- (1.) THIS is a revision under sec. 10 (2) of the Rajasthan (Protection of Tenants) Ordinance, 1954, against an order of the A. E. O. , Sikar, Jhunjhunu, dated 21-5-54 refusing protection to the applicant under sec. 7 of the Ordinance.
(2.) WE have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and have gone through the record as well. The applicant claimed reinstatement over the land in dispute known as Kanawala alias Kumharwala measuring45 bighas kham with the allegations that he had been cultivating the same since long, that in Svt. 2010 the opposite party Bagh Singh initiated false proceedings under sec. Cr. P. C. and got the filed attached on 22-6-53 that the entry in khasra kunt of Svt. 2009 stands in his favour and as the attachment amounted to a wrongful dispossession, reinstatement may be granted in favour of the applicant. This application was presented before the lower court on 10-8-53, On 12-12-53 the applicant presented a further application alleging that 145 Cr. P. C. proceeding terminated on 11-11-53 whereby the attachment was removed but that on 29-11-53 Bagh Singh opposite party, took over wrongful possession of the land. The applicant, therefore, prayed that the cause of action may under the circumstances be deemed to have accrued on 29-11-53. The claim was resisted on the ground that Bagh Singh opposite party had been in continuous possession of the land, that the applicant had never been in possession of the same, that the applicant got the entries Khasra Kunt made surreptitiously and that the attachment by a criminal court did not amount to wrongful dispossession of the applicant. The trial court after recording the evidence of the parties rejected the application and hence this revision. The points to be determined in the case are as to whether the applicant was or was not in possession of the land in dispute within three months of the request for reinstatement and whether he was wrongfully dispossessed thereof. On behalf of the applicant a certified copy of Khasra Kunt prepared by the Tehsil staff in Svt. 2009 (Ex. P. 2) has been produced in the case wherein Khasra No. 141. known as Kauawala has been shown as being in possession of the applicant as a tenant. The only point argued by the opposite party as against this entry is that in column No. 4 the name of the Bhomiya has been shown as Nahar Singh. This is evidently a mistake. The entries in all other columns are correct. It is admitted by the opposite party that the land in dispute is within his Bhom and under the circumstances the wrong entry in column No. 4 is hardly of any significance. Bagh Singh has in his statement admitted that in Svt. 2010 i. e. immediately preceding the attachment under sec. 145 Cr. P. C. the land was in possession of the applicant. His contention is that the applicant's possession was wrongful. There is absolutely no reliable evidence in support of this contention. The oral evidence examined by the applicant coupled with the documentary evidence and the significant admission made by the opposite party leave no room to doubt that the applicant is tenant of the land in dispute and was in possession thereof. This brings us to the question as to when and how he was dispossessed. As pointed out above, it is an admitted fact that attachment was made under sec. 145 (4) Cr. P. C. on 22-6-53 and till then the applicant was in possession. These criminal proceedings terminated by an order of the criminal court dated 11-11-53 wherein the criminal proceedings were dropped, the attachment was withdrawn and the receiver was ordered to remove his possession. This decision obviously came in chronological order after the institution of sec. 7, Rajasthan (Protection of Tenants) Ordinance, 1949, proceedings. Subsequently on 12-12-53, the applicant made it clear that after the decision of the criminal court, the opposite party took wrongful possession over the land. It has been admitted by the opposite party that the possession after the decision of the criminal court was taken over by him. His contention however is that as the applicant was not put in actual possession by the criminal court his possession does not amount to a wrongful dispossession of the applicant. We have carefully examined the various aspects of the case. In our opinion, the contention of the opposite party is clearly untenable. As laid down in A. I. R. 1926 Cal. , 782 "the purposes of the two attachments, one under the proviso to cl. (4) of sec. 145 and the other under sec. 146 Cr. P. C. are different, and the stakes are not the same. In the case of the former, the attachment subsists till the decision under sec. 145 cl. (4) that is to say, till it is decided which party was in possession at the date of the proceeding ; in the latter case it lasts untill a competent court has determined the rights of the parties or the person entitled to possession. It may be that an attachment under sec. 145 cl. (4) may terminate on the proceedings being dropped or attachment under sec. 146 Cr. P. C. may be withdrawn when the Magistrate is satisfied that there is no longer any likelihood of a breach of the peace ,, but that does not affect the character of the attachments. The objects of the two attachments are obviously different. The possession in the case of the one enures to the benefit of the party who was in possession at the date of the proceedings and in the case of the order to the party or to any person, either a party to the proceedings or not, who may be adjudged on the basis of his rights to be entitled to possession. As pointed out above the attachment in the case was under sec. 145 (4) Cr. P. C. and hence it logically follows that on the termination of the attachment the party which was in possession on the date of the proceedings should be deemed to be in possession after the termination of the proceedings. As observed by Dave J. in Ramsukh vs. State (1953 RLW 503) : - "the nature result arising out of the proceedings under sec. 145 Cr. P. C. after dropping or cancelling the proceedings, should be that the parties are restored in possession which they occupied before the proceedings were started, and in order to bring about status quo, the party from whose possession the property is attached should receive it back from the court. " There is no controversy in the present case on the point that the applicant was in possession of the land in dispute when it was attached under sec. 145 (4) Cr. P. C. and hence on withdrawal of attachment the applicant's possession automatically revives. The opposite party had clearly no justification for taking the law into his own hands and acquiring wrongful possession with the same. This clearly amounts to a wrongful dispossession of the applicant within the meaning of the Ordinance. We would, therefore allow this revision, set aside the order of the lower court and direct and the applicant shall be reinstated over the land in dispute with immediate effect. .;