GUPTA, J. - (1.) THE plaintiff, who claims to be the owner of the premises consisting of a room and a tin shed situated in 'c' Scheme in the city of Jaipur, alleged that he had let out the premises to the defendant on April 1, 1957, on a monthly rent of Rs. 4/-and a rent-deed was executed in respect of this tenancy by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff on April 1, 1957. As the defendant did not make payment of the rent from August 1, 1962, the plaintiff filed a suit on August 27, 1965, in the Court of Judge, Small Causes, Jaipur City, for the recovery of Rs. 144/- as arrears of rent @ Rs. 4/-per month and Rs. 9/- as house tax, in all for Rs. 153/ -.
(2.) THE defendant resisted the suit and denied the execution of the alleged rent deed by him in favour of the plaintiff and also took the defence that the alleged rent-deed was an unregistered document and as such was inadmissible in evidence for want of registration. THE Judge, Small Causes, Jaipur City, by his order dated March 3, 1966 held that the alleged rent-note was a simple 'kirayanama' and was admissible in evidence. THEreafter by his judgment dated April 13, 1968, the learned Judge held that the execution of the rent-deed Ex. 1 by the defendant was proved and holding that the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties was established from the aforesaid document and that the defendant was the plaintiff's tenant on a monthly rent of Rs. 4/-, a decree for Rs. 144/- with costs, in respect of arrears of rent was passed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant. It was further decided that as no agreement was proved between the parties in respect of the payment of house tax, the suit for the recovery of house tax was not maintainable and as such the claim for the recovery of house-tax was disallowed. The defendant filed a revision petition in this court against the decree passed by the learned Judge, Small Cause Court, Jaipur City and the finding of the trial court about the existence of the relationship of land-lord and tenant between the parties was assailed on the ground that the said finding was based solely upon the so-called rent-deed Ex. 1, but that document was inadmissible in evidence for want of registration. It was submitted on behalf of the applicant that the document Ex 1 was no doubt executed by the tenant applicant, but as it was signed by the plaintiff landlord also, in token of his acceptance thereof, it was a lease deed within the meaning of sec. 107 of the Transfer of Property Act and as it was an unregistered document, it was not admissible in evidence and did not confer any right of interest. Although the matter in question was the subject matter of four decisions given by three learned Judges of this Court sitting singly, Bhargava, J. , before whom the revision petition came up for hearing, thought that the matter was of considerable importance and required an authoritative decision by a Division Bench, made a reference to the Division Bench and it is in this way that the matter has come up before us. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the tenant-applicant before us that as the document Ex. 1 bears the signatures of both the tenant and the landlord it was a bilateral agreement of tenancy and under the second clause of sec. 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, it required registration and in the absence thereof, the said document was inadmissible in evidence and no rights flowed from it. On the other hand it was contended by the learned counsel for the landlord opposite party that the document in question was essentially a unilateral one, which was executed by the tenant alone and it was only a 'kirayanama' (rent-note) or a Kabuliyat and mere signature of the landlord, even if it be in token of his acceptance of the terms of the rent-note could not be considered as execution of the said document by the plaintiff-landlord. He further submitted that the said rent-note was only for a period of 11 months and contained a stipulation for payment or monthly rent for the premises in question and as such it did not come within the definition of a lease-deed and, therefore, did not require registration. We have considered the rival contentions. Sec. 105 of the Transfer of Property Act lays down that a lease of immovable property is a transfer of a right to enjoy such property, made for a certain time, or in perpetuity, in consideration of a price paid or promised, to the transferor by the transferee, who accepts the transfer on such terms. Thus, what sec. 105 requires for constituting a lease is a contract for transfer of the right to enjoy immovable property for consideration. A lease is essentially a transfer of an interest in immovable property entitling the lessee to the enjoyment of such immovable property, which includes the right to possession thereof. Another essential feature of a lease is that the transfer must be for consideration, though it may be for a limited period or in perpetuity. A document by which such transfer of the right of enjoyment of immovable property is effected and is accepted by the other party is a lease document and the substance of the matter must be looked into and not merely the form thereof. There is no doubt that a lease is a transfer of a right or interest in immovable property and such a transfer could only be effected by a contract between the lessor and the lessee. Therefore, a lease could be effected only by a bilateral transaction in which both lessor and lessee should be parties. In this view of the matter, it would not be right to hold that the lessor is the only person entitled to make a transfer of the right to enjoy immovable property and he alone should execute the document of lease. For instance a mere 'patta' issued by the landlord would not constitute a lease. As a matter of fact a unilateral document executed either by the lessee alone or by the lessor alone would not be capable of constituting a lease of immovable property, as it requires two parties to make a contract. However, as we have observed above, it is of little significance as to what language has been employed in the document so long as it embodies all the essential conditions of lease, as it is the substance thereof, which is material and not merely the form. So long as all the essential requirements of a lease, as defined in sec. 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, are fulfilled and the document is signed both by the lessor and the lessee and it incorporates the recital as to the property demised thereby, the period of the lease and the consideration therefor, it would no doubt be a document of lease. If the essential conditions of a lease are fulfilled, the manner in which the parties thereto chose to describe the document, is absolutely immaterial. Even if a document is written by one party in favour of the other so that from its outward form it appears to be a unilateral document, if the other party to the contract puts his signature on the said document in token of his acceptance of the terms contained therein, it would amount to the execution of the document by both the parties and such an instrument would substantially be bilateral in nature and effect. In the present case the document Ex. 1, which is on a printed form, although styled as a "kirayanama" (rent-deed) and purports to have been written by the tenant in favour of the landlord, it enumerates all the requisite terms and conditions constituting the lease of the premises in question, including the period of the demise and the consideration therefor, namely, the monthly rent for which the said premises were let out. However, it is of little consequence that such recitals have been made on behalf of the tenant because the document contains a specific recital at the end that the terms and conditions mentioned in the document are acceptable to the landlord (Malik makan ko bhi kirayanama likhit sharayat manjoor hai ). After all these recitals, including the one mentioned above, the document purports to have been signed both by the tenant as well as by the landlord and their signatures have been attested by two witnesses. Thus, it incorporates all the necessary ingredients of a document of lease and must be considered to have been duly executed by both the lessor as well as the lessee. Ex 1, therefore, constitutes a lease-Heed within the meaning of sec. 105 of the Transfer of Property Act. Such a position was accepted in this country as early as in the year 1881, when on a 'darkhast' submitted by the tenants for a lease of immovable property, embodying specified terms, the landlord had written the words "granted" on the margin and affixed his signature thereon, a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court held the document to be a lease deed. Sir Richard Garth, G. J. , delivering the judgment of the Full Bench in Syed Sufdar Reza vs. Amzad Ali (l) made the following observation - "if the application of the defendants was accepted by the plaintiff by writing the word 'granted' in the margin, we think that the instrument in question was a lease, and therefore required registration. " We do not think that the law laid down in Sufdar Reza's case (l), cited above, has ever since been departed from or even doubted.
(3.) NOW sec. 107 of the Transfer of Property Act provides that a lease of immovable property from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent, can be made only by a registered instrument and further that all other leases of immovable property may be made either by a registered instrument or by oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession. Thus, leases coming within the ambit of second paragraph of sec. 107, includes all other leases which are for a period of one year or less and in which the rent agreed upon is not yearly Such leases, if they are reduced to writing, must be effected by a registered document. An unregistered document of lease, in cases where the lease is required to be registered, conveys no title and creates no rights in the lessee and cannot be used in evidence to prove the transaction of lease or any terms thereof. In the present case as we have observed above, the document Ex. 1 fulfills all the necessary requirements of a lease, as it purports to have been executed both by the lessor and the lessee and contains all the essential terms and conditions of lease and is for a period of 11 months, reserving monthly rent. As such, it could have been effected only by a registered instrument, as required by the second paragraph of sec. 107 of the Transfer of Property Act. As the document Ex. 1 is admittedly not registered, it was clearly inadmissible in evidence and no rights could have flown from such an unregistered document nor it could have been used in the present case for the purpose of proving the relationship of landlord and tenant. In view of sec. 4 of the Transfer of Property Act, the provisions of sec. 107 thereof are to be read as supplemental to those of the Registration Act. The effect of these provisions read together, therefore, is to exclude all unregistered leases, which have been reduced to writing, from evidence. We may also observe here that the view expressed by us above has also been taken in four cases decided by other learned judges of this Court, though sitting singly. In Madanlal vs. Noor Mohd. (4) Shinghal J. held that so long as the essential requirements of a transaction of lease are fulfilled, it is immaterial, if any or all of them, are narrated in the beginning of the instrument evidencing the transfer, or in the middle, or towards the end thereof. The document, which was under consideration before the learned Judges, was a printed one of the same type as the document Ex. 1 in the present case and he also came to the conclusion that as the instrument of transfer had the effect of transferring a right to enjoy the premises to the lessee and contained stipulations regarding the period of the transfer and the consideration therefor, it amounted to a lease, and was compulsorily registrable. Similar documents were also examined by other learned Judges of this Court in Roodmal vs. Rajendra Nath (S. B. Civil Revision No. 214 of 1966) decided on 11-3-1968, Chittar Khan vs. Raja Harnath Singh (S. B. C. Revision No. 462 of 1957) decided on 13-8 68 and Bhagwandass vs. Durga Prasad (S. B. Civil Revision No. 362 of 1967) decided on 18-12-1967 and all of them also came to the same conclusion. In our opinion where a statute has been construed in one manner and the interpretation has been consistent, it should not be readily departed from. The reasons are not far to seek as on the basis of such an interpretation numerous problems must have been solved and questions answered and even if subtlety or learning tempt one to doubt the view already adopted, dictates of certainty should forbid such a course, as departure from a well established course of construction is likely to create a doubt to dispel which is the plain duty of courts. Unless, therefore, an interpretation, which is unfair or manifestly unjust, it should not be disturbed. Any practice or inclination to the contrary would work hardship and confusion in regard to rights and remedies and the sacred institution of law, instead of serving justice, will serve speculation and hair splitting. The doctrine of "stare decisis" in our opinion, acquires its sanctity from these considerations. ;