Dave, J. - (1.) THIS is a second appeal by the judgment-debtor in execution proceedings. The only question involved is that of limitation and therefore it would be proper to give the relevant dates.
(2.) THE decree-holder-respondent Jagan-nath obtained a decree against three persons Ram Chander, Ram Lal and Ram Karan from the court of the Munsiff Chittorgarh on 17th January, 1940. On 8th of January, 1941, he took out execution or the said decree. When the execution proceedings were pending, two of the defendants, Ramchander and Ramlal filed two separate appeals against the decree in the court of the District Judge, Bhilwara. Ram Chander's appeal was accepted and the suit was dismissed against him. Ramlal's appeal was only partially accepted and the decree was reduced from Rs. 942/-to Rs. 706/-Ramlal preferred a second appeal to the High Court of Mewar but with no success. His appeal was dismissed on 9th July, 1942. THE petition for execution which was originally filed on 8th January, 1941. was dismissed on 27th December, 1945, on the ground that the decree of the original court was modified by the court of the District Judge and the High Court and that the modified decree alone could be executed. THE decree-holder therefore, presented a second application for execution on 9th January, 1946. It was, however, dismissed for default on 10th October, 1946. He' therefore, presented a third application for execution on 17th April, 1948. Against this application, the judgment-debtor raised various objections one of them being that it was barred by limitation. This objection was turned down by the Munsiff. An appeal was preferred to the Court of the District Judge, Bhilwara. THE counsel for the appellant there conceded that the execution petition was within time and, therefore, that appeal was dismissed. THE judgment-debtor, however, came to the Court of Rajasthan and it was argued that an admission of a counsel on a question of law was not binding on the parties. This argument found favour with the learned Judge who heard the appeal. He remanded the case to the District Judge to decide the question of limitation on merits. THE appeal has now been heard and decided by the learned District Judge, Partapgarh to whom the case had gone on account of change in jurisdiction. He dismissed the appeal on 1st August, 1952, holding that the application was within limitation. It is against this judgment that the judgment-debtor has come here in second appeal. The appellant's learned Advocate has contended that the decree of the original court was amended by the District Judge, Bhilwara and the same decision was upheld by the High Court of Mewar on 9th July, 1942, and that an execution application of the appellate decree could, therefore, be filed within three years from that date i.e. the last date for the presentation of the execution application could be 8th July, 1945, and since the present application was filed on 17th April, 1948, it was clearly time barred. It is common ground between the parties that the Limitation Act which was in force in Mewar on the date of this application was Kunum Mayad Raj Mewar (Act No. II of Svt. 1988). It is also admitted that the only article applicable to the present case is No.29 of the said Act. It runs as follows - "29. Application for execution. Three years from the date of the pronouncement of the judgment." The appellant's learned advocate contends that according to the plain interpretation of the said Article, the application for execution should have been presented within three years from the date of the judgment of the High Court of Mewar because it was the decree of the High Court alone which could be executed. Learned advocate for the respondent has, on the other hand, urged that Art. 29 referred above was provided only for the first application in execution, the according to the practice prevailing in Mewar, it was not necessary to present fresh application for execution of the appellate decree, that this Article did not apply to the appellate decrees and therefore the District Judge was quite justified in dismissing the appellant's objection. It appears from the judgment of the learned District Judge that he has also adopted the latter view on the basis of the judgment of a Division Bench of the Mewar High Court in the case of Kajorimal vs. Parasram Agarwal (Civil Appeal No. 24 of Svt. 2000 decided on 6th October. 1945). The appellant's learned advocate has not contested that the judgment of the District Judge is not in conformity with the judgment of the Mewar High Court referred above. But he challenges the correctness of the said decision of the High/Court. We have gone through the said judgment It appears that in that case an application for execution of the amended appellate decree was presented by the decree-holder either years after the decree was amended in appeal. An objection was, therefore, raised by the judgment-debtor that the application was time barred under Art. 29 of the Mewar Limitation Act referred above. It was, however, observed by the learned Judges as follows - "At the time when the Limitation Act was brought into force, the Procedure regarding the execution petition was that when the original application for execution was presented, the case was registered and that case used to continue till the decree was completely satisfied. It was not necessary to present a second or third application for execution. Therefore, the limitation provided in Limitation Act should be taken to apply only to the first application in execution. This is why three year's period of limitation has been provided from the pronouncement of the judgment. If this law meant to provide limitation for subsequent applications, the time for computing the period of limitation should have been not from the date of the judgment but from some other date. It, therefore, appears that the purpose of Art. 29 was to provide limitation only for the first execution application." Following this reasoning; the learned Judges in that case considered the execution application within time even though it was not presented within three years but eight years after the amended decree was passed. It is clear that Art. 29 of the Limitation Act of Mewar corresponds to Art.182 of the Indian Limitation Act, which runs as follows : - Description of suit. Period of Limitation. Time from which period begins to run. "182 For the execution of a decree or order of any Civil Court hot provided for by Art. 183 or by sec. 48 of the. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Three years; or, where a certified copy of the decree or order has been registered six years. (1) The date of the decree or order, or, (2) (where there has been an appeal) the date of the final decree or order of the appellate court, or the withdrawal of the appeal, or (3) (where there has been a review of judgment) the date of the decision passed on the review, or (4) (where the decree has been amended the date of amendment, or (5) ........................". A comparison of the two would show that it was only the first paragraph of the third column of Art. 182 which was adopted by the Mewar State and the remaining portion was left out. The argument of the appellant's learned advocate really pertains to para(2) of the third column of Art. 182 which says that the period of limitation would commence from the date of the final decree or order of the appellate court or the withdrawal of the appeal where there has been an appeal. This paragraph, however, does not find any place in the Mewar Limitation Act and, therefore, it would not be proper to plant it there. The interpretation which was placed by the learned Judges of the Mewar High Court on Art. 29 of the Mewar Limitation Act was done after taking into consideration the prevailing practice and all other circumstances in which the Act was enacted, and we do not think it proper to disturb its views by interpreting that law in the light of the Indian Limitation Act which did not apply to the State at that time. In that view there would be no period of limitation for applications for execution after the first except under sec. 48 C.P.C. so long as the Mewar Limitation Act was in force. We would like to make it clear that the view we have taken above should be applied only to cases arising within the areas comprised in the former State of Mewar and only during the period the Mewar Limitation Act was in force. This view will neither apply to cases arising in areas other than those comprised within the former State of Mewar after the Mewar Limitation Act was repealed by the Former Rajasthan Limitation Ordinance (No. XXXIII of 1948) on 4th October, 1948. The appeal is therefore, dismissed with costs. ;