- (1.) THIS is an application by Laxmichand under Art. 226 of the Constitution for a writ of prohibition against the Sub-divisional officer Bayana.
(2.) IT appears that Deviram opposite party filed an application under sec. 7 of the Rajasthan (Protection of Tenants) Ordinance (No. IX) of 1949 (hereinafter) called the Ordinance) in the court of the Sub-divisional Officer, Bayana, on the 21st of July, 1952. These proceedings have dragged on, and there were remands twice by the Board of Revenue. When this application was made, they were pending before the Sub-Divisional Officer after the second remand. The main contention of the applicant in this case is that the Ordinance was only alive for two years, and its extension from time to time after the 21st June, 1951 is invalid. The question whether the extension of the Ordinance from time to time after the 21st of June, 1949, is invalid or otherwise has come before this court in a number of cases. In Sukhlal vs. Revenue Board Rajasthan (1) it was held by a Bench of this Court that the first extension made by notification of 14th June, 1951, was valid. The same matter came up before another Bench of this Court, to which one of us was a party, in Sadaria vs. The Rajasthan Board of Revenue (2 ). In that case, Bapna J. took the view that the first extension was valid, while one of us was doubtful of its validity, but agreed to the final order proposed in view of the earlier decision in Sukhlal's case (1) which was held to be binding. Then came Ramdeo vs. The State of Rajasthan (3) (since reported as 1955 RLW368) which was heard by another Bench of this Court, and was decided on the 29th of September, 1954 In that case, the main attack was on the second extension which was made in June 1953. It was held that the second extension by notification of the Raj-pramukh was invalid; but the learned Judges went on to point out that an Ordinance (No. III) of 1954 had been promulgated be-fore they came to hear that case and that that Ordinance had been replaced by the Rajasthan (Protection of Tenants) (Amendment) Act (No. X) of 1954. The validity therefore, of the extensions that had been made of the Ordinance from time to time had to be reconsidered according to the provisions of Ordinance III of 1954 and Act X of 1954. The learned Judges went into this matter, and came to the conclusion that the principle enunciated in Jatindra Nath Gupta vs. Province of Bihar (4) was not applicable to this case, and they pointed out the distinguishing features of the law as passed in Rajasthan. We have gone through the judgment in that case, and are in full agreement with the view taken there. We may also point out that after Act X of 1954 came into force, the earlier difference of opinion between one of us and Bapna J. in Sadaria's case (2) becomes immaterial, for Act No. X of 1954 retrospectively amends sec. 1 (3) of the Ordinance, and substitutes the following, namely: - "it shall come into force at once, and shall remain in force for a period of seven years. " In sec. 1 (3) of the earlier Ordinance No. III, five years were mentioned instead of seven years. Act No. X of 1954 clearly lays down in sec. 1 (2) that it shall be deemed to have come into force on the 21st of June, 1949. The result of this retrospective amendment is that one must read Ordinance No. IX of 1949 as containing the words. "it shall come into force at once and shall remain in force for a period of 7 years" from the very beginning, i. e. from the 21st of June 1949. Further, sec 3 of Act X of 1954 has provided for removal of any doubt, and lays down that the Ordinance shall always be deemed to have been validly in operation from the 21st of June, 1949. along with the amendment in sec. 1 (3 ). It follows, therefore, that one must now take it that Ordinance No. IX of 1949 enacted that it was to remain in force for seven years when it came out on the 21st of June, 1949. Therefore, the Ordinance has been in force all along and is in force even now, and there is no force in the contention of the applicant that the Ordinance does not exist after the 21st of June, 1951, or 21st of June, 1953. The next point that is urged is that even if it be taken that the Ordinance contained a term fixing its existence for 7 years, the application before the Sub-divisional Officer was beyond his jurisdiction because it was said in that application that the tenant was in possession after the 1st of April, 1948. and these words did not appear in the Ordinance as it stood on the 21st of June, 1949, and were only brought in by an amendment in May, 1952 Learned counsel urges that even if Act X of 1954 re-enacts or revives the Ordinance, it only revives it in its original form. There seems to be some mis-apprehension in this connection. What Act X of 1954 does is not to revive or re-enact the Ordinance; but it puts a certain clause into that Ordinance giving the period for which that Ordinance would be remain in force. That clause is put in the Ordinance retrospectively as if it was there from the very day it came into force, namely the 21st of June, 1949. Therefore we must read the Ordinance as providing that its duration is seven years The later amendment, which was made in that Ordinance in 1952. by which certain words were put in and of which the tenant in this case is taking advantage, must therefore, be read into the Ordinance for our purposes. It is not that Act No. X of 1954 merely revives the Ordinance as it originally stood. It amends a particular provision of that Ordinance from the date it came into force. The later amendments of the Ordinance must therefore be taken into account for our purposes. If the later amendment of 1952 is taken into account, the Sub-Divisional Officer would obviously have jurisdiction prima facie because the allegation of the tenant is that he was a tenant after the 1st of April, 1948. In this view of the matter, there is no force in this writ petition, and it is hereby dismissed. We pass no order as to costs as the amending Act came into force during the pendency of this application. The Sub-divisional Officer will be informed that the stay order has been vacated. .;