- (1.) THIS is an application in revision by Dulichand, Deokinandan, Phundilal, Onkar, Ramu, Mangu, Kanhaiya Jat, Kanhaiya Brahman, Laxman, Birda and Rampratap accused all residents of village Nimoda, Police Station Atru for the quashing of their commitment to Additional Sessions Judge, Baran, under secs. 302, 148 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code.
(2.) IT has been argued by Mr. V. P. Tyagi on behalf of the applicants that the learned Committing Magistrate has not followed the provisions of sec. 213 of the Criminal Procedure Code inasmuch as he has not recorded the reasons for commitment. IT was further argued that the prosecution evidence did not implicate all the accused and that there was no particular evidence against Lachman, Mangulal, Kanhaiyalal Brahman and Ramu which could be sufficient for the commitment. IT was argued that there was the evidence only of the solitary witness Kalu, P. W. 8 against Kanhaiyalal Brahman and Harka only against Kanhaiyalal Brahman and of Kalu, Onkar and Harkha against Ramu. IT was argued that none of these witnesses identified any of these four accused at the identification parade, and therefore, their conviction against these four accused was of no value. As regards Devkinandan. it was argued that the evidence against him is that he, with folded hands, requested the deceased not to send the cattle to cattle pond and that in the first information report he was not specifically mentioned, but all that was said was that a person of the likeness of son of Champa Lal was in the assembly who had come to attack Nanuram. Certain rulings were cited to show that if there is no evidence against any accused, his commitment should be quashed. On behalf of the State, it has been argued by Mr. R. A. Gupta that commitment can be quashed only on the point of law, and the fact that there was not sufficient evidence against a particular accused, is no ground for quashing a commitment so long as there was some legal evidence against him. The question of sufficiency should be left to the Sessions Court. I have considered the arguments of both the learned counsel. The provisions of sec. 215 of the Criminal Procedure Code are perfectly clear. Under sec. 215 of the Criminal Procedure Code commitment once made by a competent Magistrate or by a civil or revenue court under sec. 478 can be quashed by the High Court only and on a point of law. In this case, it has not been pointed out that there is no legal evidence whatsoever against any of the accused. It has been argued that there was not sufficient evidence against the five accused Lachman, Mangulal, Kanhaiya Lal Brahman, Ramu and Devkinandan. Against Lachman, it was pointed out that there was the solitary evidence of Kalu P. W. 8 and against Mangulal, there is the solitary evidence of Onkar P. W. 12. It may be that only one witness for the prosecution has implicated either of these two accused but whether this would he sufficient or not is for the Sessions Court to see. I cannot say that the commitment is bad in law because there is evidence of only one witness against each of these two accused. So far as Kanhaiyalal Brahman is concerned, two witnesses Kalu and Harkha have named him. For the reasons which I have given in the case of Lachman and Mangulal, there is no reason to quash the commitment so far as this accused too is concerned. As regards Ramu, there are three witnesses. So the prosecution is perfectly justified in saying with respect to Kanhaiyalal Brahman and Ramu that the prosecution stands on a still firmer ground as there is more than one witness against each of the two accused. So far as Devkinandan is concerned there are quite a number of witnesses, but it has been argued that he was begging Nanuram with folded hands to release the cattle and that his name is not specifically mentioned in the police report. The evidence against Devkinandan is not only of begging with folded hands to release the cattle, but some of the witnesses have stated that he dealt lathi blows to the deceased. The evidence may be believable or not, but it is for the Sessions Court to say that. As regards the omission of the name of Devkinandan from the first information report, it will also be for the Sessions Court to say whether reading the statement in the first information report along with the evidence produced in the case, the accused had committee the offence charged against him or not. It was argued that there was no evidence of be labouring the deceased against any of the accused who have been committed. It may be so, but the accused have been committed by virtue of sec. 149 of the Criminal Procedure Code and it would be for the Sessions Court to say whether they were members of unlawful assembly which had an unlawful common object of committing violence to Nanuram. The principle has been well established that so long as there is any legal evidence against the accused, it should be left to the Session Judge to judge whether an offence is made out against him. In the case of Bal Chand vs. King Emperor (l) it was held that - "to test whether there is or is not evidence for a Judge to decide and to quash a commitment it is necessary to accept the evidence for the prosecution. Whether the evidence is believed or dis-belived at the trial is a matter with which High Court is not concerned. " "the real test deciding as to whether there is evidence which could fairly be acted upon is whether a Judge at a trial held with the aid of jurymen could say that there was no evidence which could go before a jury. " In that case, the accused was committed to take trial before the court of Sessions upon the uncorroborated evidence of accomplice alone and it was held that it was for the Sessions Court to say whether an uncorroborated evidence of the accomplice under the circumstances of this case could be acted upon for the conviction or not. In an unreported case of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Bhagwatilal vs. The State (since reported 1955, R. L. W. 140) the following observations of Harington J. , in the case of Sheobux Ram vs. The Emperor (2), were quoted with approval: - "the test which in my opinion should be applied to decide whether a committal ought or ought not to be made on the facts is this - assuming that the whole of the evidence telling against the accused is true, is there a case which a Judge at a trial could leave to a jury? If the evidence is such that a Judge would have been bound to rule that there was no evidence on which a jury could convict, then a committal ought not to be made. If there was any evidence which called for an answer, however great the preponderance in favour of the prisoner might be - then the committal was proper. " In this case, it cannot be said that there is no evidence which would have called for an answer if the accused were to be tried by a jury. It was argued that the commitment order does not comply with the provisions of sec. 213 of the Criminal Procedure Code inasmuch as no reasons have been given for commitment. 1 have gone through the order of commitment and an prepared to say that it is not as it ought to be, but the learned Magistrate has considered the evidence produced in the case and has come to a finding that prima facie case is made out against the applicants. He has discharged two of the accused against whom he through there was no prima facie evidence. So it cannot be said that the learned Magistrate had not before his mind the principles on which a commitment is to be made. I do not see any reason to interfere with the order of commitment. The application for revision is dismissed. . ;