Ranawat, J. - (1.) THIS is a civil revision against the judgment of the Civil Judge, Dholpur, dated the 16th March, 1951, Confirming the judgment and decree of the court of the Munsif, Dholpur of the 23rd of August, 1949 by which the suit of the Plaintiff was dismissed.
(2.) THE plaintiff, Seth Surajbhan, Proprie-tor of Dholpur Glass Works, filed a suit against the Governor-General, Dominion of India, representing the Great Indian Peninsula Railway and the North Western Railway, now known as the Western Punjab Railway with the allegations that the plaintiff booked nine packages of goods to Bannu from Dhol pur Railway station by goods train per Railway Receipt No. 69 (34/50 on the 21st of September, 1944. THE goods were consigned to self and the Railway Receipt was sent to the consignee through a Bank but the consignee did not care to claim the delivery and the Railway Receipt was returned to the plaintiff through the Bank. THE plaintiff wrote to the Station Master Bannu, and also to the lost Property Office, Lahore, on the 31st January, 1945 to re book the said consignment to Dholpur at his expense but the Railway authorities did not comply with this request nor did they acknowledge receipt of the letter. It was claimed that the defendant was guilty of wrongfully withholding the plaintiff's goods or wrongful conversion of the same and was bound to compensate the plaintiff for his losses. It was stated that the Price of the goods was Rs. 275/- and Rs. 25/- was claimed as interest therein along with Rs. 5/-as cost of notices served on the defendant. In all a claim of Rs. 305/- was made. The defendant traversed the allegations of the plaintiff except that they admitted that the goods were booked from Dholpur as stated by the plaintiff. A number of issue were framed by the trial court and issue Nos. l, 3 and 4 which related to points of law were decided against the plaintiff. It was held that the suit was time-barred under Art. 31 of the Indian Limitation Act and that the North Western Railway, which was now in Pakistan, alone was responsible, if at all, for the claim of the plaintiff and that the Great Indian Peninsula Railway was not liable. It was further held that the Union of India was not implead as one of the defendants and as such the frame of the suit was bad and the suit was therefore not maintainable. As regards the place of suing, it was held that the court at Dholpur had the jurisdiction to determine the suit. The suit of the plaintiff was accordingly dismissed. On appeal by the plaintiff, the learned Civil Judge agreed with the finding of the fist court as regards frame of the suit it was held that the defect was one of misdescription only and was cured by the necessary amendments. The appeal was however dismissed on the point of limitation. This revision petition has been filed against the aforesaid judgment of the Civil Judge and it has been urged that the learned lower appellate court was wrong in deciding the issue of limitation against the plaintiff. It was stressed that Art. 48 of the Indian Limitation Act was applicable to this case and the lower court was wrong in taking recourse to Art. 31 of Indian Limitation Act. Attention was invited to the averments contained in the plaint about the conversion of the goods in order to bring the case of the plaintiff within the scope of Art 48. Art. 31 provides one year's period of limitation from the date when the goods ought to be delivered in cases against carriers for compensation for non-delivery of, or delay in delivering goods. Art, 48 is a general article for specific moveable property lost or acquired by theft, or dishonest misappropriation or conversion for compensation for wrongfully taking or detaining the same. The period of limitation provided is of three years from the date the person having the right to the possession of the property first learns in whose possession it is. It is stated in the plaint that the defendant was guilty of withholding and wrongful conversion of the plaintiff's goods and was bound to compensate the plaintiff for all his losses, and that the cause of action arose on or about the end of January, 1945, when the plaintiff came to know that the consignment had been sent to the Lost Property Office, Lahore, and also on subsequent dates when the defendant wrongfully converted his goods. It would be apparent from the above statement of the plaint that the plaintiff wanted to bring his case within the scope of Art. 48 on the basis of wrongful conversion. No detailed facts were however given by the plaintiff to explain how he could make a case of conversion against the defendant. The learned counsel of the petitioner stated in this behalf that the defendant Railway wrongfully detained the goods and failed to give any reply to the plaintiff when he made a request for rebooking of the goods to Dholpur. The learned counsel however admitted that no facts were placed on the record of the case to show that the goods were wrongfully detained by the defendant at any time. In the Law of Torts by Salmounds, 10th Edition, in Chapter IX, sec. 73, paragraph 4, under the head 'demand and refusal' it has been noted that "the usual method of proving that a detention is adverse within the meaning of the rule, under discussion, was to show that the plaintiff demanded the delivery of chattel and that the defendant refused or neglected to comply with the demand. . . . . . . . . Presumably any conduct of the defendant which shows that he not merely possesses the goods but intends to hold them in defiance of the plaintiff and he deprived him of the possession of them is sufficient to constitute a conversion even though there has been to formal demand of restitution " Similarly in Kaikhusroo Manekshah vs. Gangadas Dwarkadas (l) it has been held that the detention of property amounts to conversion only when it is adverse to the owner or other person entitled to possession. Reliance in this case was placed on the authority of an English case of Clayton vs. Le Roy (l911) 2 K. B. 1031. In the present case, it had not been shown by the plaintiff as to how the possession of the goods by the Railway became adverse to him. Mere non-delivery of the goods cannot be taken to mean conversion of the goods, because non-delivery by itself is not sufficient to warrant an inference of adverse possession on the part of the defendant. It is suggested in the plaint that delivery was not taken as the destination and the goods were sent by the Station Master, Bannu, to the Lost Property Office, Lahore, where they might have been sold under provision No. 56 of the Indian Railways Act. Reliance is placed in this behalf on the cases of Nawab Boot House vs. Secretary of State (2) and Secretary of State vs. Simla Footwear Co. (3) where it was held that where goods are sold by the Railway Company against the express direction of the plaintiff Art. 48 or 49 would apply to the case and not Art. 31. It appears that there is a conflict of judicial opinion on this point among some of the High Courts in India. In the case of G. I. P. Railway Company vs. Radhakrishanjaikishan (4) it was observed that a suit against a carrier for compensation for non-delivery of goods was governed by Art. 31 of the Limitation act no matter what the circumstances are which occasion the non-delivery. This point came up before a Division Bench of this Court in The Union of India vs. Girraj Prasad (5) in which after discussion of the various authorities on this point, it was observed as follows: - "we are of the view that the principal of General Special bus non derogant cannot be easily ignored and where a suit falls both within a general article and a special article the letter should prevail over the former. In the view which we have taken the present case is governed by Art. 31 of the Indian Limitation Act". That was also a case for compensation again a Railway Company in which the plaintiff wanted to bring his case under Art. 48 of the Railway Limitation Act and the defendant pleaded Art. 31 in defence. The decision in G. I. P. Railway Co. vs. Radha-kishan (4) was approved. It was held that a suit against a carrier for non-delivery of good would fail under Art. 31 irrespective of the fact that non-delivery may be due to many cause of which conversion is one and the cause of action arose from non-delivery of the goods. This Court is bound by the decision in the Union of India vs. Girraj Prasad's case (5) Though the plaintiff has tried to base his claim on the fact of conversion it cannot be denied that the suit is against a carrier and non-delivery of the good gave rise to the cause of action of the plaintiff's even though conversion had been pleaded as the special ground for the non-delivery. The special provision of Art. 31 has under these circumstances been rightly applied to this case by the lower court. As the suit of the plaintiff fails on the point of Limitation, it is not necessary to consider the other points about the maintainability of the suit. It may be pointed out here that the observations of the lower appellate court regarding issue No. 4 that the suit was not maintainable were in conflict with the observations of that court regarding defect in the frame of the suit. This point however is not material as the suit fails on the point of limitation. The revision application under these circumstances fails and is dismissed with costs. . ;