- (1.) THIS is an application in revision by the accused Dhannalal. Dhannalal was convicted of an offence under sec. 6 of the Rajasthan Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Ordinance, 1949 (No. XIII of 1949) (hereinafter referred to as "the Rajasthan Ordinance"), and sentenced to a fine of Rs. 250/- and in default to two months' simple imprisonment and an order of forfeiture in respect of 83 bags of rice was also passed against him by the Extra Magistrate, First Class, Jahazpur. The conviction and sentence were upheld on appeal by the learned Sessions Judge, Bhilwara. Hence the present revision.
(2.) THE material facts are these. It is said that the petitioner obtained a customs rawana from the customs out-post at Jhalawar for movement of 200 maunds of urad-ki-dal from Jhalawar to Jaipur on the 19th February, 1950. On 23rd February, 1950, it was, however, found at the out-post of Sikar that the accused was carrying in two motor trucks 86 bags in all of which 83 contained rice and only 3 contained urad-ki-dal. THE matter was investigated and in due course the accused was challenged in the court of the Extra Magistrate, Jahazpur, who convicted and sentenced him as already stated above. The defence of the accused was that he had throughout acted in good faith, and that having given instructions to his labourers to load 86 bags of urad-ki-dal, he had gone to attend a party at the house of a friend and as he was drunk when he came back, he was in no position to know what had in fact been loaded in the trucks. In short the plea was that it was a case of sheer mistake which had resulted in bags of rice being put instead of bags of urad-ki-dal in the trucks. Both lower courts disbelieved the defence version and held that the accused was guilty of deliberately carrying rice from Jhalawar which is in the Kotah division to Jaipur in contravention of sec. 3 of the Rajasthan Ordinance read with sec. 5 of the Rajasthan Foodgrains (Movement) Control Order, 1949. It has been strenuously urged on behalf of the petitioner before me that the accused was not guilty of any offence in the present case as the goods had been seized within the Kotah division itself and had not entered the Jaipur division. Learned counsel relies in support of his argument on a notification of the Civil Supplies Department of the Government of Rajasthan dated 23rd December, 1949, by which it was directed that the restrictions on the inter district movement of foodgrains imposed by Clause 5 (2) of the Rajasthan Foodgrain (Movement) Control Order ceased to apply to the movement of rice within a division. There are two provisos to this notification but we are not concerned with them. It was accordingly argued that as the bags of rice have been seized within the same division, and an inter district movement in the same division had been made free by the notification referred to above, the petitioner had not committed any offence. This argument though plausible on the face of it is, in my judgment, without any substance. There is no doubt that the movement of rice without a permit from one division to another was banned at the relevant time, and that is indeed admitted before me, and that, the accused was in contravention of the ban clearly carrying away rice from a place in the Kotah division to another division namely, Jaipur. It is further worthy of notice that he was seeking to do so under false colours inasmuch as he had obtained a customs rawana for 86 bags of urad-ki-dal whereas he was really carrying away 83 bags of rice with only 3 bags of urad-ki-dal under the same rawana. Now sec. 5 of the Rajasthan Food-grains (Movement) Central Order is in these terms: - "no person shall carry or move, or cause to be carried or moved, or offer for carriage any foodgrains by any means whatsoever: - (1 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . (2) From one district to another except under and in accordance with the written orders of the Commissioner or the Director. (3 ). . . . . . . . . . . . (4 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . " In order that an offence under this section is committed, it is in my judgment not necessary that the actual entry of foodgrain from one district to another should have physically taken place. The language of sec. 5 is very wide indeed, and it is sufficiently wide to cover the case of a person like the accused in the present case who has sought to move certain foodgrains from one division to another, without any permit from the competent authorities. In this view of the matter, I hold that the offence had been completed as soon as the accused had obtained the rawana and put 83 bags of rice instead of urad-ki-dal in the trucks for carriage from Jhalawar to Jaipur. I have no hesitation, therefore, in holding that the accused was rightly convicted of having committed an offence under sec. 6 of the Rajasthan Ordinance read with sec. 5 of the Rajasthan Foodgrains (Movement) Control Order, 1949. It was next argued that the conviction of the accused could not be sustained because the provisions of sec. 11 of the Rajasthan Ordinance had been complied with. That section is as follows; - '"no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under this Act except on a report in writing of the facts constituting such offence made by a person who is a public servant as defined in sec. 21 of the Indian Penal Code. " It was argued before me that although a report was made in the present case by the Sub Inspector of Police, who was a public servant within the meaning of sec. 21 I. P. C. , that report did not mention the particular rule or rules which were violated by the accused, and, therefore,the entire proceedings taken on such an insufficient report were vitiated and no conviction could be founded on them. Having given my careful consideration to this argument, I have reached the conclusion that there is no substance in it. The object of sec. 11 clearly appears to me that the filing of a complaint under the Rajasthan Ordinance was not intended by the legislature to be left to any private person as such and, therefore, the duty of filing such a complaint was restricted to a particular class of people, viz. , public servants. It was also laid down in the section that the report submitted by a public servant must be in writing and must contain the facts constituting the offence for which the accused was sought to be prosecuted Now, in my opinion the emphasis in the section is on the facts constituting the alleged offence and not on the particular rule or rules under which the alleged facts may amount to an offence. Learned counsel referred me to Purushottam Devji vs. Emperor (l) and Dr. N. G. Chatterji vs. Emperor (2 ). Now, so far as the Bombay Case (l) is concerned, a charge against the accused person in this case was quashed on the ground that the charge-sheet sent by the Sub Inspector of Police made no reference whatsoever to the offence or contravention of the Bombay Retail Trade Control and Licensing Order. The other charge for exporting the foodgrain from a place within the limits of one district to another place outside that district was, however, maintained, and that was so because the particulars of that charge, or the facts upon which it was founded, were fully contained in the charge-sheet sent by the police. That case is, therefore, of no assistance to the petitioner in the present case because there can be no controversy that the facts constituting the offence against the petitioner were mentioned in detail in the chargesheet by the police in this case. So far as the Allahabad case (2) is concerned, it has no doubt been held that the failure the prosecution to specify the rule or the order for the contravention of which the accused is being prosecuted is an illegality and not merely an irregularity. The learned single Judge who decided the case was of opinion that the defect was something like the one which is noticed by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Subramania Iyer's case (3), and amounted to an illegality sufficient to vitiate trial. With great respect, I am unable to share that view. As I have already pointed out above, the meaning and intendment of sec. 11 of the Rajasthan Ordinance is that the complaint must be filed by a public servant and that such a complaint must contain all the facts constituting the offence for which the accused is sought to be prosecuted. Sec. 11 does not anywhere say that the number of the rule or of the section of a particular enactment which has been transgressed should be mentioned as such. The result of the above discussion is that the conviction of the petitioner need not be interfered with it the report made against him contained all the salient facts of the offences of which he was charged and he had due notice of the case against him. From a perusal of the report filed by the Sub Inspector in the present case, I have no doubt whatsoever that the report was full enough and mentioned all the salient facts which, according to the prosecution, constituted the offence against him. I may notice in passing that where the report went wrong was when it tried to mention the particular rule or rules which had been violated by the petitioner in the present case according to the officer making the report. That only shows the danger of the view which insists on the requirement that the report must also contain a specific reference to the rule or rules violated. Consequently, this revision fails and is hereby dismissed. .;