SHINGHAL, J. - (1.) THE necessity for this reference has arisen in these circumstances: A writ petition (No. 457 of 1973) was filed by M/s Bherulal and Company against the State of Rajasthan, the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and three others. THEre were several other petitions of a similar nature. Some of them came up for admission before Jain J. , on April 6, 1973 and were admitted by him. Mr. R. N. Munshi, who was then the Government Advocate, accepted notice on behalf of the respondents the same day, and the learned counsel for the petitioners were directed to supply copies of the writ petitions and the stay application to him. At the same time, interim stay orders were made and the stay applications were ordered to be taken up for hearing on April 16, 1972, on which date those orders were confirmed. Having regard to the urgency of the main cases, it was ordered that they may be listed for hearing on July 9, 1973 and the parties were directed to place the other material on the record by July 2, 1973.
(2.) ON July 4, 1973 Mr. R. N. Munshi filed an application (in writ petition No. 447 of 1973 and other connected petitions) under the first proviso to rule 55 of the Rules of the High Court of Rajasthan, 1952, hereinafter referred to as "the Rules" read with sec 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The application was addressed to the Hon'ble the Chief Justice and it was prayed that, for the reasons mentioned in the application, all the connected cases may be ordered to heard by a Divisions Bench. Copies of the application were given to the other learned counsel. It came up for consideration before the Chief Justice on August 3, 1973. Mr. L. L. Sharma and Mr. S. M. Mehta appearing for a large number of petitioners had no objection to the hearing of the writ petitions by a Division Bench so long as that did not prejudice the application which they had made in the meantime, on July, 20, 1973, against Mr. R. N. Munshi and others for contempt of Court. Mr. M. M. Vyas and Mr. R. R. Vyas (who represented the petitioners in 8 out of 63 petitions) opposed the application on the ground that it was likely to create a bad precedent. The Chief Justice took the view that as the petitions affected the business interests of numerous private operators as well as the Rajasthan State Roadways Corporation which had purchased a number of vehicles already, the interests of justice required that, having regard to the stakes involved and the urgency of the matter, all the petitions should be heard by a Division Bench. In the meantime, Jain J. , had adjourned the hearing of petitions. The petitions were thus heard by the Division Bench and were dismissed on November 16, 1973. The propriety of the aforesaid order of the Hon'ble Chief Justice dated August 3, 1973 was not the subject-matter of any controversy at all, in those petitions. The application which was made on July 20, 1973 for taking action against Mr. R. N. Munshi and others for contempt of court came up for consideration before the same Division Bench on January 8, 1974. In deciding it the same day, their Lordships observed as follows: - "according to R. 54 of the Rajasthan High Court Rules, 1952, it is the privilege of Hon'ble the Chief Justice to constitute Single or Division Benches from time to time and to allot business (cases) to them and the Judges of the Court shall sit to hear cases according to the arrangement made by Hon'ble the Chief Justice. R. 55 provides for the type of cases that shall ordinarily be heard and disposed of by a Judge sitting singly. The writ petitions that Jain J. was hearing were covered by R. 55 of the Rules. In our humble view, once a case goes before a Bench according to the allotment of business made by Hon'ble the Chief Justice and thereafter the Bench is seized of the case then, we are afraid, the Hon'ble the Chief Justice has no power to withdraw that case from that case. Bench and to allot it to another Bench. It will be for that Bench who is seized of the case to think for itself whether it would like to hear that particular case or not. It is only when such Bench releases that case that Hon'ble the Chief Justice would he able to allot it to another Bench, but not otherwise. The Rules make no provision for transfer of such a case from one Bench to another, as we find in sec. 24 of C. P. C for Subordinate Courts. When a Bench is seized of a case it is dealing with the case as the High Court and the judgment pronounced by that Bench is the judgment of the High Court and in the absence of any provision to enable Hon'ble the Chief Justice to withdraw such a case from a Bench we cannot hold that such a power exists in Hon'ble the Chief Justice. In the circumstances when Jain J. had already fixed 9-7-73 for the hearing of these cases and such type of cases were being normally dealt with by Jain J. at the relevant time the opposite parties had no justification whatsoever for approaching Hon'ble the Chief Justice, only four days before the hearing, to constitute another Bench for the hearing of these cases. If the opposite parties felt that the cases were of great importance then they should have made a move before Jain J himself so that, if the learned Judge were satisfied of the sufficient importance of the cases he would have himself made a reference to a larger Bench and then Hon'ble the Chief Justice could have constituted a larger Bench. " Their Lordships' decision has since been reported in Bherulal & Co. vs. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (l ). It is these observations of the Division Bench which have given rise to the present reference in S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 483 of 1973 (Niranjan Singh vs. State of Rajasthan and others) which is pending before a learned Single Judge. That case was placed for admission before Jain J. , on April 12, 1973. He admitted the petition and issued notice to the respondents. The same day he made an order, in S. B. Civil Miscellaneous Stay Application No. 450 of 1973, for the issue of a notice and directed that, meanwhile, the petitioner shall not be dispossessed "from the land in dispute". It is not disputed before us, and is in fact admitted, that the constitution of the Benches of the Court was changed with effect from September 27, 1973 by an order of the Hon'ble Chief Justice, so that the writ petition fell to be heard by Joshi J. The aforesaid stay application therefore came up for orders before him on November 26, 1973. He confirmed the ad interim stay order of Jain J. , and directed that the main case may be listed for hearing on February 12, 1974 along with other similar cases. There was some change in the roster from January 12, 1974 by an order of the Chief Justice and it is admitted before us that according to it such cases we re thereafter to be heard by Gupta J. An application was, however, made to the Hon'ble the Chief Justice on behalf of the respondent State on February 22, 1974, under the first proviso to rule 55 of the Rules and sec. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, praying that the writ petition, along with the other connected petitions, may be ordered to be heard by a Division Bench. So when the case came up for hearing before Gupta J. , on February 28, 1974, the learned Deputy Government Advocate invited his attention to the aforesaid application dated February 22, 1974. The learned counsel for the petitioner had no objection, and Gupta J. , made an order that the application may be laid before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for orders and that the hearing of that and the connected petitions may stand over. The Hon'ble that Chief Justice heard the application in the presence of the learned counsel for the parties on March 1, 1974. It was urged before him by Mr. Mridul that in view of the observations in Bherulal's case (l), Joshi J. , was "seized" of the matter and Gupta J. , "could not proceed with it" The Hon'ble the Chief Justice held that in view of the observations referred to by Mr. Mridul, he could not decide the application. The case went back to Gupta J. When it was taken up by him on March 7, 1974 it was urged by Mr. Mridul, learned counsel for the petitioner, that as Joshi J. , had, while deciding the stay application, passed an order on November 26, 1973 that the case along with like cases should be listed for hearing on February 12, 1974, it was not possible for Gupta J , to proceed to hear the cases in view of observations in Bheru Lal's case (1) as Joshi J. , was "seized" of the cases. Gupta J. , however, expressed a doubt whether, on the basis of the observations in Bherulal's case (l), even Joshi J. , would be able to hear the cases because "such type of cases" were not "being normally dealt with" by him. He examined the relevant rules, and expressed the view that the judgment in Bherulal's case (l) required reconsideration by a larger Bench. He therefore formulated the following questions for reference - " (1) Whether the Hon'ble the Chief Justice has no power to direct that any case or class of cases, in which a date of hearing had been fixed by a Bench, be listed for hearing before another Bench? (2) Whether the view taken in Bherulal's case regarding the provisions of rules 54 and 55 of the Rajasthan High Court Rules, 1952, is correct? (3) Whether any Bench before whom a case is fixed for hearing is not competent to hear it, merely on the ground that a date for hearing has been fixed in that case by another Bench at some earlier stage. " The Hon'ble the C. J. has constituted this Bench to answer the three questions in these circumstances. The first question is whether the Hon'ble the Chief Justice has no power to direct that any case or class of cases in which a date of hearing has been fixed by a Bench may be listed for hearing before another Bench? It has been argued by Mr. Mridul that the Chief Justice has no such power because the Bench which has fixed the date of hearing is "seized" of the case to the exclusion of all other Benches. The learned counsel has placed reliance on Zikar vs. Government of State of M. P. (2) to support his argument. He has also made a reference to rule 66 (1) of the Rules and has urged that such a case should always be treated as "tied up" with the Bench which had fixed the date of hearing. The learned counsel has gone to the extent of arguing that it is the mandate of rule 66 (1) that with the exception of a case in which a Bench has merely directed notice to issue to the opposite party or passed an ex parte order, all other cases should be deemed to be the partly heard cases of that Bench. Mr. Shrimal, learned Government Advocate, has argued, on the other hand, that the Chief Justice has the power to direct that any case or class of cases in which a date of hearing has been fixed by a Bench may be listed for hearing before another Bench. In order to appreciate the controversy, it is necessary to examine the relevant provisions of the Constitution of our country, the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949, and the Rules.
(3.) ART. 214 of the Constitution provide that there shall be "a High Court for each State". There can therefore be no question of there being two such courts exercising jurisdiction in a State. Apart from ART. 214, ART. 225, which deals with the jurisdiction of existing High Courts, makes it quite clear that - ". . . . . . . . the jurisdiction of, and the law administered in, any existing High Court, and the respective powers of the Judges thereof in relation to the administration of justice in the Court, including any power to make rules of Court and to regulate the sittings of the Court and of members thereof sitting alone or in Division Courts, shall be the same as immediately before the commencement of this Constitution. " The Constitution has therefore made it quite clear that (i) there is only one High Court in a State, (ii) it is that High Court which exercises jurisdiction in the State, (iii) the Judges of the High Court are members thereof and do not constitute separate courts, (iv) the Judges of the High Court exercise powers in relation to the administration of justice in the High Court, and (v) the High Court has the power, inter alia, to make rules to regulate its sittings and of its members sitting alone or in Division Court. The Judges are therefore members of the High Court and do not constitute separate Courts into themselves. They may sit "alone" or in "division Courts" for the purpose of transacting the business of the Court, in accordance with the rules of the Court, but that is a domestic matter of the High Court and cannot have the effect of creating as many High Courts as there are Benches. The Benches are in fact required to be constituted for no other purpose than to regulate the sittings of the High Court so that its Judges may be able to sit alone or in Division Benches, as may be necessary. A litigant or a party to a case cannot therefore claim to have any vested interest in any such Bench or Benches which, taken as a whole, are required by the Constitution to function as the High Court for the State. It is not in controversy before us that the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949, was in force immediately before the commencement of the Constitution and sub-secs. (1) and (2) of sec. 44 thereof provided as follows - "s. 44. Distribution of business and administratioe control - (1) The High Court may, by its own rules, provide as it thinks fit for the exercise by one or more Judges, or by Division Courts constituted by two or more Judges of the High Court, of its original and appellate jurisdiction. (2) The Chief Justice shall be responsible for the distribution and conduct of the business of the High Court, and shall determine which Judge in each case will sit alone and which Judges of Court will constitute a Bench. " The High Court has accordingly made the Rules, and the Hon'ble Chief Justice has to discharge his responsibility for the distribution and conduct of the business of the High Court both under sub-sec. (2) of the aforesaid sec. 44 and the Rules. Rule 54 of the Rules provides for the constitution of Benches. It is a part of Chapter V which deals with the jurisdiction of judges sitting alone or in Division Courts and is to the following effect - "s. 54 Judges shall sit alone or in such Division Courts as may be constituted from time to time and do such work as may be allotted to them by order of the Chief Justice or in accordance with his direction. " It is therefore the responsibility of the Chief Justice to constitute the Division Courts or Benches. The Judges are required to sit alone or in the Division Benches and, in either case, do such work as may be allotted to them by order of the Chief Justice or in accordance with his direction. This power to allot the work to the Judges cannot be taken away, in face of the clear provision of rule 54, merely because a date of hearing has been fixed in a case by a particular Bench. Rule 55 of the Rules provides what cases shall ordinarily be heard and disposed of by a Judge sitting alone. Even so, proviso (a) of the rule is to the following effect - "provided that - (a) the Chief Justice may from time to time direct that any case or class of cases which may be heard by a Judge sitting alone shall be heard by a Bench of two or more Judges. " (Empasis added) The Chief Justice has therefore the power "from time to time" to direct that any particular case or class of case may be heard by a Bench of two or more Judges even though it may, ordinarily, fall to be heard by a Single Judge. It is well settled that the meaning of the words "from time to time" is that "after once acting the donee of the power may act again; and either independently of, or by adding to, or taking from, or reversing altogether, his previous act"; Stroud's Judicial Dictionary. It cannot, in such a case, be said that the person who has the power to act has completely discharged his duty when he has once acted. " The words "from time to time" have therefore been interpreted to mean "as and when it is appropriate so to do"; Re von Dembinska. Ex parte The Debtor (3 ). It is thus clearly permissible for the Chief Justice to reverse any earlier order of allotment of any particular case or class of case to a Judge sitting alone, and to direct that it may be heard by a Bench of two or more Judges. ;