- (1.) THIS revision petition has been filed against the order of the Revenue Appellate Authority Kota dated the 27th November, 1963 whereby the learned Revenue Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal of the petitioner against the judgment and decree of the Sub-Divisional Officer, Gangapur dated the 24th April, 1963, for want of compliance of the court's order dated the 14th October, 1963.
(2.) IT was averred on behalf of the petitioner that the lower appellate court had taken a strict view of the matter and had failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it to condone the default of the petitioner. IT was stated that the appeal filed by the petitioner had been dismissed in default on the 10th June, 1963 and was subsequently restored on the 14th October, 1963, subject to the payment of Rs. 10 as costs. IT was stated that on the next date of hearing, viz. , the 27th November, 1963 the appellant had submitted an application that he was able to arrange for only Rs. 5/- and he, therefore, sought an adjournment for 2 months so that he could arrange for the remainder of Rs. 5/ -. The learned counsel for the petitioner argued that courts were meant to do justice between the parties, and undue emphasis on technicalities which cramps their powers and diminishes their effectiveness and defeats the very purpose for which they are constituted should not be insisted upon. In this connection, he sought support from A. I. R. 1960 S. C. 368, and pleaded that justice should be tempered with mercy and humanism. On the other hand, the counsel for the opposite party drew my attention to the chequered history of the case and sought to establish that the petitioner was deliberately delaying the disposal of the case by adopting dilatory tactics. He referred to the order of the Registrar dated the 23rd December, 1963, a perusal of which shows that the petitioner had not attached the copy of the order of S. D. O. Gangapur along with the petition as required under R. 17 (c) of the Rajasthan Revenue Courts Manual. He stated that although reveal adjournments had been given to the petitioner to do so, the copy of the order had not yet been filed. He argued that R. 17 (c) read with R. 32 made it obligatory on the petitioner to attach a copy of the judgment of the Court of first instance when an application is directed against an appellate order or decree. The Registrar had, of course, the authority to receive it for sufficient cause shown, and grant such time as he considered proper for supplying such documents and removing such deficiencies as existed therein. If the required documents were not supplied within the time allowed by the Registrar, the application was required to be listed for rejection before the Board. In this case, the Registrar had fixed the 24th January, 1964 for the supply of the relevant document and the case should have been listed for rejection on that day. This was not done, and the learned Member before whom the case was placed gave a week's time to the counsel for the applicant for removing the deficiency and adjourned the case to the 23rd March. On that day also, no compliance was made of this order, and the case was adjourned to the 2nd June by the Registrar, who again ordered that the required copy should be produced before the fixed date. On the 2nd June also, this deficiency was not removed and a petition was filed by the counsel for the applicant with the request that the court may dispense with the filing of the trial court's order or alternatively may grant further time for the purpose. The counsel for the opposite party argued that, in the lower court also, the petitioner had adopted similar tactics and had not attached a copy of the decree along with the appeal which was filed on the 10th May, 1963. When the case came up for hearing on the 10th June, 1963 the petitioner, who was the appellant in the lower court, was absent. The appeal was, accordingly, dismissed in default. It was restored on the petition of the applicant on the 14th October 1963, but was again rejected for want of compliance of the order of the Court. It was argued that the impugned order was apparently an order under O. 17, R. 3 of the Civil Procedure Code, as it had been passed subsequent to the default of the petitioner to perform an act necessary to the further progress of the suit for which time had been allowed. It was stated the the remedy of a party aggrieved by an order under this rule is by way of an appeal or review and not by way of a revision and, therefore, it was pleaded that the present revision petition was incompetent. In this connection my attention was drawn to AIR 1958 Rajasthan 7 in which it was held that where the Court proceeds under R. 3 of 0-17 the only remedy of the party is to file an appeal against the decree that is passed under R. 3. Same view was taken in AIR 1954 Allahabad 22 wherein it was held that the defendant's remedy was by way of appeal or review if the order granting the plaintiff a decree was made by the Court under O. 17, R. 3. It was urged on behalf of the opposite party that no revision was competent where an appeal lay. In reply, the learned counsel for the petitioner stated that the only question before this court was whether the Court below should or should not have granted the adjournment sought for as the petitioner had failed to arrange for the payment of Rs. 10/ -. It was pleaded on behalf of the petitioner that the court should have acted mercifully and judiciously in the exercise of its jurisdiction. As regards the deficiency in the application for revision discovered by the Registrar, it was submitted that the Court could dispense with this condition for sufficient cause or in the alternative could grant further time in the interest of justice. Taking into consideration the habitual default of the petitioner, I am not impressed by this argument. It appears that the petitioner has been deliberately neglecting to fulfil the requirements of law and it would not be fair to the opposite party to allow any indulgence to the petitioner who has been given a long rope, hitherto-fore. I agree with the learned counsel for the opposite party that the wheels of law must operate fairly and equitably and no undue favour should be shown to the petitioner. In the result, the revision petition is hereby dismissed as incompetent. . ;