, to give it a retrospective operation. It was also held that vested rights are not to be deemed destroyed by a statute unless the enacting words are clear. It may be noted that the third part of the Act. of 1922 provided that no action for recovery of money under the earlier Act. of 1835 shall be entertained in any Court. Now in the present case sec. 3 of the Pensions Act no doubt provides that a Civil Court shall not, except as provided in the later provisions, entertain any suit relating to any pension or grant of money. Unlike Henshall's case an alternative procedure has been provided for recovery of such grant of money under sec.4, which lays down that any person having a claim relating to a grant may prefer such claim to the Collector of the District or other officer, who has been authorised to dispose of such claim in accordance with the rules made by the Government. Sec. 5 further provides that a civil court may also take cognizance of such claim upon receiving a certificate from the Collector of the District. Thus, the right of the appellant to make a claim in respect of the grant for the period prior to coming into force of the Pensions Act was not destroyed by the said Act, but an alternative procedure was prescribed for claiming the same. The utmost, therefore, that can be said in favour of the plaintiff-respondents is that the procedure and form for claiming the grant in respect of which cause of action had accrued prior to coming into force of the Pensions Act were changed. There is certainly a vested right of action when the cause of action has accrued. But in the present case that right has not been touched or taken away by the provisions contained in the Pensions Act. The only result after the Pensions Act came into force is that the claim has to be made to the Collector of the District or other authorised officer. In other words the Pensions Act has provided a cheap and speedy remedy for enforcement of the substantive right to recover grant of money which could be claimed previously by filing a suit directly in a civil court. Thus in my opinion no rights are affected and it is only the remedy which has been changed for enforcing that right. In support of this view, reference may be made to Hazari vs. Mt. Maktula (4) and V.C.K. Bus Service V.H.B. Sethna (5). I may also refor to the following observations of their Lord-ship of the Supreme Court in Anant Gopal Sheory vs. State of Bombay (6). "No person has a vested right in any course of procedure. He has only the right of prosecution or defence in the manner prescribed for the time being by or for the Court in which the case is pending and if by an Act of Parliament the mode of procedure is altered he has no other right than to proceed according to the altered mode. ... ... ... ... ..." "In other words a change in the law of procedure operates retrospectively and unlike the law relating to vested right is not only prospective." ;