P.K.LOHRA, J. - (1.) MR . Chaitanya Gehlot, for the appellants. Appellants have preferred this appeal under Section 173(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short, 'the Act of 1988') challenging the judgment and award dated 18 th May, 2012 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal First, Rajsamant (for short, 'the learned Tribunal'). The learned Tribunal, by the award impugned, has awarded compensation to the tune of Rs.2,85,000/ - to the respondents -claimants, while adjudicating their claim petition under Section 166 of the Act of 1988.
(2.) THE instant appeal is filed by the appellant belatedly and as per office report, it is barred by limitation of 818 days. The appellants have made endeavour to seek condonation of delay by laying application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The averments made in the application are as under : - 1. That the appeal is barred by limitation by about 2 1/2 years. 2. That the aforesaid claim petition was decided by judgment dated 18.5.2012 but the applicants/appellants did not come to know about any such judgment as they were never conveyed by any of the authority or their counsel even and its only on 01.9.2014 the applicants/appellants came to know about recovery of compensation from them when their neighbourers informed them that Patwari is visiting their house in their absence stating about recovery of compensation amount. The applicants/appellants immediately contacted their Advocate and applied for certified copy of judgment on dated 04.9.2014, receiving it on 12.9.2014 and on proper legal advise deposited an amount of Rs.25,000/ - under Section 173 (1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 for the purpose of filing appeal and collecting all the relevant papers approached counsel at Jodhpur in the first week of November, 2014, thus, causing no delay immediately got prepared the appeal and filed it before this Hon'ble Court. 3. That the delay caused in filing the appeal is neither intentional nor with an intent to defeat any purpose of law, rather is accidental and beyond the control of appellants, thus, the appellants crave liberty to request this Hon'ble court to condone the delay caused in filing the aforesaid appeal.
(3.) LEARNED counsel for the appellant, Mr. Gehlot, has argued that delay in filing this appeal is due to bona fide reasons, and therefore, in the interest of justice, the same is liable to be condoned. Mr. Gehlot further submits that while condoning the delay Courts are required to be construe the term "sufficient cause" liberally for doing substantial justice. Lastly, Mr. Gehlot has urged that considering rural background of the appellants, some latitude be given to the appellants for condonation of delay. The explanation tendered by the appellant for condonation of delay is per -se based on wholly vague, cryptic and unspecific averments. The appellants have not mentioned chronological events for explaining inordinate delay of 818 days. There remains no quarrel that while exercising its judicial power and discretion, Court should adopt a liberal approach in construing word "sufficient cause", but liberal construction of the term does not mean that delay is to be condoned for mere askance and, even in cases where negligence and apathy of the litigant is clearly apparent and writ large. The expression "sufficient cause" is receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice remains unquestionable and the law Courts are construing the same utmost liberally. However, when negligence or inaction on the part of a litigant is clearly visible and there is lack of bona fide on the part of a party delay is not liable to be condoned.;