BHARGAVA, J. - (1.) THIS is a defendant's appeal in a suit for eviction.
(2.) PLAINTIFF's case was that a Chabutra with a tin shed over it was rented out to the defendant on a monthly rent of Rs. 2/ -. It was alleged that the defendant had made defaults in the payment of rent for five months i. e. , from Sawan Badi 11 to Poh Badi 11, Smt. 2016. It was also alleged that he had raised the height of the tin shed and had closed the chabutra by fixing doors fitted in a wooden frame without his permission and in contravention of the terms of the lease. On these grounds the plaintiff sought defendant's eviction from the disputed premises. The defendant contested the suit. He admitted the tenancy only over eastern half portion of the chabutra at an annual rent of Rs. 24/- and stated that the remaining part was in occupation of his son. He also admitted the raising of the height of the tin shed and the fixing of doors with the permission of Gopiram plaintiff's agent. Objection was also raised with regard to the validity of the notice determining his tenancy. Both the courts below have found that the defendant had made such constructions as have materially altered the premises. The trial court also held that the notice determining the tenancy was valid though the learned District Judge has not expressed any opinion on this point. Learned counsel for the appellant has raised the following contentions: 1. that the suit was not based on the ground referred in section 13 (1) (c) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction), Act, 1950 (hereinafter called the Act ). 2. that the raising the height of the tin shed and fixing of doors in a wooden frame had not materially altered the premises. 3. that the notice determining the tenancy was not in accordance with the provisions of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. As regards the first contention,though it may be technically true that in the plaint it was not stated precisely that the alleged constructions had materially altered the premises yet the constructions made by the defendant were clearly described in the plaint and it was alleged that it had been done unauthorisedly without the permission of the plaintiff. Both the parties also led evidence regarding the nature of constructions and the courts below have recorded their finding holding that the said constructions have materially altered the premises. Therefore when facts necessary to establish that material alterations had been made in the premises by the defendant, had been stated in the plaint though its legal effect was not stated and no prejudice has been caused to the defendant on this ground, it would not be right to non-suit the plaintiff on this technical objection. I, therefore, do not see any force in this contention. The second contention raises the question as regards the interpretation of 'material alteration of the premises' as used in section 13 (1) (c) of the Act. Section 13 (1) (c) of the Act reads as follows : - "that the tenant has without the permission of the landlord made or permitted to be made any such construction as, in the opinion of the court, has materially altered the premises or is likely to diminish the value thereof. " In order to satisfy the requirements of the above clause, it is necessary to prove that: 1. the tenant has made or permitted to be made constructions in the premises. 2. such constructions have been made without the permission of the landlord, and 3. they have materially altered the premises or is likely to diminish the value thereof. There is no dispute now in the present case that constructions in the premises have been made by the defendant without the permission of the landlord. The only question which requires determination is whether the alleged constructions have materially altered the premises or have diminished its value. The word 'or' occurring after the word 'premises' in the above clause has been used in disjunctive sense and not in conjunctive sense. It is well settled rule of interpretation that substitution of conductions should not be made without sufficient reason. Unless the change is required by any rule of grammar, or by the sense of the particular passage, or, by the general drift of the section or general scheme of the enactment or if adherence to strict literal interpretation is destructive of the object of the enactment, the word 'or' will not be read as 'and' or vice versa. (Interpretation of Indian Statutes by Jagdish Swaroop page 134 ). In the present case there appear no sufficient reasons to read the word 'or' as 'and'. If material alteration of the premises alone was not intended to be a sufficient ground for eviction and it was further necessary for the landlord to show that such material alteration had diminished the value of the premises - the purpose of the Legislature could have been served by simply saying that the construction has in the opinion of the court, diminished the value of the premises or else by using the conjunction 'and' instead of 'or' after the word premises. Under clause 13 (1) (c) a substantial alteration in the character of the demised premises by a tenant by itself will be a ground for his eviction notwithstanding that the value of the premises has thereby increased. It is not permissible that a tenant may convert a shop into a residential house or pull down a building and erect a new one in its place. Therefore, it follows that if either condition i. e. , the 'material alteration of the premises' or 'the diminishing of its value' is satisfied the case would be covered by this clause. In other words it is not necessary that the material alteration of the premises should also diminish its value. It would be sufficient to show that the premises have been materially altered even though its value may not have diminished. In the present case it is not the plaintiff's case that by the alleged constructions value of the premises is diminished. His case is only this that the said constructions have materially altered the premises. On behalf of the appellant it is contended that raising the height of the tin shed does not amount to any construction and in any event it has not materially altered the premises. Further it is contended that raising the height of the tin shed became necessary because the height of the Chabutra below had already been raised by the landlord. It is also contended that the doors have been temporarily fixed and can be removed at any time without damaging the premises. It is pointed out that the premises inspite of these constructions substantially remain the same and cannot be said to have materially altered. It is also contended that the alleged constructions have not adversely affected the premises, on the other hand they have enhanced its value and have been made by the appellant to use the premises more beneficially. In my view the question whether any material alteration has been made in the premises is a question of fact in each case depending upon the nature of the premises and nature, extent and effect of the constructions made therein. The alteration should be of structural nature and not merely of decorative nature. Fixing a door to a room or to a garage by a tenant may not amount to material alteration within the meaning of sec. 13 (1) (c) of the Act but the same will not be the case when an open verandah is converted into a closed room by fixing doors on the open portion. The character and shape of the premises in the former case remain unchanged while in the latter case the form and structure of the premises is changed. What was formally a Chabutra with a tin shed over it is converted into a closed room. In the present case it is admitted by the appellant that he has constructed a pucca masonry wall upon the floor of the Chabutra and has converted the whole of the open Chabutra into a closed shop, a part of which on his own admission is occupied by his son. The chabutras are generally kept open and it is very uncommon to close them by any sort of structure. It may be noted that the appellant formerly had a betel shop at the Chabutra and the premises were let out to him for that purpose. Now by the above constructions, he has divided it into two portions one of which is occupied by his son for running a betel shop and the other by him for selling tea. In my view though the said construction has not diminished the value of the premises yet it has certainly materially altered the premises and the case clearly comes within the mischief of clause (c) of sec. 13 (1) of the Act. I, therefore, agree with the courts below that the defendant can be ejected from the premises on this ground. Learned counsel for the appellant further contends that under the general law (Transfer of Property Act sec. 108 (p) a tenant is prohibited from making any permanent structure on the property without the latter's consent and therefore, under clause (c) of sec. 13 (1) also the construction should be of a permanent nature. It may be observed that under the general law a tenant can be ejected after determining the tenancy by a notice in accordance with the provisions of sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act while under the Act he is protected from eviction as long as he is ready and willing to pay rent and is not guilty of the acts mentioned in clauses (a) to (g) and (j) of sec. 13 (1) of the Act. Under the Act a tenant would be liable to be ejected from the premises if he makes such constructions as in the opinion of the court have materially altered the premises. As for the third contention, it may be pointed out that the premises were let out to the appellant when the Transfer of Property Act was not in force in the erstwhile Bikaner State and as such the provisions of sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act will not be applicable to this case. The only point to be considered is whether he was given reasonable time to vacate the premises. It appears from Exs. 1 and 2 that notice determining the tenancy was served on the appellant on 10 (h December, 1959 and he was asked to vacate the premises by 1st January, 1960 and thus he had a notice of 20 days which in the circumstances of the case must be regarded as quite reasonable.
(3.) ALL the contentions raised therefore, fail. The appeal has no force and is hereby dismissed with costs. Two months' time is allowed to the appellant to vacate the premises failing which the decree for eviction shall be executed against him. Learned counsel prays for leave to appeal which is rejected. .;