SHINGHAL, J - (1.) SHANTI Vardhman Pedi, respondent No. 3, filed a suit through its Secretary Panraj, on September 13, 1955, in the Court of Sub-divisional officer, Sojat, for ejectment of petitioner Chhaila under section 183 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, hare in after referred to as the Act, alleging that he was a trespasser. It was claimed in the suit that the land, khasra No. 1567. Chak No. 2, Sojat, was the "doli" land of the plaintiff and defendant Chhaila had taken possession without lawful authority in Smt. 2009. As Chhaila chimed that he had taken the possession through Smt. Saraswati, respondent No. 4, she was also impleaded as a defendant. Smt. Saraswati pleaded that she was entitled to lease out the land to petitioner Chhaila The trial court framed a number of issues including issue No. 2 which dealt with the question whether the suit land was the "doli" land of the temple which could be cultivated only by the "pujari". The Sub-divisional Officer submitted the record to the Court of Munsiff Sojat for the decision of issue No. 2 as it raised a question of proprietary right within the meaning of sec. 239(1) of the Act.
(2.) THE Munsiff decided that the suit land was the "doli" land of the temple and returned the record to the Sub-divisional Officer who dismissed the suit by his judgment Ex. 1 dated February 15, 1963. Respondent No 3 filed an appeal, but it was dismissed by judgment Ex 2 dated November 29. 1963 of the Revenue Appellate Authority, respondent No. 2. A second appeal was preferred before the Board of Revenue, respondent No. 1. That appeal was allowed by judgment Ex. 3 dated January 22, 1965 and the suit was decreed. THE petitioner applied for a review of that judgment, but his application was dismissed by order Ex. 4 dated September 14, 1966. There is no dispute about the facts mentioned above. The petitioner has applied for certiorari On the ground, inter alia, that by virtue of sub-sec. (4) of sec. 239 of the Act the two appellate judgments, and the order on the review application, are without jurisdiction and should be quashed in the exercise of this Court's extraordinary jurisdiction. A reply has been filed by respondent No. 3 controverting the claim for certiorori. The point which arises for consideration is whether this is a case of a total or inherent lack of jurisdiction on the ground that by virtue of sub secs. (4) and (5) of sec 239 of the Act the Revenue Appellate Authority, respondent No. 2, and the Board of Revenue, respondent No. 1, did not have the authority to entertain and dispose of the appeals which were preferred before them. As has been stated, issue No. 2 raised the question whether the suit land was the "doli" land of the temple. It is admitted by both the leaned counsel in this Court that it was a question of "proprietary right" within the meaning of sub-sec. (1) of sec 239, and that the record was rightly submitted to the Court of Munsiff, Sojat, for its decision. The Civil Court decided the issue It held that the suit land was the "doli" land of the temple, and returned the record with that finding to the Sub-divisional Officer. The Sub-divisional Officer however dismissed the suit by his judgment Ex.1 dated February 15, 1963. It was therefore a decision under sub-sec. (3) of sec. 239. Sub-sec. (4) of sec. 239 of the Act deals with appeals from decrees of revenue Courts in such cases, and provides as follows, - "(4). An appeal from a decree of revenue court passed in a suit in which an issue involving a question of proprietary right has been decided by a civil court under sub-sec. (2) shall lie to the civil court which, having regard to the valuation of the suit, has jurisdiction to hear appeals from the court to which the issue of proprietary right had been referred." Then comes sub sec. (5) which deals with second appeals and provides as follows, - "(5). A second appeal from a decree or order passed by a civil court in appeal under sub-sec. (4) shall lie to the High Court on any of the grounds mentioned in sec. 100 or the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 Central Act V of 1908)". It is thus quite clear, and admits of no doubt or controversy, that as the issue involving a question of proprietary right had admittedly been decided by the civil court under sub-sec. (2), the appeal from the decree of the Sub-divisional Officer lay only to the competent "Civil Court", under sub-sec. (4), and not to the Revenue appellate Aut-hoiity, and, a fortiori, the second appeal lay only to the High Court under sub sec (5) and not to the Board of Revenue.
(3.) JURISDICTION means "authority to decide", and the question whether a tribunal has jurisdiction depends not upon the correctness of its findings, but upon the nature of the facts into which it has to inquire. It is determinable at the commencement of the inquiry and not at its conclusion. A tribunal may thus lack the jurisdiction to make an inquiry, or hear an appeal, if it has been debarred from doing so by an express provision of the law. So where a tribunal is incompetent to adjudicate on a particular matter, its decision thereon is void, and is a nullity. As is obvious, there is much force in this theory of jurisdiction for it is based on logical consistency. It is equally well settled that a decision which is made without jurisdiction, and is void for that reason, cannot be validated by any express or implied consent of a party to the proceedings. It has thus been held as follows in Ledgard vs. Bull(l), - "When the Judge has no inherent jurisdiction over the subject matter of a suit, the parties cannot, by their mutual consent, convert it into a proper judicial process." Reference may also be made to the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Kiran Singh vs. Chaman Paswan 2) where it has been held as follows - "It is a fundamental principle well established that a decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction is a nullity, & that it could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction, whether it. is a pecuniary or territorial, or whether it is in respect of the subject matter of the action, strikes at the very authority of the Court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties." We have therefore no hesitation in holding that the impugned judgments of the Revenue Appellate Authority and the Board of Revenue being without jurisdiction were void and were a nullity. ;