BHARGAVA, J. - (1.) THIS is a second appeal by the defendant in a suit for recovery of possession of the temple of Shri Roop Chaturbhujji and Mahadeoji and for perpetual injunction seeking to restrain the defendant from interfering with the Seva Puja of the temple.
(2.) THE suit was filed on behalf of Thakurji Shriji of Temple Roopji Mahadeo Ji, Chowkri Gangapol, Jaipur City through the Mahant of Thikana Galta on the allegation that the temple belonged to Thikana Galta and was being managed through its Mahant who engaged the services of the defendant on a monthly salary of Rs. 5/8/- for the purpose of Seva Puja of the temple. It was alleged that the defendant had denied the title of the Thikana Galta to the temple and has asserted his own right by taking rent notes of the temple property in his own name and further had not allowed the plaintiff's men to enter the temple premises to carry out the repairs of the temple and had thus misconducted himself in the discharge of his duties and hence he was removed from the office by a registered notice sent to him on 17th November, 1954. As after his removal from the office of Pujari the defendant refused to deliver possession of the properties both movable and immovable of the temple of which he was in possession by virtue of his office, the present suit was filed for the above reliefs. Defendant contested the suit and stated that irrevocable grant of the temple had been made in favour of his ancestors and therefore, the plaintiff had no right to remove him from the office. As regards the allegations of mis-conduct he admitted the letting out of houses and land on rent and stated that the plaintiff had no right to interfere in that matter. In paragraph 6 of the written statement, it was stated that the Mahant of Thikana Galta unauthorisedly wanted to take possession of the temple and when he was unsuccessful, he filed the present suit. It was further stated that the defendant and his ancestors had been living and performing Seva Puja in the temple for generations. Plaintiff's allegation that the defendant was paid Rs. 5/8/- as salary was not specifically denied in the written statement. The following two issues were tried in the court below: - 1. Whether the defendant was an employee of the plaintiff and was in possession of the temple as such, and that he was paid expenses for Bhograg etc. by the plaintiff? 2. Whether the conduct of the defendant was in contravention of the duties entrusted to him, and the plaintiff was entitled to remove him and obtain posses-sion of the temple? On the above issues the courts below have found that though the defendant and his ancestors have held the office of Pujari of the temple of the Roopji Mahadeoji for several generations yet the defendant's father was actually appointed to the office by the Mahant of Thikana Galta. It has been further found that the defendant was in possession of the temple properties as a Pujari and no grant of the temple had even been made in perpetuity in favour of his ancestors. They have also held that before the institution of the present suit the defendant disclaimed the title of the plaintiff and claimed an absolute right of ownership and possession in him which amounted to misconduct on his part and was a sufficient ground for his removal by the plaintiff. On these findings a decree for possession of temple specified in para 1 of the plaint and for injunction restraining the defendant from conducting the Seva Puja of the temple either or personally or through his agents or in any manner interfering with the Seva Puja of the temple has been passed against the defendant. The courts below have rightly repelled the defendant's contention that grant of the temple in perpetuity had been made in favour of his ancestors and the plaintiff had no right to interfere in the affairs of the temple. Patta Ex. 1 relied upon by the defendant which was issued in favour of Ram Ballabh father of the defendant in Smt. year 1951 by the ancestor of the plaintiff clearly describes Ram Ballabh as a Pujari of the temple entrusted with the work of Seva Puja of the temple. It further recites that Ram Ballabh would get prescribed commodities for Bhog and would perform his duties well and rear his children with the Bhog Samigri and the Thikana would not interfere with it. The defendant in his own application marked Exs. 4, 5 and 6 has described himself as Pujari of the temple. In Ex. 4 he apologised to the Mahant of Thikana Galta for misbehaviour of his brother and admitted that he was a Pujari in the temple on behalf of Thikans Galta. In Ex. 5 the defendant made a request to Thikana Galta to pay him five months salary in advance in cash for the treatment of his mother. In Ex. 6 also he described himself as Pujari and is also addressed to Thikana Galta. In the face of these admissions it is futile to urge that the defendant was not the Pujari of the temple but held it as an owner. The application Ex. 5 further makes it clear that the defendant was getting salary from the plaintiff. The only question which deserves consideration is whether the plaintiff was entitled to remove the defendant from his office on account of the alleged misconduct. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that the defendant is a hereditary Pujari of a Public temple and emoluments are attached to his office and as such he can only be removed by the court, and the plaintiff has no right to remove him. In support of this contention reliance is placed on a Single Bench decision of this Court in Smt. Bansi Devi Vs. Girdharilal (1), which was approved by the same learned Judge in a subsequent decision in Dhananjai Vs. Ram Kumar (2 ). The above two decisions no doubt support the contention raised by the learned counsel. In Smt. Bansi Devi's case (1) the learned Judge after quoting the following observations from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Raj Kali Kuer Vs. Rattan (3 ). "that religious offices can be hereditary and that the right to such an office is in the nature of property under the Hindu Law is now well established. . . . . . . . . On ; the view that 'shebait' is property, this Court has also recognised the right of a female to succeed to the religious office of 'shebaitship'. ,. . . . . . On the same analogy that of a 'shebaiti' right, the right of a hereditary priest or 'pujari' in a temple must also amount to property where emoluments are attached to such an office. . . . . . . . . Now there can be no doubt that while in one sense the right to such a religious office is property it involves also substantial elements of duty. . . . . . ' both the elements of office and property, of duties and personal interest are blended together (in such offices) and neither can be detached from the other. "it is also to be recognised that in respect of such offices especially where they are attached to (public institutions, the duties are to be regarded as primary and that the rights and emoluments are only appurtenant to the duties. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . whether such an office has developed into a hereditary right of property, the consideration of public policy cannot be insisted on to the extent of negativing the right itself. In such a situation what has to be equally emphasised is the duty-aspect of the office and to insist, on the superior authorities in charge of the temple exercising vigilantly their responsibility by controlling the then incumbent of the priestly office in the exercise of his rights (or by other person having interest taking appropriate stamps through court), when it is found that the services are not being properly or efficiently performed. In view of the peculiar nature of such offices as combining in them both the element of property and the element of duty, it cannot be doubted that superior authorities in charge of the institutions or other persons interested have this right which may be enforced by appropriate legal means. " came to the conclusion that: - "a hereditary Pujari of a public temple where emoluments are attached to such an office can only be removed by a civil suit. The right to such an office is a right to property. The right to such office no doubt involves substantial elements of duty. The duties and personal interest are blended together and neither can be detached from the other. But the consideration of public policy cannot be insisted on to the extent of negativing the right itself. The right to the office in such a case cannot be destroyed without an adjudication by a civil court. The Shebait cannot be left to decide whether there has been neglect of duty to the extent of destroying the right to the office. " The above observations were made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in a case where a woman claimed joint title to the office of Pujari along with the defendant and the question for their Lordships' consideration was whether the office of a Pujari and Panda of the temple can be inherited by a female. On that question their Lordships found that there was nothing in the Hindu Law debarring a female succeeding to a priestly office and getting the same performed through a competent deputy. On the other hand it appeared to be fairly well recognised by usage that a female could succeed to a priestly office. " It is in that context that the above observations were made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. Their Lordships pointed out that the consideration of public policy cannot be insisted on to the extent of negativing the female's right to succeed to the office of a Pujari when there is no express prohibition in the texts for the performance of the duties of the Pujaris' office by the appointment of substitutes and where such an office has developed into a hereditary right of property. Their Lordships further emphasised the duty aspect of the office and in that connection observed that - "that superior authorities in charge of the temple exercising vigilantly their responsibility by controlling the then incumbent of the priestly office in exercise of his rights (or by other persons having interest taking appropriate steps through court), when it is found that the services are not being properly or efficiently performed. " It was further pointed that - "in view of the peculiar nature of such offices as combining in them both the element of property and the element of duty, it cannot be doubted that superior authorities in charge of the institutions or other persona interested have this right which may be enforced by appropriate legal means. " Their Lordships further referred to the decision of the Privy Council in Peary Mohan Mukherji Vs. Monoher Mukherji (4) where the Privy Council recognised that : - "notwithstanding the personal interest of a 'shebait' in respect of his office, the performance of the duties thereof has got to be safeguarded and that he can be removed where he has put himself in a position in which the obligation of his office can no longer be faithfully discharged. " with respect the above observations cannot be pressed into service to hold that a Shebait or the authorities incharge of the temple do not possess a right to remove a Pujari from the office even if good and sufficient grounds are made out for such action and the only remedy for them is to enforce that right by appropriate legal action. Before to Supreme Court there was no question about the rights of a Shebait to remove a Pujari from his office. With great respect, I am unable to agree with view taken in Smt. Bansi Devi's case (1 ). If that view were to be adopted it will lead to very undesirable situations and a Pujari though guilty of committing gross misconduct would have a right to continue in office until a decree for his removal is passed by a court. It has been laid down in several cases that where the appointment of a Purohit has been at the will of the founder, the mere fact that the appointees have performed the worship for several generations, will not confer an independent right upon the members of the family so appointed and, will not entitle them as of right to be continued in office as priest. (See Ananda Chandra Chakrabarti Vs. Brojalal Singh (5), Kali Krishna Ray Vs. Makhanlal Mukherjee (6) and Gauri Shanker Vs. Ambika Dutt (7 ). It has further been held that the managers of a temple are clearly entitled to remove Pujaris from their office (See Dharam Karan Bahadur Asaf Jahi Vs. Smt. Shahzad Kunwar (8), Ajit Bhavgar Ratigar Vs. Managers of Property (9) and Mandir of Jadeshwar Mahadev Vs. Ranga Bhattar (10) where it was held that "a hereditary Archaka can be dismissed by the trustee but only for good reasons which are liable to examination by a court of justice. With respect, I agree with the view taken in the Madras case that a Pujari can be dismissed by the Shebait or the manager of the temple for good reasons which are liable to examination by a court of justice. To say that a Pujari is not subject to disciplinary jurisdiction of his superior authorities and cannot be removed by him even on grounds of misconduct, would be placing him on a pedestal even higher than that of persons employed in the service of the State, because they too can be removed from their office on good reasons by competent authorities after following the provisions of the Constitution. In the present case all that has been shown is that the defendant was receiving salary from the plaintiff and certain articles of food for the Bhog of the deity. Besides this it has not been shown that he was enjoying any other property or income of the temple. As regards the misconduct on the part of the defendant, it has been proved that he got the rent notes of the temple properties executed in his personal name. It has been further proved that he did not allow the workmen sent by the plaintiff to carry on the work of repairs in the temple. On the other hand he asserted his own title to the property. This is not disputed by the defendant. On the other hand both in the written statement and in his own statement before the court, he maintained that the plaintiff had no right to interfere and that he was justified in the above actions done by him. The courts below have found that charge of misconduct is proved by the above acts of the defendant and I agree with that finding. That being so, the plaintiff was entitled to remove the defendant from his office. The defendant therefore, does not possess any right to remain in possession of the properties of the temple of which he was in occupation by virtue of his office only. Since he has already been removed from that office, he cannot now remain in possession of the property. The suit has been rightly decreed against him. There is fro force in this appeal which is hereby dismissed with costs. Learned counsel prays for leave to appeal to a larger Bench. The leave is allowed. .;