R.S. Chauhan, J. - (1.) THE petitioner is aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 13.2.2008 passed by the Civil Judge (S.D.), Kotputali, District Jaipur, whereby the learned Magistrate has allowed an application filed by the respondents -plaintiffs under Section 6 of the Rajasthan Agricultural Debt Relief Act, 1957 ('the Act' for short). The petitioner is also aggrieved by the order dated 24.9.2013 passed by the District Judge, Jaipur District, Jaipur, whereby the learned Judge has dismissed the revision petition filed by the petitioner against the judgment and decree dated 13.2.2008.
(2.) THE brief facts of the case are that on 12.5.2004, Arjun, the original plaintiff filed an application under Section 6 of the Act against the petitioner, Shivdayal. He had claimed that on 1.6.2001, the petitioner has taken an agricultural loan of Rs. 2,63,700/ - and executed a pronote and a receipt. But the petitioner failed to repay the loan. The petitioner was served with the notice; he denied the averments of the application. After hearing both the parties, the learned trial court framed the issues. By order dated 13.2.2008, the learned Magistrate held that the parties are agriculturist and determined the debt to the tune of Rs. 2,63,700/ - and directed the petitioner to pay the amount in 12 installments of 6 months each. Being aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner filed a revision petition before the learned Judge. By order dated 24.9.2013, the learned Judge dismissed the revision petition. Hence, this petition before this Court. Mr. Jai Raj Tantia, the learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently contended that under the Rajasthan Scheduled Debtors (Liquidation of Indebtedness) Act, 1976 (henceforth 'the Act of 1976' in short) a marginal farmer is protected from repaying the loan amount. Since, the petitioner happens to be a marginal farmer, as he owns merely 0.8 hectares of land, which is less than 1 hectare of land, the learned trial court was unjustified in passing the judgment and decree against him. Secondly, that the protection provided by the Act of 1976 has also been ignored by the learned Judge. Therefore, both the impugned judgments need to be interfered with.
(3.) HEARD the learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the impugned judgments.;