WANCHOO, C. J. - (1.) THESE are connected applications under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the validity of the Rajasthan Agricultural Rents Control Act (No. XIX) of 1952.
(2.) THE Act was passed on the 14th May, 1952, and was enforced in the districts of Bharatpur and Alwar on the 16th May, 1952. THE main contentions of the applicants are that the Act was void in view of Art. 13 of the Constitution because (1) it offends Art. 14, and (2) is not a reasonable restriction on the fundamental right conferred on the applicants by Art. 19 (1) (f), and cannot therefore be saved by Art. 19 (5) of the Constitution. The applications have been opposed by the State, and it is contended that the Act is not hit by Art. 14, and is saved by Art. 19 (5) as a reasonable restriction on the fundamental right conferred by Art. 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution. The main argument, however, has been confined to Art. 14, and is directed against sec. 1 (3) of the Act. It may be mentioned that the Act, as it stand, is a permanent measure, and by sec. 1, sub-sec. (2) it extends to the whole of Rajasthan sub-sec. (3), however, reads as follows: - "it shall come into force on such date and in such areas of Rajasthan as the State Government may from time to time notify in the Rajasthan Gazette. " It was under this power that the State Government notified on the 16th May, 1952, that the Act would apply to the districts of Bharatpur and Alwar. That notification reads as follows: - "in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-sec. (3) of sec. 1 of the Rajasthan Agricultural Rents Control Act, 1952, the Government of Rajasthan has been pleased to notify that the provisions of the said Act shall come into force in the Districts of Alwar and Bharatpur on the 16th days of May, 1952. " The argument on behalf of the applicants is that sec. 1 (3) confers a naked and arbitrary power to the State Government to enforce this Act wherever it likes, and whenever it likes, without any guiding principle to control the action of the State Government, and as such is invalid as it is liable to lead to discrimination. It is also pointed out that in actual fact the State Government has only enforced this Act in two districts of Rajasthan, and the notification to that effect does not disclose any reason for singling out these districts, and the Act has thus been applied arbitrarily. The principles governing the application of Art. 14 of the Constitution have been fully explained in three cases by the Supreme Court. These cases are The State of West Bengal vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar (1) (AIR 1952 S. C. , 75.), Kathi Raning Rawat vs. State of Saurashtra (2) and Kedar Nath Bajoria vs. The State of West Bengal (3 ). The first case related to the West Bengal Special Courts Act (No. X) of 1950, and the validity of sec. 5 (1) of that Act came up for consideration. It was held by the majority of the Judges that the section was ultra vires of the Constitution as it was in conflict with Art. 14 of the Constitution. The basis of the decision in these cases was that that Act gave no indication of the principles on which the State Government would exercise the power conferred on it under sec. 5 (1) of sending cases or classes of cases to Special Courts, or providing for trial of offences or classes of offences by such courts. For this reason it was held that sec. 5 (1) offended against Art. 14 of the Constitution as there was no basis for any classification in it. Then allowed Kathi Raning Rawat's case (2) (AIR 1952 S. C. 123.) which dealt with similar law passed by the State of Saurashtra. That law was upheld by the majority of the Judges on the ground that it provided basis for classification, and that the classification was founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguished persons or things that were grouped together from others left out of the group, and that the differentia had a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act. These cases were considered in Kedar Nath Bajoria's case (3) (AIR l953 S. C. , 404.), and the following principles were laid down at page 406 by the majority: - "now, it is well settled that the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by Art. 14 of the Constitution does not mean that all laws must be general in character and universal in application and that the State is no longer to have the power of distinguishing and classifying persons or things for the purposes of legislation. To put it simply, all that is required in class or special legislation is that the legislative classification must not be arbitrary but should be based on an intelligible principle having a reasonable relation to the object which the legislature seeks to attain. If the classification on which the legislation is founded fulfils this requirement, then the differentiation which the legislation makes between the class of persons or things to which it applies and other persons or things left outside the purview of the legislation cannot be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the law, for, if the legislation were embracing in its scope, r,o question could arise of classification being based on intelligible differentia having a reasonable relation to the legislative purpose. The real tissue, therefore is whether having regard to the underlying purpose and policy of the Act as disclosed by its title, preamble and provisions. . . . . classification. . . . . . can be said to be unreasonable or arbitrary and therefore violate of the equal protection clause. " The learned Judges pointed out that applying these principles Anwar Ali Sarkar's case (1) was on one side of the line, while Kathi Raning Rawat's case (2) was on the other side. Further at page 409 the following principle was laid down for judging whether an impugned legislation violates Art. 14: - "if the impugned legislation indicates the policy which inspired it and the object, which it seeks to attain, the mere fact that the legislation does not itself make a complete and precise classification of the persons or things to which it is to be applied, but leaves the selective application of the law to be made by the executive authority in accordance with the standard indicated or the underlying policy and object disclosed is not a sufficient ground for condemning it as arbitrary and, therefore, obnoxious to Art. 14. In the case of such a statute it could make no difference in principle whether the direction which is entrusted to the executive Government is to make a selection of individual cases or of offences or classes of cases. For, in either case, the discretion to make the selection is a guided and controlled discretion and not an absolute or unfettered one and is equally liable to be abused, but as has been pointed out, if it be shown in any given case that the discretion has been exercised in disregard of the standard or contrary to the declared policy and object of the legislation, such exercise could be challenged and annulled under Art. 14 which includes within its purview both executive and legislative acts. " The contention on behalf of the applications is that reading the impugned Act from the beginning to the end there is no principle indicated in it anywhere either in its title or in the preamble or in its provisions to serve as a guide to control the discretion of the State Government regarding the application of the Act to any particular areas. It is also contended that there is nothing in the Act to indicate the policy which inspired it and the object which it seeks to attain, except perhaps that the object is to prescribe the maximum extend of cash rents recoverable on account of agricultural lands in Rajasthan. It is admitted by the learned Advocate General that this criticism is correct, and in fact a reading of the impugned Act from the beginning to the end clearly shows that there is no guiding principle anywhere in the Act controlling the discretion of the State Government as to the application of the Act to particular area in Rajasthan, and the discretion, which is vested by sec. 1 (3) in the State Government is absolute and unfettered. Obviously therefore this Act falls on that side of the line in which the case of Anwar Ali Sarkar falls, and is ultra vires as it violates Art. 14 of the Constitution. It is urged by the learned Advocate General that though there is nothing in the Act to indicate how the discretion vested in the State Government by sec. 1 (3) is to be exercised, we should travel beyond the title, preamble and the provisions of the Act to discover the basis of classification, and in this connection he relies on certain observations in Kedar Nath Bajoria's case (l ). In that case, the learned Judges considered the background of the legislation also in determining whether there was basis for reasonable classification. The background, however, of which the learned Judges apparently took judicial notice, consisted of certain circumstances arising during the post-war period, and it was held that it was well-known that during the postwar period a large number of undertakings had to be wound up, and this gave special opportunities to unscrupulous persons in public services, placed in charge of such undertaking, to enrich themselves by corrupt practices and antisocial acts. It was against this background that the West Bengal legislation was viewed in Kedar Nath Bajoria's case (1) (AIR 1953 S. C. , 404. ). But when dealing with the question of classification the learned Judges only referred to the title, the preamble and the provisions of the Act, and not to the statement of objects and reasons at which the learned Advocate General wants us to look. It seems to us therefore that though we may look at the background if we can take judicial notice of it, it is not permissible to us to look into statements of objects and reasons in order to discover a reasonable basis for classification. Reliance is also placed on certain observations in Charanjit Lal Chowdhury vs. The Union of India (2) (AIR 1951 S. C. , 41.) where Fazl Ali J. referred to the Parliamentary proceedings in order to find out the background of fact which led to the enactment of legislation relating to the Sholapur Mill. There also, however, the learned Judges looked at the background of facts and not at the statement of objects and reasons. It is well-settled that parliamentary proceedings cannot be looked into for construing a statute vide State of Travankore-Cochin vs. Bombay Company Ltd. , Alleppey (1) (AIR 1952 S. C. , 366. ). It has also been held by the Supreme Court in Aswini Kumar Ghose vs. Arabinda Bose (2) (AIR 1952 S. C. , 369.) that the statement of objects and reasons cannot be looked into for the construction of a statute. The learned Advocate General, however, contends that Aswini Kumar Ghose's case (2), prohibits the court from looking into the statement of objects and reason for the interpretation of statutes; but it does not go so far as to say that the statement of objects and reasons cannot be looked into in order to determine a basis for permissible classification. The reasons, which require that the courts should not look into the statement of objects and reasons in interpreting statutes, are given at page 378 in these words : - "as regards the propriety of the reference to the statement of objects and reasons, it must be remembered that it seeks only to explain what reasons induced the mover to introduce the Bill in the House and what objects he sought to achieve. But those objects and reasons may or may not correspond to the objective which the majority of members had in view when they passed it into law. The Bill may have undergone radical changes during its passage through the House or Houses, and there is no guarantee that the reasons which led to its introduction and the objects thereby sough to be achieved have remained the same throughout till the Bill emerges from the House as in Act of legislature, for they do not form part of the Bill and are not voted upon by the members". These reasons, in our opinion, apply with full force in cases where a basis for permissible classification is sought for, and it is not, in our opinion, proper to look to the statement of objects and reasons for purposes of determining the basis for classification. We are enforced in this opinion by what actually happened in this case. The statement of objects and reasons, which was published along with the bill, stated that Government had reason to believe that rack-renting was going on considerably in many parts of Rajasthan, and it was high time that such rack-renting be stopped forthwith. There was a preamble in the bill in these terms: - "whereas, with a view to protecting tenants from rack-renting on the part of landholders, it is expedient to prescribe the maximum extent of cash rents recoverable on account of agricultural lands in Rajasthan. " When, however, the Bill emerged from the legislature as an Act, the preamble, which was in the bill and which embodied what was said in the statement of objects, was dropped. It is easy therefore from this to infer that the majority of the Act should be controlled by the preamble and should only be used in those areas where it was believed that there was rack-renting. The legislature obviously intended that guiding principle should not remain in the Act, and therefore apparently dropped the preamble. The Act thus gives completely uncontrolled and unfettered power to the State Government to apply or not to apply it anywhere in Rajasthan under sec. 1 (3), and the title guide which the preamble to the Bill provided was also removed from the Act. In these circumstances, even if it were premi-ssible for us to look into the statement of objects and reasons cannot be held to provide a guiding principle for the use of the power given in sec. 1 (3), as the preamble to the bill, which contained that guiding principle, has been dropped from the Act. We have, therefore, no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that this Act falls on the same side of the line as Anwar Ali Sarkar's case (3) (AIR 1952 S. C. , 75.), and as there is no guiding principle anywhere to control the application of the Act to particular areas and sec. 1 (3) gives unfettered and arbitrary power to the State Government to apply it where it likes and not to apply where it does not like, the whole Act falls. It is remarkable that even in the notification, which was issued on the 16th May,, there is no mention of any reason why this Act was applied only to two districts of Bharatpur and Alwar. An affidavit was filed before us after we had heard arguments for the applicants to the effect that the reason why the Act was applied to Bharatpur and Alwar districts was that there was rack-renting prevalent there. We are not prepared to accept this belated affidavit specially when we find that there is nothing in the reply of the State Government to suggest any reason for the application of the Act of the Bharatpur and Alwar districts only. This affidavit was apparently filed when it was felt there was nothing by which the naked power conferred by sec. 1 (3) could be controlled.
(3.) AS sec. 1 (3) falls,, and as that is the only section which provides for the enforcement of the Act, the whole Act, in our opinion, falls. It is unnecessary under the circumstances to consider the argument based on Art. 19. We, therefore, allow these applications, and declaring that the Rajasthan Agricultural Rents Control Act (No. XIX) of 1952 violates Art. 14 of the Constitution direct that all actions under it against the applicants be cancelled, and the State Government be prohibited from enforcing the Act against them. Each applicant will get Rs. 50/- as costs from the State Government. .;