WANCHOO, C.J. - (1.) THERE are two connected applications by Prabuda and others (No.l), and Khemla and others (No. 2) for the issue of a writ of certiorari or any other writ direction or order against the State of Rajasthan, the Collector of Nagaur, and other Revenue Authorities. As the point raised in the two casts are exactly the same, we shall decide them by one judgment.
(2.) THE case of the applicants is briefly this - THE applicants are tenants in two villages namely, Khakarki and Nokha. It seems that there was a dispute between the applicants and the jagirdars about the collection of jagirdars' share of crops as rent for Rabi 1951. Proceedings under sec. 78 of the Marwar Tenancy Act (hereinafter called the Marwar Act) were taken by the jagirdars for realization of their share of the produce. Before, however, these proceedings could come to an end, a notification No. F4(74). Rev. 1/51, dated 22.2.51, under sec. 85 of the Marwar Act, was issued by the (Government of Rajasthan, and published in the Gazette, dated the 3rd of March, 1951. This notification related to 24 villages including Khakarki and Nokha. THE notification said that it had been made to appear that the cultivators of these 24 villages had refused to pay rent, and therefore, the government was pleased to declare that such rents might be recovered as arrears of rent revenue under sec. 85(1) of the Marwar Act. THEreupon, the jagirdars applied to the Collector, and among other objections urged that notice of the applications should be given to them, and the procedure prescribed in the rules, framed under the Rajasthan Revenue Courts (Procedure and Jurisdiction) Act, (No. 1) of 1951, hereinafter called the Rajasthan Act) be followed. THE Collector dismissed the application on the 29th March, 1951, and did not give an opportunity to the applicants to be heard. THEreafter, on the 5th April, 1951, the Collector ordered the Tehsildar to collect certain sums from the tenants under R. 33 of the Rules framed under sec. 85 of the Marwar Act. THE applicants went in appeal to the Additional Commissioner who upheld the order of the Collector. THEre was then a second appeal to the Board of Revenue. It was contended that the procedure prescribed by the rules framed under the Rajasthan Act should be followed prescribed under the rules framed under sec. 85 of the Marwar Act. This contention was repelled by the Board. It was also urged before the Board that there were other points which were not decided, and the Board appears to have remanded the appeal for decision on the other points. THEreafter, the matter went to the Additional Commissioner, and he again dismissed the appeal. THEn there was again an appeal to the Board of Revenue, and by the time that appeal came to be heard a notification had been issued by the Rajasthan Government on the 24th October, 1952, cancelling the notification dated 22nd February, 1951. THEreupon, it was urged before the Board of Revenue that the notification having been cancelled, it was longer open to the Collector to realize the rent as arrears of land revenue. This objection was also dismissed by the Board, and the appeal finally failed. THEreafter, the applicants have come to this court for a writ of certiorari. Their main contentions before us are threefold - In the first place, it is urged that in view of the enactment of the Rajasthan Act, sec. 85 of the Marwar Act stands repealed, and no proceedings can be taken under that section. Secondly, it is urged that R. 114 framed under the Rajasthan Act repeals the rules framed under sec. 85 of the Marwar Act, and the procedure provided by the rules framed under the Rajasthan Act should have been applied, and not the procedure in the rules framed under the Marwar Act. Lastly, it is urged that the notification, dated 22.2.51, having been cancelled on the 24th October, 1952, there was no power left in the Collector to realize the rent as arrears of land revenue, and these proceedings should therefore be quashed. The applications have been opposed by the jagirdars as well as by the State, and they traversed the three points raised on behalf of the applicants. The first question is whether sec. 85 of the Marwar Act has been repealed by the enactment of the Rajasthan Act. Sec. 2 of the Rajasthan Act is in these terms - "On and from the coming into force of this Act, all existing laws shall, in so far as they relate to matters dealt with in this Act, be repealed." This Act deals, as the preamble shows, with regulating the jurisdiction and procedure of revenue courts and officers in relation to tenancy etc. under the laws in force in the covenanting states of Rajasthan. The Rajasthan Act is thus an Act which is concerned with the procedure and jurisdiction of revenue courts and with nothing else. This general description of the Act will be borne out by the provisions contained therein, which all deal with the procedure and jurisdiction of courts. Therefore, sec. 2 of the Act will repeal the provisions existing in Rajasthan before the Act came into force so far as those provisions related to procedure and jurisdiction of the courts. But the section does not repeal other provisions of the tenancy or revenue laws of the covenanting States, which deal with matters other than those relating to procedure and jurisdiction. The argument is that there is provision in the First Schedule, Group C, item 2 for applications for realization of rent as land revenue on general refusal to pay rent. Therefore, as the Act provides for such applications, sec. 85 must be held to have been repealed. We are of opinion that there is no force in this argument. In the first place, it may be pointed out that there is a similar item in Schedule 11 of the Marwar Act in Group E, item 4, which provides for collection of rent as land revenue in the evnn of general refusal to pay. Item 2 of Group C of the First Schedule of the Rajasthan Act will certainly repeal item 4 of Group E of the Second Schedule of the Marwar Act; but it will not repeal sec. 85 of the Marwar Act unless that section is a procedural section and no more. Sec. 85 reads as follows - (1) In case of any general refusal to pay rent to persons entitled to collect the same in any local area the Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare that such rents may be recovered as arrears of land revenue. (2) In any local area to which a notification made under sub-sec. (i) applies a landlord or any other person to whom an arrear of rent is due, may notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this or any other enactment for the time being in force, instead of suing for recovery of the arrears under this Act, apply in writing to the Deputy Commissioner to realize the same, and the Deputy Commissioner shall after satisfying himself that the amount claimed is due, proceed, subject to rules made by the Government, to recover such amount with costs and interest as an arrear of land revenue. (3) The Deputy Commissioner shall not be made a defendant in any suit in respect of which an order has been passed under this section. (4) Nothing herein contained and no order passed under this section shall debar - (a) A landlord from recovering by suit or application any amount due to him which has not been recovered under this section ; (b) A person from whom any amount has been recovered under this section, in excess of the amount due from him, from recovering such excess by suit against the landlord or other person on whose application the arrear was realized." It is apparent that this section is not merely a procedural section. It gives power to Government to declare by notification that there is a general refusal to pay rent in a particular area, and then provides an alternative mode of realization of rents in that area. We are, therefore, of opinion that this section is not repealed by anything in the Rajasthan Act, as it is not a mere procedural section. We now come to the second point raised on behalf of the applicants, namely whether rule 114 framed under the Rajasthan Act applies to applications under Group C of Schedule I of the Rajasthan Act, or the rules framed under sec. 85 of the Marwar Act apply. Rule 114 framed under the Rajasthan Act is as follows: - "The procedure laid down in Chapter II in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in revenue courts : Provided that no decree need be prepared in the case of an application." Chapter II provides the procedure for the trial of suits in general and contains as many as 68 rules. The essence of the procedure in Chapter II is that notice is given to the defendant who has right to file a written statement. Thereafter issues are framed and evidence is taken and then judgment delivered. Rule 114 applies the procedure applicable to suits in cases of applications also as far as it can be made applicable. The basic procedure, which we have mentioned above, can be made applicable to all applications, the opposite party taking the place of the defendant, the reply taking the place of written statement, and the points for determination taking the place of issues. So far as evidence and judgment are concerned, they apply to applications as well as suits. Clearly therefore rule 114 applies this basic procedure to applications under item 2, Group C of the First Schedule of the Rajasthan Act for realization of rent as land revenue on the general refusal to pay rent. It has been urged on behalf of the opposite parties that the procedure provided under the rules framed under sec. 85 of the Marwar Act is a special procedure, and it will therefore override the general procedure provided by-rule 114 of the Rajasthan Act. Normally where there is special procedure provided under any provision of an Act, that procedure has to be applied in exclusion of the general procedure, and if the procedure, which is to be found in the rules framed under sec. 85 of the Marwar Act had been included in the rules framed under the Rajasthan Act, that procedure might have been followed to the exclusion of the general procedure provided in Chapter II of the rules framed under the Rajasthan Act. But no rules excluding the general procedure have been framed under the Rajasthan Act, and the rules framed under the Marwar Act cannot, in our opinion, exclude the general procedure provided under the Rajasthan Act. The fact that the words "as far as applica-ble"appear in R. 114 of the Rajasthan Rules,does not mean that the basic general procedure would not apply, add the procedural rules framed under sec. 85 of the Marwar Act would only apply. As a matter of fact, we find that even in the Marwar Act, the general procedure applied and the special rules under sec. 85 were only supplementary. Sec. 119 of the Marwar Act provides that the provisions of the Marwar Code of Civil Procedure, which were more or less similar to the Indian Code of Civil Procedure, would apply subject to the exceptions mentioned in that section. By framing rules under sec. 85 read with sec. 145 of the Marwar Act, the Government could not provide for anything, which was inconsistent with sec. 119 of the Marwar Act. It seems to us, therefore, that the procedure provided in rules 28 to 46 of the Marwar Rules was only supplemental to the procedure given in sec. 119 of the Marwar Act, and realization of rent as arrears of land revenue was a proceeding started on an application under item 4, Group E of the Second Schedule. We are, therefore, of opinion that even, under the Marwar Act, it was necessary to deal with an application of a jagirdar of this nature in the manner provided in the Civil Procedure Code, and the special rules under sec. 85 could only be held to be supplemental. But even if this was not so under the Marwar Act, we have no doubt that the rules framed under sec. 85 of the Marwar Act are merely procedural rules and if other procedural rules have been framed under the Rajasthan Act, the procedural rules framed under the Marwar Act must be held to have been repealed by sec. 2 of the Rajasthan Act. That section repeals all existing laws in force in so far as they relate to matters dealt with in the Rajasthan Act. Rules are dealt with in sec. 43 of the Rajasthan Act. These rules can be framed with respect to applications under item 2 of Group C of the First Schedule of the Rajasthan Act. Such rules are laws, and therefore the Rajasthan rules must repeal any other rules framed on the same subject. In view of rule 114 of the Rajasthan Rules, it must be held that rules in chapter II apply as far as they can be made applicable to applications of this nature, and all previous rules on the subject of the covenanting States must be deemed to have been repealed. There is no question, therefore, of there being special rules in existence, which exclude the general rules provided in chapter II. Stress was laid on the words "as far as it can be made applicable" in rule 114 of the Rajasthan Rules. These words generally appear in such legislation because rules relating to suits cannot be applied in toto to applications, and therefore, these words are put in to allow the courts to decide what rules would apply in what form. For example, in sec. 141 of the Civil Procedure Code we find these very words appearing and that section also applies the procedure in that Code as regards suits to all proceedings in any court of civil jurisdiction as far as it can be made applicable. These words do not mean that if certain existing laws are repealed under sec. 2, they can be saved by the words appearing in the rules. In any case the words of the section must prevail over any rules framed under an Act, even if these words can be twisted to mean what is being contended for on behalf of the opposite parties. We are therefore, of opinion that the revenue courts were wrong in holding that the applicants were not entitled to be heard in view of the rules framed under sec. 85 of the Marwar Act. By holding that wrong view the revenue courts did not exercise the jurisdiction they had of hearing the applicants. There is thus a clear error of law apparent on the record, and a writ of certiorari should be issued. The last question, to which we address ourselves, is the interpretation of sec. 85 of the Marwar Act. It has been urged on behalf of the applicants that sec. 85(2) requires that the notification under sec. 85(1) should be in force both at the time when the application is made by the landlord, and when the amount is realized by the Deputy Commissioner as an arrear of land revenue. That sub-section begins with the following words: - "In any local area to which a notification made under sub-sec. (1) applies." and it is the effect of these words which we have to consider. The sub-section provides that if the notification applies, certain consequences issue, and those consequences are that the landlord can apply for realization of arrears of rent as arrears of land revenue, and the Deputy Commissioner, after satisfying himself that the arrears of rent are due, can proceed to recover the amount as arrears of land revenue. The proper interpretation of this sub-section is that the notification should be in actual application when the application is made as well as when the arrear is being realized. The Deputy Commissioner derives his power of realizing arrears of rent as arrears of land revenue by the existence the notification under sec. 85(1), and so long as the notification is there, the power remains. As soon as the notification is withdrawn, it seems to us that of the Dy. Commissioner (now the Collector) has no power, left to realize the arrears of rent as arrears of land revenue. This view is supported by the provisions of sub-sec. (4). That sub-section provides that no order passed under sec. 85 shall debar a landlord from recovering by suit or application any amount due to him which has not been recovered under this section. It is obviously contemplated that if any amount has remained unrecovered under sec. 85, the landlord would have the right to recover it by suit or by an application under the Marwar Act. This can only lead to the inference that as soon as the notification is withdrawn or cancelled, the power of the Collector to realize arrears of rent as arrears of land revenue comes to an end, and if the time the notification is withdrawn or cancelled, some arrears of rent remain unrecovered, the landlord can recover them by ordinary procedure provided under other provisions of the Act. If it was not so, and if it was the intention of | the legislature that the procedure provided under sec. 85 could also be used after the notification had been withdrawn or cancelled there was no necessity of providing specifically in the sub-section that the landlord could sue for any amounts due to him which had not been recovered under the special procedure. It was urged that sec. 85 did not prevent the landlord from filing a suit, and therefore the period of limitation would be running all along, and the applicants in this case would not now be able to file a suit as more than three years have gone by since the amount became due. It is true that sub-sec.(2) provides for an additional method of recovering arrears of rent, and leaves the right of the landlord to sue unhindered, and therefore limitation would continue to run. But the difficulty pointed out would, in our opinion, be met in a case of this kind by the application of sec. 14 of the Limitation Act. In any case, even if the difficulty is there, that is no reason for not giving its true meaning to sub-sec. (2). In the alternative, it has been urged that the notification of October, 1952 cancelling the earlier notification under sec.85 (1) is not retrospective in effect and that for the period between the two notifications it must be held that there was a general refusal to pay, and the Collector could act under sub-sec. (2) of sec. 85 even after cancellation. This argument does not, in our opinion, help the opposite parties. So far as permanent Acts are concerned, sec. 6 of the General Clauses Act applies and solves the difficulty. But it is well-settled that so far as temporary Acts are concerned, sec. 6 of the General Clauses Act does not apply. (See B. Bansgopal vs. Emperor (1) (A.I.R. 1933 Alld., 669.)). The cancellation of a notification cannot, in our opinion, stand on a higher footing than the coming to an end of a temporary Act. It is also well settled that things done while the temporary Act was in force cannot be undone when it ceases to exist, and the same would apply to cancellation of notifications like this. The argument on behalf of the opposite parties is that as the Collector had satisfied himself that the amount claimed was due, and had sent the papers to the Tehsildar for realization, and it was at this stage that the proceedings were stayed, the satisfaction of the Collector must be held to amount to a decree, and all that now remains is the realization of the amount, which may be taken to be equivalent to execution of the decree. We are of opinion that this argument is not sound. In the first place, there is no question of a decree and its execution so far as sub-sec. (2) is concerned. All that sub-sec. (2) provides is an alternative mode of realizing the arrears of rent as arrears of land revenue. The satisfaction of the Collector, which is provided in sub-sec. (2), is not for purposes of passing a decree or an order having the force of a decree, but merely for his own satisfaction so that he may put the machinery of realization as arrears of land revenue in motion. The whole procedure, as provided in sub-sec. (2), is a procedure for realization, and there is no question of any order by the Collector, which has the force of a decree. The words of the sub-section are that the Deputy Commissioner, after satisfying himself that the amount is due, shall proceed to realize it as an arrear of land revenue. The sub-section does not provide that the Collector shall pass an order declaring the amount due, and then send such order to the Tehsildar or some other officer subordinate to him to execute it. There is, therefore, no question in this case of an order having been passed by the Collector declaring the amount due, and all that now remains is to make realization in accordance with that order. Besides, we have to look to sec. 85 itself, and if that section contemplates that the notification should be in force both at the time when the application is made and also at the time when the realization is made, as it, in our opinion, does, is not necessary to import the analogy of cases where the law provides two stages i.e. (1) the passing of an executable order, and (2) the execution of such order. Such a case is found in the provisions of sec. 15 and 15-A of the Indian Police Act (No. V) of 1861. Sec. 15 provides that the magistrate shall apportion the cost of additional police among the inhabitants of the area where the additional police is quartered Sec. 15-G provides that the Collector shall declare the persons to whom injury has been caused from such misconduct and fix the amount of compensation 1 be paid to such persons, and the manner in which it has to be distributed among them, and assess the proportion in which the same shall be paid to the inhabitants. Then follows sec. 16 which provides that all moneys payable under sec. 15 and 15-A shall be recoverable under secs. 386 and 387 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, or by suit. Where provisions are in this language, it may be possible to say that once the magistrate has passed the order specifying the proportion in which payment has to be made by the inhabitants, the rest is a matter of execution which may be carried on under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code or by means of a suit. Sec. 85 of the Marwar Act is not of this type. It is one whole proceeding with the application and ending with the realization, depending upon the satisfaction of the Deputy Commissioner that the amount is due. We are, therefore, of opinion that the notification having been cancelled on the 24th October, 1952, it is no longer open to the Collector to realize any amount from the tenants as arrears of land revenue. We, therefore, allow the applications, and set aside the orders of the revenue courts. We further order that as the notification under sec. 85(1) has been cancelled, no further proceedings for realization of arrears of rent as arrears of land revenue from these applicants will be taken by the Collector of Nagaur. As to costs, we feel that all this litigation would have been avoided if the original notification had been issued with greater particularity. General refusal to pay rent can only arise crop by crop. It can hardly be said that because there is a general refusal to pay rent, say in Rabi (March) 1954, there will necessarily be general refusal to pay rent in Kharif (November) 1954. It seems therefore that notification under sec. 85 of the Marwar Act, or analogous law, should be issued with particularity, and should relate to the one crop in connection with which they are issued- Once such a notification with reference to a particular crop is issued, it would never acquire concella-tion have arisen because the original notification was a general notification without any limit and naturally, to be cancelled some day. We feel that difficulties in this case have arisen because of the form of the notification, and, under these circumstances, it is best that parties should bear their own costs of the proceeding in this Court. We order accordingly. ;