SHARMA, J. - (1.) THIS is an application for revision by the plaintiff Seth Gulab Chand and Gopichand against the order of the learned Civil Judge, Jaipur.
(2.) THE application arises out of a suit for the recovery of Rs. 300/- as damages for use and occupation of the plaintiff's shop inspite of a notice of determining tenancy to the defendant. THE damages for use and occupation were claimed at the rate of Rs. 4/- per day,, taking advantage of a ruling of a single Judge of this Court in the case of Hanuman Bux vs. Dev Dutt (1) (AIR 1952 Raj. 111.), in which it was held that it was open to the landlord after giving notice of termination of tenancy to charge more for use and occupation that the rent which was agreed between the parties before the tenancy was determined. An issue to the following affect was framed in the case and it was issue No. 4: - Whether the court had power to determine the damages on the basis of the rent of neighbouring shops and other evidence. " By the consent of the parties, arguments were heard on this issue in the first instance. Before this issue came up for decision, the ruling of the single Judge quoted above had been overruled by a Division Bench of this court in the case of Hansraj vs. Gappulal (2 ). THE learned lower court after hearing the arguments of the parties decided that it had no power in the present suit to determine damages on the basis of rent of neighbouring shops as that would amount to the fixing of standard rent of the premises in dispute and, therefore, the plaintiffs could not be allowed to produce evidence on that point. Against this order the plaintiffs have come in revision. I have heard the learned counsel for both the parties. It was argued by Mr. G. C. Kasliwal on behalf of the applicants that the plaintiffs, after determining tenancy by a legal notice, could obtain a decree for damages for use and occupation at the rate of the standard rent and that there is nothing in the judgment of Hansraj's case (2), referred to above against such a view. Mr. S. M. Sanghi on behalf of the opposite party argued that the standard rent is a creature of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) and that such rent can be determined only in the manner provided by the Act. A civil court cannot give any decision in an ordinary civil suit which would be tantamount to fixing standard rent. I have considered the arguments of both the learned counsel. In the case of Karnani Industrial Bank Ltd. vs. Satya Niranjan Shaw and another (3) (AIR 1928 P. C. 227.), a question arose before their Lordships of the Privy Council as to what was the meaning of the word "tenant" appearing in sec. 14 of the Calcutta Rent Act (1920 ). After considering the various provisions of the Act, their Lordships observed as follows at page 230: - "in order to give any working effect to the Act it is necessary that the words 'landlord and tenant' must include, as they often do in ordinary parlance, ex-landlord and ex-tenant. An action by ex-landlord against ex-tenant might ordinarily be described as an action of landlord against tenant. In sec. 11 which provides for what has come to be known as a statutory tenancy, a tenant must include a person whose term, under the contract of tenancy has come to an end. " These observations of their Lordships of the Privy Council were held by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Hansraj (2) (1953 RLW 419.) referred to above to apply to a tenant Under the Act. It was also observed in that case that if the purposes of the Act are to be fulfilled rent must be deemed to include whatever is paid as damages for use and occupation. That suit was under the Jaipur (Rent Control) Order, 1947, and it was observed that the intention of the Legislature obviously was to come to the rescue of tenants so that they remained in occupation of the premises let out to them on the rents which they were paying and thus be saved from excessive increases in rent on account of the emergency which was then prevailing due to shortage of houses. These observation apply with equal force to the Act and it can be said that the intention of the framers of the Act was that the tenants might not be disturbed in their possession of the premises let out to them on the rent agreed upon and that if any party wanted variation in the agreed rent, the only course open to him was in the manner provided by the Act. One of these methods is to file a suit for fixation of standard rent under sec. 6 and the court before whom such suit is filed can determine such rent in accordance with the principles laid down in the said section. The other method which is applicable to a landlord when he wants the rent to be increased is to proceed in the manner provided by sec. 11 of the Act. Under sec. 5 of the Act, the rent payable for any premises situated within the areas to which the Act extends for the time being shall, subject to the other provisions thereof, he ordinarily such, as may be agreed upon between the landlord and the tenant. Thus a landlord which term includes the ex-landlord can realise only agreed rent from the tenant wherein is included also the term ex-tenant. A landlord who wants to realise increased rent cannot by giving a notice of termination of tenancy claim increased rent in an ordinary suit and the only method of realising rent is by proceeding under the relevant provisions of the Act. It is not open to a landlord to realise increased rent by bringing a suit against his tenant for damages for use and occupation after giving him a notice determining his tenancy. If that were allowed, the purpose of the Act is liable to be defeated, and the provisions of the Act which provide the procedure for a party desiring variations in agreed rent would become redundant. The learned Additional Civil Judge was therefore, perfectly justified in refusing to embark upon a useless enquiry. If the plaintiff wants to increase the rent, the only course open to him is to file a suit according to the provisions of the Act. The application for revision has no force and it is dismissed. The costs of this revision shall abide the result of the suit in the lower court. . ;