KAN SINGH, J. - (1.) THIS is a motion for contempt of Court. The petitioner had filed a writ petition which was No. 557 of 1973 in this Court challenging certain schemes under sec. 6-C of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. He also moved a stay application along with the writ petition. The stay application was heard on 16. 4. 73 by a Single Bench of this Court presided over by Jain, J. passed a detailed order granting stay in favour of the petitioner restraining the respondents from giving effect to the impugned schemes as also staying the hearing of certain objections by the Deputy Legal Remembrancer. Jain J further ordered that having regard to the urgency of the case the case along with connected writ petitions be listed for hearing on 9-7-73. Thereafter the respondents in the writ petition moved for reconsideration of the stay matter, but their prayer was rejected by Jain J. on 8-5-73. On 4. 7. 73, an application was moved before Hon'ble the Chief Justice for and on behalf of the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation for ordering that the writ petitions aforesaid be placed before a Division Bench for hearing. The application was signed on behalf of the Corporation by opposite party Shri Raghuvir Singh and Shri R. N. Munshi, Additional Advocate General and counsel for the State Road Transport Corporation. We may read the grounds on which the matter was requested to be placed before a Division Bench: "from a bare perusal of the order passed by Hon'ble Mr. Justice Jain quoted above, it is clear that he has virtually decided the matter and has held that the schemes published under sec. 68-C of the Act in pursuance |of the Corporation Resolution dated 27- -69 cannot be said so be the schemes framed by the Corporation. Though the learned Judge, while making the aforesaid observation has said that he is prima facie of that view yet it is clear from the order passed by him that in his view since the draft scheme prepared by the Corporation in pursuance of its Resolution dated 27-5 69 was not placed before the Corporation so the schemes prepared in pursuance of that resolution could not be said to be the scheme of the Corporation In face of such a finding, it is difficult to conceive that when these matters are to be heard finally he will give any other decision in the matter. That the Corporation further Submits that when such a large number of Writ Petitions are involved it is eminently desirable that these matters should be heard by a Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court so that the dispute involved in these matters may be resolved without any further delay. That beside this the Corporation further submits that questions raised in these Writ Petitions are of urgent nature and it will be in the public interest that question involved in these petitions are decided finally by a Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court. " On 5-7-73, another application was moved before Jain J. by and on behalf of the State Road Transport Corporation that as they had moved Hon'ble the Chief Justice for referring the cases to a larger Bench the cases be not heard by him. Jain, J. accordingly adjourned the hearing of the cases. On 20. 7. 73, the petitioner moved the present application for taking contempt proceedings against the opposite parties.
(2.) ON 3-8-73, the matter came up before Hon'ble the Chief Justice who ordered that a Division Bench consisting of us be constituted for hearing the writ petitions. He further ordered that a notice be issued to the opposite parties to show cause why they be not punished for contempt. The contempt is alleged to have been committed by the opposite parties when they alleged in the application dated 4. 7. 73 that Jain J. had already formed his opinion in the matter and it was difficult to conceive that when these matters would be heard finally by him, he would be giving any other decision in the matter than what he had held in deciding the stay application. The law on the subject of contempt of court is founded entirely on public policy. It is not there to protect the private rights of parties to a litigation or prosecution. It is there to prevent interference with the administration of justice and it should be limited to what is reasonably necessary for that purpose. In an ordered community courts are established for the specific settlement of disputes and for the maintenance of law and order. In the general interests of the community it is imperative that the authority of the courts should not be imperilled and that recourse to them should not be subject to unjustifiable interference. Various types of behaviour have been taken to constitute contempt. A study of decided cases is helpful for showing the attitude that the courts had at different times taken and a certain pattern emerges. In any civilised society it is the function of the Government to maintain courts of law to which its citizens can have access for the impartial decision of disputes as to their legal rights and obligations towards one another individually and towards the State as representing society as a whole. The provision of such a system for the administration of justice by courts of law and the maintenance of public confidence in it are essential if citizens are to live together in peaceful association with one another. 'contempt of Court' is a generic term descriptive of conduct in relation to particular proceedings in a court or law which tends to undermine that system or to inhibit citizens from availing themselves of it for the settlement of their disputes. Contempt of court may thus take many forms. The due administration of justice requires first that all citizens have unhindered access to the constitutionally established courts of criminal or civil jurisdiction for the determination of disputes as to their legal rights or liabilities, secondly that they should be able to rely on obtaining in the courts the arbitrament of a tribunal which is free from bias against and party any whose decision will be based on those facts only that have been proved in evidence adduced before it in accordance with the procedure adopted in courts of law, and thirdly that once the dispute has been submitted to a court of law, they should be able to rely on there being no usurpation by any other person of the function of that court to decide it according to law. Conduct which is calculated to prejudice any of these three requirements or to undermine the public confidence that they will be observed is contempt of court.
(3.) THE law of contempt of court is a body of rules which exists to safeguard another, quite different institution of civilised society. It is the means by which the law vindicates the public interest in due administration of justice i. e. in the resolution of disputes, not by force or by private or public influence, but by independent adjudication in courts of law according to an objective code. THE alternative is anarchy (including that feudalirtic anarchy which results from arrogation to determine disputes by others than those charged by society to do so in impartial arbitrament according to an abjective code.) The term 'contempt of court' means an interference with the administration of justice and it is unfortunate that the offence should continue to be known by a name which suggests to the modern mind that its essence is a supposed affront to the dignity of the court Nowadays when sympathy is readily accorded to any one who defies constituted authority the very name of the offence predisposes many people in favour of the alleged offender. Yet the due administration of justice is something which all citizens, whether on the left or the right or in the centre, should be anxious to safeguard. We have drawn for the above consolidated observations on the learned speeches of the Law Lords in a very recent decision of the House of Lords reported as Attorney General vs. Times Newspapers Ltd. (l ). ;