- (1.) THIS is an application in revision by Shambhuram and others against an order of the District and Sessions Judge, Jodhpur dated 22nd December, 11952. transferring an appeal which was filed by the petitioners in that court under sec. 23 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (Act No. XVII of 1950), hereinafter referred to us the Rajasthan Premises Act. The petitioners filed their suit for increase in rent against the opposite party under sec. 11 of the Rajasthan Premises Act in the court of the Munsiff, Jodhpur City. The Munsiff dismissed the suit, and the petitioners went up in appeal to the learned District Judge who transferred the appeal to the Civil and Additional Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, acting under sec. 221) of the Rajasthan Civil Courts Ordinance, 1950 (Ordinance No. VIl of 1950) by the order which is being attacked by means of this revisional application.
(2.) THE contention of learned counsel for the petitioners is that the learned District Judge was a persona designate and not a civil court and, therefore, had no jurisdiction to transfer the appeal to another court under the Civil Courts Ordinance. THE principal point for determination, therefore, is whether the learned District Judge,in taking cognizance of the appeal against the order of the Munsiff under sec. 22 of the Rajasthan Premises Act, was acting as an ordinary civil court of the land or was a persona designate. It is clear that if the later was the case, the learned District Judge would have no authority to transfer the appeal. THE argument of learned counsel for the petitioners was that the Rajasthan Premises Act was a piece of special legislation enacted to control evictions from, letting of, and rent for, certain premises in Rajasthan. and the authorities appointed to deal with the matters arising out of this Act had been invested with special jurisdiction in so far as they dealt with them and were, therefore, not courts in the correct sense of the term. | I have given this matter my very careful consideration and have reached the conclusion that the contention of learned counsel is not well founded. An analysis of the act in question clearly shows to my mind that the scheme of the Act was and is to entrust this special branch of work to the ordinary courts of the State. Sec. 6 (1) thus provides that where no rent has been agreed upon or where for any reason the rent agreed upon is claimed to be excessive, the landlord or the tenant may institute a suit in the lowest court of competent jurisdiction for fixation of standard rent for any premises. The expression "lowest court of competent jurisdiction is significant. Sub-section (2) of this section undoubtedly provides that the court shall determine the standard rent, on certain principles which has been laid down in the section, after holding such summary inquiry as it may consider just and necessary. Learned counsel for the petitioners laid considerable emphasis on the nature of the inquiry that the court was required to make in law, which was to be a summary one as the court might consider just and necessary, and proceeded to argue that it was an indication in support of his contention. There is no substance, however, in my judgment in this contention. The mere fact that the legislature permits summary inquiry to be held in such cases does not and would not detract from the quality of such functions as being those of a court. We are familiar with courts invested with summary jurisdiction which are nevertheless courts when they perform their functions. Turning next to the nature of the specific proceedings, out of which the present revision has arisen, I may refer to sec. 11 of the Rajasthan Premises Act. That section provides that where the landlord wishes to increase the rent of any premises, he shall give the tenant notice in writing of his intention to increase the rent. If the tenant does not agree to the increase which may be permissible under this Act, the landlord may bring a suit for increase in rent or standard rent in the lowest court of competent jurisdiction. Sub-sec. (4) of this section further provides that the court shall, after such summary inquiry as it may think necessary, make orders according to law, and a decree shall follow, This latter requirement in my opinion, is a complete answer to the contention raised by the petitioners' learned counsel. In doing so, the court functions as a court and its orders are finalized in the form of a decree. Then sec. 22 which deals with appeals and revisions lays down that an appeal shall lie to the Court of District Judge from every decree or order passed by a Court under this Act. Sub-sec. (2) provides that no second appeal shall lie from any such decree or order and than follows a proviso to the effect that nothing contained in the Act shall affect the powers of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan in revision. It may be pointed out here that as regards certain orders passed by the controller or according to the subsequent amendment by a Magistrate under certain provision of the Rajasthan Premises Act, they are made appealable to such authority as the Government may from time to time appoint in that behalf. I say nothing with regard to such matters, as they have no relevance to the decision of the question before me. There is thus no doubt whatever that the proceeding which has culminated in the order attacked before me has, according to the Act, to be instituted before a court and court has also been made to lie to the court an appeal from the decree passed by that of the District Judge. It may be pointed out that the entire tenor and language of these provisions leads me irresistibly to the conclusion that what the legislature intended was that the proceedings under sec. 6 or sec. 11 of the Rajasthan Premises Act should lie to the ordinary courts of the State. Learned counsel for the petitioners strongly relied on a decision of this Court in Ramachandra vs. Daulutram (1 ). That case is clearly distinguishable on facts inasmuch as sec. 10 of the Matsya Premises (Rent Control) Ordinance, 1948, provided that "any person aggrieved by an order of the Controller may within one month from the date of the communication of the order, presented an appeal in writing to such officer as the Government of the United State may appoint. It is clear from the language of sec. 10 that the Government would be free in such a case to appoint any person as an appellate authority regardless of the consideration whether he was a judicial officer or not, and the mere fact that the District Judge, Alwar, was appointed as an appellate authority did not make him a civil court subordinate to the jurisdiction of this Court. Two other cases relied on by learned council were Pitman's Shorthand vs. Lilaram & Sons (F. B.) (2) and Indian Homeopathic Medical Assocn. vs. Kanai Lal (3 ). It was held in the East Panjab case (2) that: - "the Rent Controller and the appellate authority appointed under Panjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1947, do not constitute Civil Courts subordinate to the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court, and, therefore, their orders are not subject to revision by the High Court. " The decision of the case mainly turned upon the provisions of sec. 15 of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act according to which the Provincial Government had the power to appoint such officer as appellate authorities for the purpose of the Act as they thought fit. The scheme of the Rajasthan Premises Act is, as has already been pointed out above, fundamentally different and, therefore, this case cannot rightly govern the decision of the case before me. Indeed, Khosla J. who delivered the judgment of the Full Bench in the East Punjab case observed that whether a Senior Subordinate Judge or a District Magistrate or a District Judge performs certain duties assigned to him as a court or not will depend upon the circumstances of each particular case, and upon the consideration as to whether the intention of the legislature was to create a court or to appoint a persona designate. Similarly it was held in Indian Homeopathic Medical Assocn. vs. Kanai Lal (3) that an order of a Chief Judge of the Court of Small Causes modifying on appeal an order of the Rent Controller fixing the standard rent for certain premises was not open to revision by the High Court under sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The decision was arrived at on the ground that the revisional powers of the High Court had been taken away by necessary implication on the wording of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provision) Act (XXXVIII of 1943), 1948, and does not give any assistance to the petitioners. It may be added in this connection that although a second appeal is barred by sec. 22 (2) of the Rajasthan Premises Act, the proviso to that section preserves the revisional powers of this Court to correct the decisions of the lower courts. The language of the proviso is clearly designed to provide beyond all question that the ordinary revisional jurisdiction of this Court shall not be affected in any manner by anything contained in the Act. In fact, it appears to me that the proviso in question has been put in this form deliberately by the legislature to serve as a complete answer to the contention, such as has been raised before me, that the District Judge was not a civil court while functioning under the Rajasthan Premises Act. It is scarcely necessary to point out that the revisional jurisdiction of this Court is directed against the decisions of courts subordinate to it. The District Judge functions as such subordinate civil court under the Rajasthan Premises Act. For the reasons stated above, I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the District Judge under the Rajasthan Premises Act acts as an ordinary civil court of the State and is not a persona designate. It is a well settled principle that, "when a question is said to be referred to an established Court without more, it imports that the ordinary incidents of the procedure of that Court are to attach, and also that any general right of appeal from its decision likewise attaches. " This principle was laid down by the House of Lords in National Telephone Company vs. Postmaster-General (4), Reference may also be made in this connection to Secretary of State for India vs. Chellikani Rama Rao (5),maung Ba Thaw vs. Ma Pin (6), Hem Singh vs. Basant Das (7), and Adaikappa vs. Chandrashekhara (8 ). The same principle has been approved by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in N S. Thread Co. vs. James Chadwick & Bros. (9 ). Applying the aforesaid principle to the present case, it clearly follows that where the Rajasthan Premises Act does not contain any specific provision on any particular matter, such as, the power to transfer, then the ordinary powers enjoyed by the District Judge under the Rajasthan Civil Courts Ordinance (No, VII) of 1950 would be available to him, and the District Judge has the authority to transfer to any Civil Judge under his administrative control any appeal pending before him from the decrees or orders of Munsiffs. (See sec. 22 of the Ordinance ). Before concluding I may briefly dispose of an argument which was urged by learned counsel for the petitioners in support of his contention. Learned counsel argued that according to the Rajasthan Civil Courts Ordinance as amended, first appeals from the decisions of the Civil Judge incases of the valuation of Rs. 5000/- and over are made to lie directly to the High Court whereas according to sec. 22 of the Rajasthan Premises Act, every decree or order passed by a Civil Judge would lie to the District Judgs and no second appeal shall lie from any such decree. The answer to this conflict is that the provisions of the Rajasthan Premises Act will prevail with respect to cases arising under that Act on the principle that the general rule must give way to the special provision as to appeals made in the Act itself and that in no way affects the principle laid down by the House of Lords in National Telephone Company vs. Post-Master General (4) and by their Lordships of the Privy Council and the Supreme Court cited above, The result its that this revision fails and is hereby dismissed. As the opposite party has not put in appearance in this Court, there will be no order as to costs. .;