Modi, J. - (1.) THESE revjdional applications, which have been referred to this bench, raised an identical question of law. Thal question is whether a landlord can under the Rajasthan Premises Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (No. XVII of 1950) (hereinafter referred to as the Rajasthan Act) enhance the rent which was once agreed upon between the landlord and his tenant in cases not falling under sec. 10 thereof, and where the tenant does not agree to the increases desired by the landlord, apply to court for such increase and the court can entertain a suit for the purpose, and decree such increase as may be resonalble in the circumstance of the case.
(2.) THE cases before us have certain broad features which may be briefly stated. In all of them, the landlord charged a certain rent by an agreement under tenancies which commenced prior to 1946. In all of them the landlord gave a notice to the tenant, after the introduction of the Rajasthan Act, that the fromer wished to increase the rent. THE tenant declined to pay the increased rent suggested. THEreupon the landlord filed a suit praying for the desired enhancement. This was claimed apart altogether from the grounds mentioned in sec. 10 of the Act. Both lower courts held that these cases fell outside the purview of sed. 6 of the Rajasthan Act, and, therefore the court had no jurisdiction to fix a standard rent. THEy also held that sec. 11 had no application as any increase under that section could be asked for only in those cases which fell within the four corners of sec. 10 and as the cases under consideration admittedly were outside the purview of that section, the courts dismissed the suits. Hence these revisions. The contention raised before us by Mr. Chhangani on behalf of the petitioners is twofold. In the forst place, it was argued that even though rent was agreed upon, to start with, between the parties, the legal position was that as soon as the landlord gave a notice no rent could be sid to be agreed upon, and then on that view sec. 6 became applicable and the landlord was competent to make an application for fixation of the standard rent. Alternatively, it was conended that even if this view was not accepted, sec. 11 was wide enough to permit the landlord to ask for an increase within the limits permitted by the Act, and where such increase was not agreed to by the tenant, the landlord could file a suit for the purpose, and that this section was not limited by or tied to sec. 10 of the Act only. On the other hand it was strenuously contended on behalf of the opposite parties that where rent was once fixed by agreement between the parties, sec. 6 was wholly inapplicable as it could not be said that no rent had been agreed upon, and that so far as sec. 11 was concerned, it was a procedural section and came into play only where the landlord had made structural additions or alterations or where a case of sub-tenancy had arisen within the meaning of sec. 10. I was claimed, with great force, that where such conditions did not exist, and where rent was once fixed by agreement, the Rajasthan Act did not at all contemplate any increase of rent at the instance of the landlord and therefore the view taken by the courts below was perfectly correct and must be upheld. 4 We now proceed to examine the rival contentions in the light of the provisions of the Rajasthan Act. Sec. 5 provides that the rent payable for any premises in the areas to which this Act extends shall ordinarily be as may be agreed upon between the landlord and the tenant though this has been made subject to the order provisions of the Act. Sec. 6 then provides that the landlord or tenant may institute a suit for fixation of standard rent, and it is further laid down that this can be done (1) where no rent has been agreed upon and (2) where for any reason the rent agreed upon is claimed to be excessive. The section further lays down the principles for determining the standard rent. A very important provision made in this section is that the standard rent shall not exceed the basic rent by 50% where the premises are let for residential purposes or for public and charitable purposes specified in the section; but where the premises are let for any other purpose (e. g. , commercial purpose) the standard rent shall not exceed two and a half times of the basic rent thereof. A proviso to the section states that where the premises have been let after the 1st January, 1946, the standard rent shall not exceed the basic rent. In an explanation to this section, as amended by the Rajasthan Premises Control of (Rent and Eviction) Amendment Act (No. IX) of 1952, the basic rent is defined as the rent at which the premises were let on the 1st January. 1943, and if not let on that day, the rent at which they were first let after that day. The next important section to which reference may be made is sec. 8. It provides that no agreement for the payment of rent in excess of the standard rent can have legal validity and any such agreement shall be construed as an agreement to pay standard rent only. Two exceptions are made to this rule. First, where rent is liable to periodical increment by an agreement made prior to 1st January 1943, and not superseded by a decree of court. Secondly, the landlord may levy an additional charge, over and above the standard rent, for electricity or water or any tax or charge imposed on the landlord by the Government or a local authority for services rendered to the premises. Then comes sec. 9 which prohibits the landlord from charging from the tenant and premium, fine, advance or other payment for the grant, continuance or renewal of the tenancy, unless the same is permissible under the Act. Sec. 10 bears the marginal note "circumstances under which standard rent is liable to increase" which, it may be pointed out, is not quite happy. We consider it proper to quote this and the following sec. 11 in extenso: - Sec. 10. Circumstances under which standard rent is liable to increase : (1) Where the land-lord has at any time incurred expenditure on any improvement or structural alteration of the premises, not being expenditure on decoration maintenance or normal repairs, and such expenditure has not been taken into account in determining the standard rent of the premises, he may increase the rent by an amount which shall secure him a return of income not exceeding seven and a half percent per annum on such expenditure. (2) Where a part of the premises let has been sub-let by the tenant, then, without prejudice to the provisions of sec. 13, - (a) The land-lord may increase the rent payable by tenant, - (i) in the case of premises let for purpose mentioned in clause (1) of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 6, by an amount not exceeding twelve and a half per cent of the rent or standard rent for the part sub-let, and (ii) in other cases, by an amount not exceeding twenty five percent of the rent or standard rent for such part; (b) The tenant may increase the rent payable by the sub-tenant, - (i) in the case of premises let for purposes mentioned in clause (a) of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 6 by an amount not exceeding twenty-five per cent of the rent or standard rent for the part sub-let; and (ii) in other cases, by an amount not exceeding fifty per cent of the rent or standard rent for such part; and (c) The tenant shall, on being so requested in writing by land-lord supply him within fourteen days thereafter a statement in writing giving full particulars of any sub-letting including the rent charged. Explanation.- For the purposes of this subsection the rent or standard rent of the part sublet shall be an amount bearing such proportion to the rent or standard rent of the entire premises as may be reasonable, having regard to the extent of the part sub-let and other relevant consideration. Sec. 11. Procedure for increase in rent. (1) Where the land-lord wished to increase the rent of any premises he shall be give the tenant notice of his intention to make the increase, and, in so far as such increase is permissible under this Act, it shall be due and recoverable only in respect of the period of tenancy after the end of the month in which the notice is given. (2) Every notice under sub-sec. (1) shall be in writing signed by or on behalf of the landlord. (3) If the tenant does not agree to the increase specified in the notice given under sub-sec. (1) or fails to respond to it within a month from the receipt thereof, the landlord may bring a suit for increase in rent or standard rent in the lowest court of competent jurisdiction. (4) The court shall, after such summary inquiry as it may think necessary make orders according to law, and a decree shall follow. " It is not necessary to notice the other provisions of the Act for our present purposes. Now, after a carefull consideration of the provision of the Act as noticed above, we are in a position to formulate a few conclusions. We may point out at the outset that the object of the Act as stated in the preamble thereof is to control the rents of and evictions from certain premises in this State. It was submitted to us that the object of the Act was mainly to afford protection and relief to tenants from the rapacious activities of the landlords created or accentuated by dearth of housing accommodation and that our interpretation of the Act must be solely guided by this paramount consideration. We consider that this is true so far as it goes But we cannot accept the view that if the plain intention and meaning of some of the provisions contained in the Act is to afford certain reasonable facilities to landlord also within certain limitations we should strain the meaning of these provisions and stretch them against the landlords and in favour of the tenants. It appears to us that while one of the main objects of the Act was certainly to afford security of their tenancy rights and protection against excessive rents to the tenants, the framers of the Act also intended that the landlords may not be denied some increase in the rents which were fixed years ago much earlier, say in 1942 or 1943 or earlier, and had become entirely out of harmony with the prevailing conditions in 1950. We may make it clear in this connection that the intention of the Act clearly appears to us to be that no variation in the rents of tenancies dating from after the 1st January, 1946, is as a rule contemplated by the legislature. Any rents fixed before that date appear to us be susceptible to variation within the limitations provided under the Act. A ceiling was however, fixed for such increase - which is not to exceed 50% in the case of residential properties or properties devoted to certain educational or public purposes specified in clause (a) of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 6; and in the case of other properties the maximum is fixed so as not to exceed two and a half times the basic rent - which has been defined to be the rent payable on the 1st January, 1943, or in the case of tenancies arising subsequently on the date of commence-ment thereof. It seems clear to us therefore that variation in rates of rent in the tenancies arising before the 1st January, 1946, - within the limits specified above is permissible under the Act. There is no question that where the rent fixed is excessive, a tenant can apply for a standard rent to be fixed under sec. 6. It is also conceded on behalf of the opposite parties that where no rent has at all been fixed between the land lord and the tenant - and such cases in our view must be rare - a landlord may file a suit for fixation of a standard rent which may be fixed within the limits already stated. What has been vehemently contested before us is that where rent was once agreed upon under the Act, there is nothing in the Act which enables a landlord to ask for an increase in the rent so agreed to unless he asks for such increase on the ground of structural alterations or on the ground of a subletting of the premises as provided under sec. 10. But where no such circumstances have supervened, it is contended, that the landlord cannot ask for any increase whatsoever in rent under the Rajasthan Act. Having given this matter our most anxious and careful consideration, we have come to the conclusion that this contention must be repelled. It this connection we asked learned counsel for the opposite parties whether the landlord and tenant could enhance the rent in the case of tenancies dating before 1st January, 1946, by mutual agreement and having so agreed could the tenant repudiate such increase on the ground that the Rajasthan Act did not permit any increase in the rent which was fixed by mutual agreement before. Learned counsel was obviously in a serious difficulty and had to concede that the landlord could bind the tenant to the rent revised by mutual agreement and the latter could not be permitted to repudiate it so long as the increase agree to was within the standard limits permitted by the Act. We ourselves think that there is no escape from this position and would refer to sec. 8 (2) of the Rajasthan Act. The question which then arise for our decision is where the rent was fixed by agreement in a tenancy arising before 1946 - but is inadequate in view of the rising cost of maintenance and the general level of prices - or is unduly low as compared with the rent of similar properties situated under like conditions, can the landlord ask for an increase in his rent under any of the provisions of this Act, of course within the limits permitted under sec. 6 of the Act or any other provisions contained therein. We have formed the opinion that he can and that the Act does not prohibit from doing so. The only prohibitory section to which our attention was drawn is sec. 9. But the section has no application for obvious reasons. The landlord does not ask here for any fine, premium, advance or any other payment of a similar nature. What he asks for is increase in rent - which for one (thing is not prohibited as such and for another it is within the limits permitted under the Act. The other provision to which we are referred in this connection on behalf of the opposite parses is sec. 6. It is contended that this section permits a suit for fixation of standard rent only under two contingencies - (1) where no rent has been fixed upon and (2) where rent is excessive, The argument is that neither of the two conditions is fulfilled in the cases under consideration. We will assume for our. present purposes that sec. 6 in terms does not apply. But we do not lead sec. 6 to imply any prohibition against a landlord from suing for an increase in rent where it is inadequate and falls below the permissible limit. Then we come to sec. 10. It undoubtedly lays down certain circumstances under sub-sec. (1) where a landlord may enhance the standard rent for structural alterations etc. made by him. Here again, we asked learned counsel whether the landlord could enhance the rent where no standard rent had been determined but he had made structural alterations and wished perfectly reasonably to enhance the rent. We were not furnished with any satisfactory answer. The only logical reply to our question, on the premises relied upon by learned counsel, could be that the landlord could not ask for any increase because neither sec. 6, nor sec. 10 applied. This, however, reduces the argument of the respondents to a reduction ad absurdum, and we have no hesitation in saying that if it was the intention of the legislature that rent having once been agreed upon, the landlord who altogether prohibited from demanding any increase whatsoever, there was nothing to prevent the legislature from saying so. The legislature has not said that. And unless we are compelled to come to that conclusion we consider that we should not interpret the Act in that manner, as it would be most arbitrary and unreasonable to do so. One clear and cogent consideration against the submission made to us is that. the Act even permits increase in and over and above the standard rent under certain contingencies. We may invite attention in this connection to the provisions of sec. 8 (1) and (3) and sec 10 of the Act. This brings us to a consideration of sec. 11 which we have already quoted at length in the earlier part of our judgment. A careful consideration of the provisions of this section leads us to come to the same conclusion. The opposite parties want us to hold that this section only applies to a set of conditions set forth in the next preceding sec. 10. We do not agree. The language of the section does not permit any such construction; and, were we to do so, we would be introducing certain words like "under the next preceding section" after the word 'premises' in sec. 11 which we do not find there at all. We see no justification to adopt this interpretation in the circumstances of the case, as it would lead to illogical results, and it is perfectly possible to give proper meaning and effect to the section without the importation of these words into the section It is next contended that the construction which commends itself to us loses sight of the marginal note given to sec. 11 which runs as "procedure for increase in rent". We are of opinion that on a thorough and careful consideration of the matter, we have reached the conclusion that the drafting of this Act is not as happy as it should have been, and the marginal notes to certain sections including the present are neither apt nor accurate. We shall quote another example to carry our meaning home. The marginal note to sec. 10 - which has been much debated open before us, is - "circumstances under which standard rent is liable to increase. " But that section also deals with and permits increase in rent which has not been the subject -matter of any standardisation. Likewise the marginal note to sec. 11 is, with great respect, inapt, and misleading. We desire to point out in this connection that it is an accepted principle of the interpretation of statutes that the marginal note to a section cannot be interpreted to control or interfere with the plain meaning thereof which its language clearly bears. Reference may be made in support of this view to the observations of Lord Macnaghten in Thakurain Balraj Kunwar vs. Rae. Jagatpal Singh (1) that it is well-settled that "the marginal notes to the sections of an Act of Parliament cannot be referred to for the purpose of construing the Act. The contrary opinion originated in a mistake and it has been exploded long ago. These seems to be no reason for giving the marginal notes in an Indian statute any greater authority than the marginal notes in an English Act of Parliament. " We respectfully agree, and wish to say that the construction which has commended itself to us is the one which gives a meaning to every part of the section, uncontrolled by the marginal note thereto The section in question says that where the landlord wishes to increase the rent of any premises - these words are unqualified - he shall give the tenant notice of his intention to do so. The section further lays down that in so far as such increase is permissible under the Act, it will be recoverable from the month next following after the notice. The third sub-section is particularly significant and provides that if the tenant does not agree to the increase specified in the notice, the landlord may bring a suit for increase in rent or standard rent. The fourth sub-section then provides that the court may make such summary inquiry as it considers necessary and make orders according to law and a decree shall follow. Reading this section as a whole and giving meaning to every part of it as we should, unfettered by any prepossessions, we consider that this section is complementary to sec. 6. That section permits a suit for fixation of standard rent where no rent has been fixed between the parties at where the rent fixed is excessive. Sec. 11 deals with a situation were obviously the rent is fixed but the landlord wants to increase it on considerations which may make such increase justifiable. As already stated, there is nothing in this section which limits its application to the considerations set forth in sec. 10. The language used in the section is wide and unqualified and must receive its full effect. The increase allowed is such as may be permissible under the Act and for that we must naturally look to the other provisions thereof namely secs. 6 and 8, 9 and 10; and not sec. 10 alone. Then sub-sec. (3) clearly lays down that the landlord may bring a suit for increase in rent which is not the same thing as standard rent. Now the expression 'increase in rent' as contradistinguished from 'increase in standard rent' clearly indicates that the legislature contemplated the possibility of an increase in rent that is over and above what had been once agreed upon, at the suit of a landlord even where no standard rent had been fixed, such increase to be within the limits permissible under the Act. To our mind, the expression "permissible under the Act" also indicates that the scope of sec. 11 is wider than it would be if, insteads the legislature had used the phrase "permissible under sec. 10". And looking at the matter as a whole, we see nothing essentially wrong in this. The legislature has set its face generally against an increase in rents of tenancies commencing after the 1st January, 1946, except in exceptional cases. The tenant was given the statutory right, however,of having his rent reduced where it was excessive and certain standards were laid down. Where no rent was at all fixed, the land-lord could file a suit for the fixation of a standard rent and rely on the same standards as his guiding principles. Now for ourselves,we see no over-riding principle of justice equity or good conscience that in cases where rent was agreed upon in tenancies commencing before the 1st January. 1946, and which rent being inadequate the landlord wished to raise it, the legislature should have refused to allow this to be done even within the limits permissible under the Act. In fact it seems to us to be essentially not at all opposed to justice that the legislature may well have contemplated to allow the landlord a reasonable increase on the rents fixed with reference to the conditions prevailing in 1943 or earlier when the prices were admittedly low and the scale of rents was also bound to be low. Nor can the tenant justly complain if such a result is aimed at. particularly as the conditions of housing accommodation had generally improved by the time the present Act was brought into force. We. therefore, hold that it is open to a landlord to file a suit for increase of rent independently of the provisions of sec. 10 of the Act, and the courts can rightly take cognizance of such suit and decide according to law. That sec. 11 does not catalogue any principles within itself for the adjudication of such disputes is to our mind no consideration to the contrary because the increase permissible under the Act has been specified under the Act in sec. 6 and allied sections and the courts may well adopt those criteria for arriving at a fair decision of the disputes before them subject to the maxima specified under sec. 6. Mr. Desai, learned counsel for some of the petitioners referred us to Section of State vs. Rajendra Prasad (2) in which it was held that the relationships of a landlord and a tenant is in the first instance a matter of contract, and that where a court assesses a fair and equitable rent to be paid by the tenant to the landlord in a suit which does not relate to agricultural land but to land let out for building purposes the court purports to make a bargain of its own making between the parties and that the court had no jurisdiction to impose such a bargain. This authority is entirely inapplicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. A perusal of the Patna case (2) shows that there the court was not exercising its jurisdiction under any statute whatsoever and, therefore, such a power was negatived. In the cases before us, however, the enhancement is claimed under a definite statutory authority, viz. , the Rajasthan Act. It is ofcourse an altogether different matter whether that Act permits an enhancement of the agreed rent to the landlord; but assuming for the purposes of the present argument that it does, we have do doubt that such increase cannot be refused or negatived on the contention that the courts have no jurisdiction to do so. We wish to add that we are greatly fortified in the conclusion arrived at by us above by a consideration of similar law enacted in other Indian States. It is common knowledge that the idea of control of rent and accommodation was born of the conditions brought about by the second World War and was first regulated under the Defence of India Act. and the rules made thereunder. The Defence of India Act lapsed on Sept. 30, 1946, and with it the rules framed under the Act also lapsed; but the Indian provinces enacted temporary ordinances or acts for certain periods and extended their duration from time to time as it was felt necessary to continue the control as to rents and evictions in some form or the other. The part of India known as the Indian States also framed similar laws on the pattern of those prevailing in what was then British India, and Rent Control Acts were likewise passed by the law-making autho-rities in many of the various States now forming the State of Rajasthan. As sec. 30 of the Rajasthan Act shows all these various Acts were repealed in 1950 and were replaced by the present Act which was brought into force on 9th December, 1951, for a period of two years in the first instance and its duration has been extended for a further period of two years by the Rajparmukh under a notification dated the 10th November, 19i2, published in the Rajasthan Gazette Extraordinary dated the 21st November, 1952. In view of this back-ground, we considered it desirable to take note of the state of law in the other Indian States also and we have found, strikingly enough, that in all those States the landlords have been permitted to file a suit or application for fixation of standard rent where the rent agreed to was low and inadequate just as the tenants were permitted to file suits or applications for reduction of rents where the rent charged by the landlord was excessive irrespective of the agreement of the parties. The method by which this result has been achieved may be different under the different Acts but this clearly appears to us to be common result arrived at by them. In this connection, we wish to invite reference to sec. 5 of the United Provinces Control of rent and Eviction Act (No. III) of 1947 as amended by the amendment Act (No. XLIV) of 1948; sec. 4 of the Aasam Urban Areas Rent Control Act (No. XII) of 1949; sec. 6 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act (No. HI) of 1947; sec. 11 of the Bombay, Rent Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act (No. LVII) of 1947; sec 4 of the C. P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949; sec. 7 of the Delhi and Ajmer-Merwara Rent Control Act, 1947; sec. 4 of the Madras Buildings (Lease) and Rent Control) Act (No. XXV) of 1949. and sec 6 of the Orissa House Rent Control Act. Under such circumstances, we find it impossible to accept the argument that the landlords in the State of Rajasthan alone, have been placed in position where they cannot ask for the fixation of Standard rent or for any increase in agreed rent whatever. We hold that sec. 11 of the Rajasthan Act permits them to sue for increase in rent which was once fixed by agreement irrespective of and apart from the provisions of sec. 10 of the Act. This increase must, however, be only within the limits prescribed under sec. 6 and other provisions of the Act. We may further point out that the precise quantum of increase will depend upon the circumstances of each case subject to the ceiling fixed by the relevant sections of the Act. Any other view, in our opinion, would be needlessly anomalous and unfair because both landlords and tenants should have equal opportunity to have their rents fixed with regard to the standard rent prescribed by the Act, and there can be no just or valid objection to this course being adopted. Any argument negativing this view on the footing of sec. 5,6,9 and 10 is untenable and we repel it as erroneous. In this view of the matter, we have not considered it necessary to examine the contention raised on behalf of the petitioners that their cases also fall within sub-sec. (1) of sec. 6, the contention being that as soon as a dispute arose as to the question of the rent between the landlord and the tenant, and the former gave a notice to enhance the rent, then a case arose under the first clause of the aforesaid sub-section, as it amounted to a case "where no rent had been agreed upon". We do not propose to pronounce any opinion on this contention. A few other points were raised on behalf of the opposite parties and we propose to deal with them briefly. It was argued that in none of these cases the landlords had given any notice under sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, that the giving of such notices was obligatory under sec. 28 of the Rajasthan Act before the petitioners could ask for any increase in rent. This objection, in our judgment, is wholly misconceived There is no question of termination of tenancy in these cases which are only concerned with increase in rent, and, therefore, and notice under sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is wholly unnecessary. We also wish to add that the conception underlying this objection and other similar objections to which we consider it entirely unnecessary to refer, seems to be that ah increase in rent cannot to asked for during the continuance or course of a tenancy ; but that is entirely erroneous, in view of the general scheme of the Rent restriction acts, under which the rights to eviction has been severally restricted although a variation in the rent payable has been provided for within certain limits. Reference may be made in this connection to Kai Khushroo vs. Bai Jerbai (3) and Kuppu swami vs. Mahadeva (4 ). The result of the above discussion is that we disagree with the opinion of the lower courts on the legal question involved in there revisions and hereby over-rule it and hold that sec. 11 of the Rajasthan Act enables a landlord to enhance an agreed rent within the limits permissible under the Act. We shall now deal with the effect of this conclusion on each of the cases before us. Revision No. 105 of 1952. Shambhu Ram vs. Kanhiya Lal. It is admitted that the defendant opposite party was in occupation of the premises which is a residential house by an agreement dated 1. 1. 1944 whereby the defendant agreed to pay a rent of Rs. 4/- p. m. This rent was in force on 1. 1. 1942. It is also admitted that the defendant had paid rent up to 31. 5. 52. The plaintiffs by a notice on 10. 1. 51 claimed an increase on the allegation that they were not able to maintain the premises on the rental of Rs. 4/- p. m. and claimed a rent of Rs. 7/- p. m. with effect from 1. 2. 1951. The trial court appears to have dismissed the suit on the legal ground that the plaintiffs had failed to prove any circumstances which brought their case within sec. 10. and held that sec. 11 was merely procedural. The District Judge on appeal upheld the same view. He, however, went into the merits of issue No. 2 which was in these terms : "whether the landlords are not in a position to maintain the house properly with this rent?" The learned Judge discussed the plaintiffs' evidence and came to the conclusion that they had failed to establish circumstances by which it was possible to conclude that they were entitled to any increase in rent. It has been contended before us that the learned District Judge failed to read the defendant's evidence which supports the plaintiff's case. We consider that the learned District Judge should have read the defendant's evidence before coming to the conclusion to which he came We do not consider it proper to say any thing as to the effect of this evidence ourselves and would leave it to the courts below to come to their own finding regarding it. It has also been urged before us on behalf of the opposite party that the notice given by the plaintiffs to the defendant intending to raise the rent of residential house from Rs. 4/- to Rs. 7/- was invalid and that defect vitiated the entire proceedings. This ground was not raised in the courts below and has naturally not been the subject of any decision by them. As the point appears to be one of law, we leave it to the defendant to raise it before the trial court if so advised. In these circumstances, we allow this revision, set aside the order of the learned District Judge and send the case back to the trial court for a fresh decision in accordance with law. In the peculiar circumstances of this (and the other cases), we would leave both parties to bear their own costs in this Court in the lower appellate court and the costs of the trial court hitherto and hereafter shall aside the result. Revision No 106 of 1952. Shambhu Ram vs. Omprakash. This is a case by the same landlords as in the above case against another tenant. The latter has been paying a rent of Rs. 6/-p. m. from the 1st June, 1945. The landlords claimed an enhanced rent on the same grounds as in the above case at the rate of Rs. 10/-p. m. from 1st February, 1951. The Munsiff dismissed the suit on the legal ground that such a suit did not lie. The learned District Judge upheld that view and, further, was of opinion that the plaintiffs had not brought on record any evidence as to the circumstances which would entitle them to any enhancement We have perused the evidence and are unable to come to the conclusion that the District Judge's estimate of the evidence is wrong. We therefore, see no reason to interfere with the decree of the lower courts. We dismiss this revision but would make no order as to costs in this Court. Civil Revision No. 132 of 1952. Motilal vs. Meghraj. It is admitted in this case that the tenant Meghraj has been paying rent in respect of the suit shop at the rate of Rs. 36/- p. m. with effect from 19. 7. 1950. The rent for the said shop in 1942 was Rs. 21 - p. m. The plaintiffs gave the defendant a notice on 19. 7. 1950 that they wished to raise the rent to Rs. 52/-, which according to the plaintiffs, was the standard rent. Both lower courts dismissed the plaintiffs' suit on the legal view held by them that no suit for increase in rent was maintainable apart from sec. 10 of the Rajasthan Act, and admittedly the plaintiffs had not raised any claim under that section. It appears that the case has not been gone into on the merits at all. We, therefore, allow this revision, set aside the order of the courts below and send the case back to the trial court for an enquiry and re-decision in accordance with law. As regards costs we think it proper that the costs of this revision and of the lower appellate court shall be borne by the respective parties The costs in the trial court and further costs there shall aside the result. Revision No. 133 of 1953. Motilal vs. Ram Chander.
(3.) THIS case was also brought by the landlords in revision No. 132 against tenants Ramchander and another. The latter have been paying an agreed rent of Rs. 8/- p. m. for the shop in question from 4. 4. 46. The tenancy has been in existence from before and the agreed rent in 1942 was Rs 7/ -. p. m. The plaintiffs gave the defendant notice under sec. 11 of the Rajasthan Act to pay rent at an enhanced rate, namely, Rs. 17/8/ -. Both courts dismissed the suit as unentertainable on the legal view held by them. As we have held this view to be erroneous and for the same reasons as in revision No. 132, we allow this revision, set aside the decrees of the courts below and send the case back to the trial court with a direction that it will make a proper inquiry according to law and decide the case afresh. The parties will bear their own costs of this revision. The costs of the lower court shall also be similarly borne. The costs in the trial court hitherto and further costs shall abide the result. Revision No. 134 of 1953. Mahaveer Chand vs. Ganpat Singh In this case the defendant opposite party was initially paying a rent of Rs. 8/-p. m. for certain residential apartments under an agreement dated Kati Vadi 3 Svt. 1992, which corresponds to some time in 1935 A. D. Thereafter the rent was reduced to Rs. 7/-p m. (The date of this reduction is not disclosed) and the defendant has been paying the same since then. On 22nd January, 1951, the plaintiffs gave a notice to the defendant to pay rent at the rate of Rs. 17/8/- p. m. but the defendant declined. Both lower courts dismissed the suit as not entertain able in law. As we have over-ruled that view and as there has been no enquiry on the merits, we hereby allow this revision, set aside the decrees of the courts below and remit the case to the trial court for a proper enquiry and fresh decision according to law. The parties will bear their own costs here and in the lower appellate court. The costs in the trial court hitherto and hereafter shall abide the result. .;