- (1.) THESE three applications for revision are directed against the appellate order of the Revenue Appellate Authority Kota, Dated 20-9-1963, whereby he disallowed by a single judgment the three appeals proffered by the applicants one in each case against the orders passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Kota on 29-7-1963.
(2.) THE facts are that the opposite party in each of these revision applications had filed separate suits against the present applicants in all these cases for the declaration of Khatedari status and the grant of permanent injunction to restrain the applicants from interfering with the possession of the opposite party in each case. Along with the suits, the opposite party in each case prayed for the grant of temporary injunction. It was the case of the opposite party in each case that they were cultivators of long standing of the muafi lands in dispute which were resumed sometime in 1958, that they had been in possession all along, that the girdawari record from Samvat 2014 to 2018 showed them to be in possession, that the settlement entries were also in their favour, and that the applicants had fraudulently got the girdawari record corrected in their favour for the year 1954 to 1962 which would correspond to Samvat 2011 to 2019. THE opposite party filed affidavits in support of their claim that they were in possession. Counter affidavits regarding possession were filed by the applicants. THE trial court issued orders of temporary injunction to restrain the applicants from interfering with the possession of the opposite party and the orders of the trial court were confirmed by the Revenue Appellate Authority in appeal. Here before me, the learned counsel for the applicants has argued that the lands in dispute have been recorded as khudkasht lands in accordance with the orders issued by the Sub-Divisional Officer on the applications for the correction of the girdawari record for 2011-2019 made by the applicants. The learned counsel has urged that these applications for the correction of the girdawari record were conceded by the opposite party who accepted the position that they were 'halis' ( ploughmen ) of the khudkasht lands of the applicants which are in dispute. The learned counsel has gone on to argue that the opposite party were now estopped from claiming possession because of the concessions made by them in the court of the Sub-Divisional Officer in the proceedings leading to the correction of the girdawari record. The learned counsel for the opposite party in all these three cases has argued that the settlement record which showed the opposite party to be in possession bears out that the main contesting party among the applicants for revision had not objected to the proceedings of the Assistant Settlement Officer dated 17-11-1962, and that in the record prepared by the Assistant Settlement Officer the opposite party were shown to be khatedar tenants. He has further urged that fraud is apparent from the face of the proceedings leading to the correction of the girdawari record in favour of the applicants by the orders of the Sub-Divisional Officer, and that in any case, all that was necessary for the lower courts to see was whether the opposite party had a fair question regarding title to raise an inference whether the balance of convenience lay in not disturbing the possession of the opposite party. He has further urged that the orders of the lower courts should not be interfered with in revision unless there is a jurisdictional defect or illegality or irregularity of procedure. It is settled law that the court of revision would not interfere unless there is an assumption of jurisdiction which does not vest in the lower court or there is failure to exercise jurisdiction or that in the exercise of jurisdiction there is an illegality or an irregularity of procedure. In these three cases, undoubtedly the lower courts had the necessary jurisdiction, and it has to be seen whether there is any illegality of procedure which would warrant interference. A number of rulings have been cited on both sides as to when temporary injunction should be granted. These are discussed below. In A. I. R. 1959 Kerla 277, it has been held that an interlocutory injunction of a mandatory character can only be granted if the court is satisfied that the plaintiffs have not only made out a prima facie case but that an irreparable or serious injury would be caused to the plaintiffs if the injunction is not issued. In AIR 1925 Lah. 628, it has been held that there is nothing in law or principle which justifies the refusal of a temporary injunction on the sole ground that the relief prayed for in the suit may be eventually refused, and that a temporary injunction may be issued where there is a substantial dispute and there is a reasonable apprehension that the property in dispute may be alienated or damaged. In A. I. R. 1937 Cal. I 72, it has been ruled that the grant of an interlocutory injunction does not depend on the validity of the suit in which the application is made. In A. I. R. 1950 Patna 366, the principle has been laid down that in appeal against the order granting an interim injunction, the High Court is not concerned to decide what is the correct answer to the question involved in the suit, but has merely to see whether there is a fair point for trial. In AIR 1952 Travancore Cochin 424, it has been held that if there seems to be a fair question to raise regarding the legal right claimed by the plaintiff, then the application for injunction has to be considered upon the grounds of balance of convenience, injury to the party and so forth. In I. L. R. 1953 Raj. p. 257, it has been laid down that in the matter of temporary injunction, the decision of the first court which is of a discretionary nature should not be easily interfered with. It has further been laid down that a person seeking temporary injunction should be able to satisfy (1) that he has prima facie case, (2) that the interference of the court is necessary to protect him from irreparable injury before his legal right is established, and (3) that the comparative mischief likely to result from with-holding the injunction will be greater than that which is likely to arise from granting it. In I. L. R. Calcutta Volume XXII, page 459, it has been held that for the grant of a temporary injunction the plaintiff in the suit should have a fair question to raise as to the existence of the right alleged by him, while for the appointment of a receiver the plaintiff must have a good prima facie title. In Indian Cases Volume 66 page 161 (Lahore), it has been held that for the grant of a temporary injunction the real point is not how the question should be decided at the hearing of the case, but whether there is a substantial question to be investigated and whether matters should not be preserved in status quo until that question can be finally decided. In A. I. R. 1951 Travancor-Cochin 221, it has been held that in cases of disputed possession a temporary injunction should not be granted unless a very strong case for it has been made out. The common point that emerges from the above rulings is that if the plaintiff makes out a fair prima facie case of right of title, the courts may grant a temporary injunction, if it is necessary to do so to prevent an irreparable injury to the plaintiff. The lower courts have given their decisions on a due consideration of these principles. The case of the opposite party in each case was that they were recorded to have been in possession in the khasra girdawari record from 2014 to 2018, and that in the proceedings of the Assistant Settlement Officer of 1962 they were adjudged to be in possession and recorded as khatedar tenants. They also alleged that the correction of the Girdawari record in favour of the applicants was a result of fraud. In fact, in the proceedings for the correction of the girdawari record before the Sub-Divisional Officer the confession made by the opposite party was only this that they were not tenants but halis (ploughmen) of the khudkasht lands of the applicants for revision. The case of the applicants for revision was that they were muafidars and held the lands in dispute as khudkasht lands in their possession. They took their stand on the fact that the opposite party had admitted themselves to be halis in the proceedings for the correction of the girdawari record. Subsequent to the orders of temporary injunction passed by the trial court, the applicants also produced receipts to show that it is they and not the opposite party who were paying rent to the State. The recital of these facts would show that the opposite party in each case had a fair question of title or right to raise for the eventual decision of the suit. The lower courts believed the evidence of the opposite party that prima facie they were in possession. The lower courts also felt that an irreparable injury would be caused to the opposite party if they were displaced, and that the inconvenience resulting from not granting temporary injunction would be greater than that resulting from the granting of the injunction. These considerations are inherent in the orders of the lower courts. The main question is whether the opposite party had made out a prima facie case for possession in their favour. This is a question of fact, and this question of fact was decided by the lower courts in favour of the opposite party on a consideration of the prima facie evidence that was produced before them. The learned counsel for the applicants has vehemently urged that in view of the confessions made by the opposite party in the proceedings for the correction of the girdawari record, they were estopped from bringing the suit altogether, or in any case, these confessions totally militated against the grant of temporary injunction. I cannot subscribe to this view. The opposite party had alleged that the proceedings of the Sub Divisional Officer for the correction of the girdawari record were the result of a fraud, and this was a matter which had to be determined eventually by lower courts. Meanwhile, the lower courts had to deal with the applications for temporary injunction on the basis of the prima facie evidence. The confessions made by the opposite party in the proceed ins before the Sub-Divisional Officer for the correction of the girdawari record were but one piece of evidence which had to be considered along with the rest of the evidence. In revision I cannot interfere with the orders of the lower courts regarding question of fact, and I see no illegality in the orders passed by the lower courts or any irregularity of procedure in the manner in which they arrived at their findings. I must strictly eschew giving my own decision regarding questions of fact, so as to avoid prejudicing the minds of the lower courts in the eventual determination of the matters in controversy in the main suits. The result of the foregoing discussion is that I dismiss these three application. . ;