Pratap Krishna Lohra, J. - (1.) BOTH these writ petitions are founded on identical facts and the question of law involved therein is common, therefore, these petitions are disposed of by this common order.
(2.) FACTS in brevity, as projected in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2016/2014, are narrated in chronological order as under: - At the threshold, a contract for work of handling of goods/parcels transshipment was awarded to the first respondent for a period of three years commencing from 14th October, 1984 and pursuant thereto an agreement was signed between the petitioners and the first respondent on 17th October, 1984 containing arbitration clause. Subsequently, another contract of same nature was awarded to the first respondent for a period of three years commencing from 16th May, 1990 and an agreement between the parties was executed for the same on 15th May, 1990 having arbitration clause. On completion of both the contracts, a dispute cropped up between the rival parties regarding payments, and therefore, first respondent for redressal of his grievances invoked arbitration clause and initiated the proceedings for appointment of arbitrator for both the contracts. By judicial intervention, subject -matter of dispute in both the contracts were referred to an arbitrator and Shri Lal Singh Ujjawal, retired Divisional Manager, North -Western Railway, Jodhpur was appointed as sole arbitrator. The arbitrator passed separate awards for both the contracts of even date i.e. 1st March, 2003. Being aggrieved by the arbitral awards, petitioners laid separate petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short, hereinafter referred to as 'the Act of 1996') before the learned District Judge, Bikaner raising certain objections against the awards. Along with the petitions under Section 34 of the Act of 1996, petitioners also filed separate applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay. The learned District Judge, Bikaner, while relying on a decision of Hon'ble Apex Court, rejected both the petitions under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 by holding that in these proceedings, provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act are not applicable. Thus, both the petitions were thrown away solely on the ground of limitation.
(3.) FEELING dismayed with the order of the learned District Judge, Bikaner, petitioners preferred two separate appeals before this Court under Section 37 of the Act of 1996 and this Court was pleased to decide both these appeals by a common order dated 16th February, 2005. The Court held that petitions under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 are not time barred, and therefore, while allowing the appeals, matter was remanded back to the learned District Judge for deciding objections of the petitioners afresh on merits. The operative portion of the order reads as under: - The net result is that the impugned order cannot be sustained. The appeal is therefore allowed, the impugned order is set aside, and the matter is sent back to the learned trial Court, with a direction to decide the objections on merits, in accordance with the law, and most expeditiously. The parties are directed to appear before the learned trial Court on 11th March 2004, as prayed.;