Dave, J. - (1.) THIS is a second appeal by the defendant against the judgment and decree of the Civil Judge, Udaipur, dated 15th November, 1952.
(2.) THE facts leading to this appeal are that the plaintiff respondent filed a suit against the appellant for Rs. 1600/ -. THE trial court decreed the entire claim and the same judgment was upheld by the first appellate court. THE claim consisted of two items of Rs. 1000/-and Rs 600/- and the foundations for both were different. In the present appeal, the defendant has challenged the decree only about the item of Rs. 1000/ -. The above claim for Rs. 1000/- was made on the basis that the respondent and his two brothers had sold their house to the appellant for Rs. 29,000/- on Falgun Shukla 12, Svt. 2003. It was averred by the plaintiff that he kept with the defendant Rs. 1000/-as a deposit in that connection and the defendant executed in his favour a document for the same amount on Chait Sudi 13, Svt. 2003, It was promised that this amount of Rs. 1000/- would be given to the plaintiff after the sale-deed is registered but since that promise was not kept' the present suit was filed. The defendant pleaded in his written statement that Rs. 8,600/- was already given to the vendors and Rs. 20,400/- were to be given before the Registrar. It was, however, settled that the vendors would admit before the Registrar that they have received Rs. 9,600/- instead of Rs. 8,600/- that Rs. 19,400/- would be paid before the Registrar, and that the document Ex. P-l was thus executed for the remaining amount of Rs. 1,000/ -. Later, however, the vendors insisted that the full amount of Rs. 20,400/- should be paid before the Registrar and, therefore, the defendant paid the entire sum before the Registrar and no further amount was thereafter payable. It was, mere fore, prayed that the document Ex. P-l was without any consideration and the suit be dismissed. After inquiry, the trial court came to the conclusion that the amount of Rs. 1,000/-mentioned in Ex. P-l was not paid at the time of the registration and that this amount was to be paid over and above Rs. 29,000/ -. It was further found by the court that the defendant had agreed to pay this amount to the plaintiff in consideration of his persuading his brother to get the document registered and, therefore, a decree was given in the plaintiff's favour. It appears that the question about the validity of the consideration was not argued in that court. When the defendant went in appeal it was urged before the learned Civil Judge that the consideration for which Ex. P-l was executed was unlawful but this contention was repelled by that court and the appeal was dismissed. The only point for determination before this Court is whether the respondent's promise to influence his brother to get the sale deed registered was a good consideration for executing Ex. P-l. The appellant's learned advocate has contended to this Court that the sale-deed was executed and signed by the respondent and his brother on Falgun Shukla 10, Svt. 2003, that all the brothers were under an obligation to get the document registered on receiving the balance, that the entire sum of the purchase money was paid before the Registrar, that the performance of a preexisting obligation on the part of the respondent was not a valid consideration for the execution of Ex. P-l and, therefore, the decree to the extent of Rs. 1,000/- should be set aside. On the other hand, the respondent's learned advocate has urged that his brothers were not willing to sell away the house for Rs. 29,000/- that the respondent's services were, therefore, sought by the appellant, that although the respondent was under an obligation to perform the part of his contract he was under no pre-existing obligation to persuade his brothers to perform their part and since he had rendered that service to the appellant, it was a good consideration and the appeal should, therefore, be dismissed. The respondents argument seems to have found favour with first appellate court. The learned Judge has referred to the case of England vs. Davidson (1) in support of his view. I think that the learned Judge was not justified in applying the analogy of that case to the present one. In that case, a reward was offered by advertisement for giving information which might lead to the conviction of a felon. On a claim being made by a police constable, it was argued from the opposite side that there was no consideration inasmuch as it was his duty as a police constable to apprehend the offender. It was however, held that: - "there may be services which a constable was not bound to render and which he may therefore make the ground of a contract. " In that case the constable had a public duty to apprehend the offender but he was under no obligation to render to the person who had advertised the reward any service in particular. In the present case, the respondent and his brothers had executed the sale-deed in favour of the appellant They had even received part-payment of the sale-price and therefore, they were under an obligation to get the document registered. The respondent's learned Advocate has referred to two more cases in this court to support the first appellate court's view. The first case is Shadwell vs. Shadwell (2 ). In that case the plaintiff who was a barrister was promised by his wealthy uncle that on his marrying Ellen, Nichollan he would receive an annual payment of £ 150/- during his life and until his annual income from his profession as a Chancery barrister would amount to 600 guineas. The plaintiff subsequently married that lady and when he brought an action on the promise made by his uncle against his uncle's executors, it was urged that the promise was without consideration. The court however, held that the promise was enforceable because, as between the plaintiff and the party promising, the consideration was the performance of the marriage. It is apparent that the facts of that case are very different and the respondent can derive no help from the principle enunciated there. The other case referred to by the respondent's learned advocate is Scotson vs. Page (3 ). In that case the plaintiffs averment was that they had delivered to the defendant a certain cargo of coals on board their ship in consideration of the defendant's promising to unload and discharge the cargo at fourty-nine tons per day. The defence was that the plaintiffs were already bound to deliver the cargo of coals in pursuance of a contract with a third person who had directed the plaintiffs to deliver the goods to the defendant. It is clear that the facts and circumstances of this case were also very different and the respondent cannot derive any advantage from this decision. Apart from the fact that the respondent was under a pre-existing obligation, the consideration in the present case was, in my opinion, unlawful and, therefore, the contract between the parties was void. Sec. 24 of the Indian Contract Act says that, "if any part of a single consideration for one or more objects, or any one or any part of any one of several considerations for a single object, is unlawful, the agreement is void. " Sec. 23 of the same Act lays down that the consideration or object of an agreement is unlawful if the court regards it as immoral, or opposed to public policy. Illustration (j) to sec. 23 is as follows - "a who is B's mukhtyar promises to exercise his influence, as such, with B in favour of C and C promises to pay 1,000/-rupees to A. The agreement is void because it is immoral. " The only difference between this illustration and the present case is that in the said illustration was B's mukhtyar and he was required to exercise his influence as such, while in the present case, the respondent was not a mukhtyar but a brother of the other vendors. That would not,however,make much difference in my opinion because the respondent was selling the property jointly with his brothers and it was immoral on his part to use his influence with them to their detriment. The respondent's contract with the appellant in fact came to this that the appellant was prepared to give one thousand rupees more for the property and the respondent had managed to hide this fact from his brothers and get one thousand rupees for himself alone. The respondent has not clearly mentioned in his statement in what way he was required to use his influence with his brothers. The natural inference is that the respondent's brothers either did not think that 29,000/- rupees was a fair price for the property or they were not willing to get the document registered for some other reason. The appellant offered this amount of Rs. 1,000/- to the respondent merely as a bribe and the respondent agreed to influence his brothers to stick to that transaction In Ex. P-l it was shown as if the respondent had deposited Rs. 1000/- with the appellant. In the plaint also, the respondent tried to show that this amount was deposited with the defendant. It was only after inquiry that it transpired that this amount was not in fact deposited but the appellant had only promised to give this sum as a bribe to the respondent. The very fact that the reality was concealed both in Ex. P-l and in the plaint shows that both the parties had guilty conscience and they were aware of the fact that they were entering into an agreement whose consideration was immoral and therefore unlawful. It was grossly unfair on the part of the respondent to make unlawful earning at the cost of his brothers. I do not mean to say that the appellant is an honest person, He may be accused of being equally dishonest in not given the money to the respondent as promised by him but the courts cannot and should not in my opinion, enforce such contracts in which the consideration is immoral. 12. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the trial court's decree is reduced to the extent of Rs. 600/ -. In view of the circumstances of this case, the costs to the extent of the said sum will be borne by both the parties throughout. . ;