SHINGHAL, J. - (1.) AS the learned counsel for the respondents have been successful in raising a preliminary objection against the maintainability of these proceedings on the grounds of limitation, it will be sufficient to state those facts which bear on it.
(2.) DR. P. L. Jauhar, the present petitioner, filed S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 946 of 1969 to challenge the appointment of DR. Brij Mohan Sharma, respondent No. 5, as Deputy Director Medical (E. S. I.), by order Ex. 1 dated March 7, 1969, when that post fell vacant on the retirement of DR. D. N. Rai. That petition was allowed by a judgment of this Court dated January 29, 1971, and it was directed as follws - "it will thus appear that the impugned order Ex. 1 dated March 7, 1969 is quite illegal, and it is set aside with the direction that the post of Deputy Director in question should be filled up by the State Government according to the law. The petitioner will be entitled to his costs from respondent No. 1. " The State Government did not, however, revert DR. Brij Mohan Sharma and did not care to fill the post of Deputy Director according to the law. The petitioner therefore filed the present petition on December 20, 1973, praying that the respondents may be suitably punished for disobedience of the aforesaid directions dated January 29, 1971. The petition was admitted, and rule was issued to the respondents requiring them to appear in this court and answer the allegation. They filed their replies in which they took the plea inter alia, that it was not Permissible for this Court to initiate any proceedings for contempt after the expiry of the period of one year specified in sec. 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, hereafter referred to as "the Act". The learned counsel for the petitioner filed a rejoinder, as also an application under sec 5 of the Limitation Act, for condonation of the delay. The preliminary objection of the learned counsel for the respondents therefore relates to the bar of limitation, and it is necessary to decide the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed by the respondents. As has been stated, the judgment in the writ petition was delivered on January 29, 1971 by which this court set aside the order dated March 7, 1969 promoting Dr. Brij Mohan Sharma as Deputy Director Medical (E. S. I ), which was a post encadred in the Rajasthan Medical Service, and gave the direction that the post should be filled by the State Government according to the law It has been stated by the petitioner, in his affidavit dated February 6, 1974, and is not in dispute, that Dr. Brij Mohan Sharma was allowed to continue on the post of Deputy Director (E. S. I.) until April 1, 1971 and was thereafter transferred to the other cadre post of Deputy Director (Medical) which he held until October 30, 1971. He was thereafter appointed as State Family Planning Officer, which was not a cadre post. It is therefore quite clear, on the admit-ted facts, that the contempt, if any, was committed by October 30, 1971 whereas the present petition was filed on December 20, 1973. The question then is whether proceedings for contempt could be initiated against the respondents after the expiry of the period of one year specified sec. 20 of the Act? It has been argued by Mr. Rajnarain, learned counsel for the petitioner, that a statute of limitation ceases to be a statute of mere procedure where it shortens the period of limitation and the period of limitation prescribed by sec. 20 of the Act cannot therefore govern the present petition because the cause of action which had accrued to the petitioner earlier, under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952, could not be defeated by recourse to sec. 20 of the Act. The learned counsel has placed reliance on Rajah of Pittapur vs. Gani Benkata Subba Row (l), Panna vs. Madan Lal (2), and Government of Rajasthan vs. Sangram Singh (3) in support of his argument. He has also invited attention to the decisions in Syed Mohammed Yar Khan vs. Syed Yousuf Yar Khan (4) and Syed Yousuf Yar Khan vs. Syed Mohammed Yar Khan (5 ). There is considerable case law on the point, but it would be sufficient to refer to the more important decisions. As has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in G. Beepathusa vs. Velasari Shankaranarayana Kadambolithaya (6) and Ramprasad Dagaduram vs. Vijaykumar Motilal Hirakhanwala (7), the law of limitation is a procedural law and the provisions existing on the date of the suit will be applicable to it. But it is equally well settled that where a subsequent law of procedure comes into force at once, without giving an opportunity to the parties to seek their remedy under it, it cannot be allowed to have retrospective operation merely on the ground that it is a law of procedure, for that would otherwise destroy their pre-existing rights. A similar point arose for consideration in Khusalbhai vs. Kabhai (8 ). Refering to an earlier decision in their Court, their Lordships held as follows - "but we think that it is somewhat too broadly stated that the case that 'an Act of limitation, being a law of procedure, Governs all proceedings, to which its terms are applicable, from the moment of its enactment, except so far as its operation is expressly excluded or postponed. This general rule must admit of the qualification that, when the retrospective application of a statute of limitation would destroy vested rights, or inflict such hardship or injustice as could not have been within the contemplation of the Legislature, then the statute is not, any more than any other law, to be construed retrospectively. " (emphasis added) This rule of interpretation has been accepted all through. Thus it has been held in Ramakrishna Chetty vs. Suhparaya Iyer (9), after a consideration of the decision in Khushalbhai's case (8), that it is unreasonable to suppose that the subsequent Act "intended to destroy a men's right without giving him an opportunity to comply with its provisions " It was argued before their Lordships that if the Act in question be held not to be applicable to the case before them, it would logically lead to the conclusion that it would not apply to any case where the cause of action for rent arose before that Act was passed. Their Lordships repelled the argument as follows - "but this would certainly not be the case; for, the principle we have enunciated would not apply to cases where three years did not elapse before the Act came into force, for them, the rule enacted in it would not have the effect of destroying the causes of action vested in the landholder for the rent due to him. " The point arose for consideration in Manjuri Bibi vs. Akkel Mahmud (10 ). Their Lord-ships considered the decision in Khushalbhai's case (8), and held that the new precedure would not apply where its application would prejudice the rights established under the old law. I may refer here to the decision in Rajah of Pittapur's case (l), on which reliance has been placed by Mr. Rajnarain. That was a Full Bench decision where Wallis C. J. , with whom Kumaraswamy Sastri J. , was in agreement, held as follows after a consideration of the decision in Ramakrishna Chetty vs. Subharaya Iyer - "i think that Sudativa Aiyar, J. , was right in following the carefully considered judgment of Menson and Samdara Aiyar, JJ. in Ramakrishna Chetti vs. Subbraya Ayer and that the principle to be applied is that where an Act contains provisions for the limitation of suits which take away altogether a vested right of suit without providing any equivalent remedy, than according to the approved rule of construction, the provisions must be considered to have been enacted subject to the implied exception that they were not to extend to such vested rights of suit which were to continue subject to the rules of limitation in force at the passing of the Act. " It was held that although the laws affecting limitation might abridge or enlarge periods of limitation in causes of action which were alive at the date when the new enactment came into force and which under the old law would expire afterwards, the change could not, unless there was a clearly express intention to the contrary, be retrospective so as to destroy rights of suits which were alive on that date. I am unable to find anything in the judgment which can be said to support the argument of Mr. Rajnarain that sec. 20 of the Act would not be applicable in the present case even though the petitioner had a period of almost ten months after the coming into force of the Act within which to move this Court for initiating proceedings for contempt against the respondents. I may refer here to the decision in Gopaldas Ganpatdas vs. Tribhowan (11) where the question for consideration was whether sec. 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, could be said to have a retrospective effect on the plaintiff's decree. Their Lordships referred to the test of possibility of compliance and held, as follows, that sec. 48 must have retrospective effect on the decree - "for the 12 years laid down by sec. 48 did not expire till 1910, and the plaintiff had therefore about 2 years from the passing of the new Code for taking steps to get their decree executed by sale of the immovable property. "
(3.) REFERENCE may also be made to the decision in Khondkar Mahomed Saleh vs. Chandra Kumar Mukerji (l2 ). It has been held in that case that statutes of limitation cannot be considered as anything else than matters relating to procedure, and ordinarily such statutes have their operation from the date fixed in the statute and govern all matters before the court after the commencement of the operation of the statute, but there is one exception and it is that where under the Act as amended the application could not be made, the amendment will not apply retrospectively, for the principle is that the effect of an amendment is to regulate and not to confiscate a vested right. Their Lordships therefore gave retrospective effect to the provision in the law of limitation because while it had the effect of cutting the period for making the application, it did not take away the right to do so. A similar view has been taken in pearey Lal vs. Solu Gir (13 ). The point arose for consideration in this court in Jethmal vs. Ambsingh (14) and it was held that even though the Legislature may not have provided a saving clause in the new Act, the reduced period of limitation should not receive retrospective operation so as adversely to affect the suits which would have become barred at the commencement of the Act, but all such suits would continue to be governed by the old law. That decision was taken into consideration by Full Bench in Gangram Singri's case (3) and it was held as follows - "it is a well settled proposition of law that the new law of limitation would not revive a barred right. Similarly, it may be taken to be equally well settled that the new law of limitation cannot be construed retrospectively so as to destroy altogether the remedy of litigant to enforce his right in a court of law. " It has farther been held that in case the remedy to enforce a vested right is altogether barred, when the new law comes into force, without providing any breathing time to a litigant, that remedy must continue to be governed by the old law of limitation. It is thus well settled that if the new law of limitation does not destroy a vested or pre-existing right, it would be nothing more than a law of procedure and would provide the period of limitation for seeking the remedy in a court of law, even if it has the effect of curtailing the period of limitation prescribed under the earlier law, so long as it provides a breathing time to the litigant to seem his remedy under the new law. It will be recalled that October 30, 1971 was, at any rate, the date by which the contempt in question was alleged to have been committed, and as the Act came into force on December 24. 1971, it was permissible for this court to initiate the proceedings for contempt upto October 29, 1972. The petitioner therefore had ample opportunity to move this court well within the period of limitation prescribed by sec. 20 of the Act. He did not, however, care to do so, for he filed the present petition on December 20, 1973, long after the expiry of the period of one year prescribed by sec. 20 of the Act. The respondents are thus justified in contending that it was not permissible for this court to initiate the present proceedings after the expiry of the period of one year provided by that section. I have gone through the cases cited by Mr. Rajnarain. As has been shown, the decision in Rajah of Pittapur's case (1) does not support his contention. The decision in Panna vs. Madan Lal (2) was based on the principle of destruction of right enunciated in Rajah of Pittapur's case (1) and cannot avail the petitioner. Sangram Singh's case (3) is also of no help to the petitioner for I have referred to the view which has been propounded there. Syed Mohammed Yar Khan's case (4) and Syed Yousuf Yar Khan's case (5) were quite different where saving clauses had been provided in the new law. These cases cannot therefore avail the petitioner. ;