- (1.) Ramjas and others plaintiff appellants have filed this appeal against the judgment and decree of the Additional Commissioner, Bikaner dated 24 -8 -61.
(2.) Briefly, the facts of the case are that a suit for division of the holding filed by the plaintiff appellant was dismissed by the Assistant Collector, Nohar by judgment dated 10 -3 -60. An application for obtaining the copy of the decree was filed by the appellants on 1 -8 -60. The decree by that time was not ready and was actually signed by the Presiding Officer on 2 -9 -60 and given to the appellants on 3 -9 -60. He filed an appeal before the Additional Commissioner, Bikaner on 5 -10 -60. The Additional Commissioner, Bikaner heard the appeal and rejected it on the ground that it was time barred holding that the limitation would run from the date of the judgment. Aggrieved by that judgment of the first appellate Court, the appellants have come in the second appeal before us
(3.) It is an admitted fact that the application for obtaining the copy of the decree filed by the appellant was made long after the expiry of the limitation period of 90 days reckoned from the date of the judgment dated 10 -3 -60. Art. 156 of the Limitation Act lays down 90 days within which the appeal should be filed from the date of the decree. According to O. 20, R. 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure date of a decree has to be reckoned as the date of a judgment because the decree must bear the date of the judgment. Revenue Manual R. 136 requires that the decree should be prepared within 3 days after the date of the judgment. Therefore, the limitation period according to Art.156 of the Limitation Act would run from the date of the judgment i.e. on 10 -3 -60. Sec. 12 sub -sec. (2) of the Limitation Act allows that in computing the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal, which is 90 days, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced and, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree therefrom shall be excluded. The counsel for the appellant therefore argued that as the decree was not prepared on the date of the judgment in this case by the trial Court but subsequently signed on 2 -9 -60 the appellant applied for the copy of the same on 1 -8 -60 i.e. a few days prior to the signing of the decree. Since no decree was in existence the question of application for a copy of the decree did not arise. He therefore urged that the limitation in this case should run from 2 -9 -60 and he presented the appeal before the Additional Commissioner on 5 -10 -60 well within 90 days from the date the decree was signed and supplied to him. In support the counsel cited 75 Indian Cases page 265 of the Patna High Court to support his contention that an application filed after signing of the decree, the limitation should run from the date and not previous to it. The counsel for the respondent, however replied by saying that the judgment was given on 10 -3 -60 whereas the application for copy of the decree was made on 1 -8 -60 long after the limitation period had expired and therefore the appellant was not entitled to the benefit of sec. 12 sub -sec. 2 of the Limitation Act for the time spent between the date of the judgment and the date when a decree was given to him. This was not the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree appealed from. In support the counsel cited R.R.D. 1959 p. 164, R.R.D. 1959 p. 121, A.I.R. 1953 Raj. p. 165, A.I.R. 1960 Madhya Pradesh, p. 108. The counsel for the respondent further pointed out that all these rulings clearly support his case that where an application is filed for obtaining a copy of the decree long after the expiry of the limitation period reckoned from the date of the judgment that time in between the two documents cannot be excluded.;