- (1.) THIS is a writ application by two persons namely Khetpal and Nanniram under Art. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.
(2.) THE facts giving rise to it are that the non-petitioner No. 1 Bhuraram presented an application to the Debt Relief Court namely the Court of Civil Judge, Ganganagar under sec. 6 of the Rajasthan Relief of Agricultural Indebtedness Act, 1957, which will hereinafter be referred to as 'the Act. ' In the said application both the petitioners were mentioned as creditors. THE Debt Relief Court proceeded ex-parte against the petitioners and on 15. 2. 1961, it passed an order that the debts due to the petitioners would stand discharged since no claims were filed by them within the prescribed period as required by sec. 8 sub-sec. (1) of the Act. Against this order, both the petitioners filed review application in the same Court and it was urged that the notices were not served upon them according to law. THEir application was contested on the ground that it was beyond limitation and also another points. It was held by the Court that the review application was within limitation but on other grounds, it was dismissed on 20th December, 1961. THE petitioners then filed a revision application in the Court of the learned District Judge, Ganganagar. THE opposite party raised a preliminary objection to the effect that the revision application against the order passed in review application was not maintainable under sec. 17 of the Act. This argument found favour with the learned District Judge and he dismissed the application on this ground alone. It is this order of the learned District Judge dated 28th August, 1962 which is sought to be impugned by this writ application. The non petitioners have not cared to appear in this Court and, therefore, the petition has been heard ex-parte. It is urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the learned District Judge has committed an error in refusing to exercise his jurisdiction by not entertaining and deciding the revision application on merits and therefore this Court should interfere in the matter in its extraordinary jurisdiction and quash the said order. It appeals from the perusal of the impugned order that the learned District Judge seems to be of the view that according to the language of sec. 17 of the Act an aggrieved person had two alternative remedies namely one of filing a review application in the same Court and another of filing a revision application in the Court of the District Judge and that if the first remedy was availed, the second would be barred. It was observed by him that since the petitioners filed a review application against the order dated 15. 2. 61, he had no jurisdiction to entertain revision application against the order of that Court passed in the review application. We have given due consideration to the view expressed by the learned District Judge and we find it extremely difficult to accept it. Sec. 17 and 18 of the Act of 1957 ran as follows : "17. Revision of order of Debt Relief Court - Any person aggrieved by an order of a Debt Relief Court may, within ninety days of such order, apply to the District Court for revision of the order on any of the following grounds: - (a) that the order is contrary to law; (b) that the Court has exercised jurisdiction not vested in it by law; (c) that the instalments fixed under subsec. (3) of sec. 11 are inequitable but subject to the orders of the District Court on such application and further subject to the provisions of sec. 18, the order of the Debt Relief Court shall be final. Explanation - For the purposes of this section the District Court shall be deemed to be the Court of the District Judge within whose civil jurisdiction the Debt Relief Court is situate. "18. Review - A Debt Relief Court or the District Court which has passed any order under sec. 17, may, either on its own motion at any time or on an application from any person interested made within sixty days of the passing of any order, review the order so passed and passany other order in reference thereto as it thinks fit. Provided that no order once passed shall be varied or reversed unless notice has been given to the persons interested to appear and be heard in support thereof. " This Act was amended by the Rajasthan Relief of Agricultural Indebtedness (Amendment) Act, 1962 (Act No. 9 of 1962) and thereby sec. 17 was amended by sec. 12, which runs as follows : "in the Explanation to Sec. 17, of the principal Act, after the words "this section" the words and figures "and secs. 18, 18-A and 19" shall, as from the 13th day of October, 1961, be and be deemed to have been inserted. '' It would appear from Sec. 12 of the amendment Act that Sec. 17 of the original Act was amended retrospectively. This position is quite clear from the use of the words " shall, as from the 13th day of Oct. 1961, be and be deemed to have been inserted" appearing in Sec. 12 of the amendment Act. It may now be pointed out that the opening words of Sec. 17 make it clear that a person aggrieved by an order of the Debt Relief Court may within ninety days of such order apply to the District Court for revision of the order on any of the grounds mentioned thereafter. The use of the words "an order" would show that the Legislature did not mean to restrict the jurisdiction of the District Court to the revision of only original final orders passed by a Debt Relief Court. There is nothing in this Sec. to show that the jurisdiction of the District Court did not extend to revision of the order of the Debt Relief Court passed under Sec. 18. If the view expressed by the learned District Judge is to be accepted, then it would mean that if the Debt Relief Court, on review, happens to commit a mistake and instead of rectifying a mistake in the original order passes a wrong order on review while correcting one mistake leaves out another mistake uncorrected, there would be no remedy left for the aggrieved person under the Act. In our opinion, this could never have been the intention of the Legislature. The learned District Judge has interpreted the following words appearing in clause (c) of Sec. 17 - "subject to the orders of the District Court on such application and further subject to the provisions of Sec. 18, the order of the Debt Relief Court shall be final. " to mean that the orders of the Debt Relief Court passed in review under Section 18 was final. In our view, the learned District Judge has not correctly appreciated the true import of these words. The ordinary meaning of these words would be that if no review application is filed or no revision application is filed the order of the Debt Relief Court would be final. If a review application is filed and the order is passed in review that would be final provided it is not altered in a revision application filed against it to the District Judge. If no application for review is filed, then also the order of the District Judge passed in revision application would be final. It may be further pointed out that even if it be assumed that there was some room for two interpretations of the language of Sec. 17 on this point, there was no scope left for any doubt after the amendment of Sec. 17 by Sec. 12 of the Amendment Act. It is clear from the amendment referred above that the Court of the District Judge would be the Court of revisional jurisdiction not only for the purposes of Sec. 17 but also for purposes of Sec. 18. It is, therefore, clear that the learned District Judge has committed an error in refusing to exercise his jurisdiction and in not deciding the revision application on its merits. The writ application is, therefore, allowed and the order of the learned District Judge dated 28th August, 1962 is set aside. He is directed to hear both the parties and decide the revision application on merits. As the opposite party has not appeard in this Court to contest the writ application, the petitioners are left to bear their own costs in this Court. . ;