Alok Sharma, J. - (1.) THIS civil first appeal under Sec. 96 C.P.C. has been filed against the judgment and decree dt. 01.11.2012, passed by the Additional District Judge No. 1, Bharatpur whereby the suit for specific performance filed by the plaintiff -respondent No. 1 (hereinafter 'the plaintiff') against the defendant -respondent No. 2 (hereinafter 'the defendant') was decreed on the basis of a compromise between the plaintiff and the defendant. The appellants were not a party in the underlying suit decreed on consent as aforesaid, but state to be the assignees of the defendant under a registered sale -deed dt. 06.09.2011 qua the suit land and submit that the consent decree dt. 01.11.2012 between the plaintiff and the defendant is fraudulent, works to their obvious disadvantage and entitles them to file a regular civil appeal under Sec. 96 CPC. The appellants' submission is that the judgment and decree dt. 01.11.2012 based on the plaintiff's fraudulent consent at a time he had no interest in the suit property is liable to be set aside. The question which arises in the present appeal is as to whether an appeal by a stranger not a party in the suit against a compromise decree is maintainable in spite of the disbarment under Sec. 96(3) C.P.C. which provides that no appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the Court with the consent of parties.
(2.) MR . Manoj Bhardwaj, appearing for the appellants, submits that the bar under Sec. 96(3) C.P.C. is not an absolute bar and a challenge to a compromise decree can be made under the said provision with the aid of Order 43 Rule 1A(2) C.P.C. which provides that in an appeal against a decree passed in a suit after recording a compromise or refusing to record a compromise, it shall be open to the appellant to contest the decree on the ground that the compromise should, or should not, have been recorded. It was submitted that as the registered owner of the suit property in respect of which a decree for specific performance came to be passed on a collusion between the plaintiff and the defendant, the appellants have the right to file the present appeal on the ground that the compromise between the plaintiff and defendant was unlawful. Counsel submits that in the event the appellants were not allowed to agitate the appeal against the compromise decree dt. 01.11.2012, they would be rendered remedy less inasmuch as Order 23 Rule 3A C.P.C. provides that no suit shall lie to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful. It was submitted that it cannot have been an intention of the legislature to render an aggrieved party remedy less and in view of the absolute bar under Order 23 Rule 3A C.P.C. with regard to the laying of a separate suit challenging a compromise decree, this appeal is maintainable. Mr. Jagmeet Singh, appearing for the plaintiff -decree -holder has submitted that the bar under Sec. 96(3) C.P.C. against the filing of an appeal against a consent decree is absolute unless the case can be brought in within Order 43 Rule 1A CPC. It was submitted that even an appeal under Order 43 Rule 1A C.P.C. can be filed by only a party to the compromise on the basis of which the consent decree had been passed. It is a party to the compromise alone who can question the legality and validity of the underlying compromise recorded by the Court and the decree passed thereon. Counsel submitted that this situation does not obtain in the present case as the appeal has not been filed by the defendant -judgment -debtor or the plaintiff -decree -holder. Counsel submitted that in any event the appellants having admittedly purchased the suit property during the pendency of the suit for specific performance laid by the plaintiff against the defendant, it was for them to have engaged with requisite diligence in moving an application for impleadment in the pending suit before the passing of a judgment and decree. And if the subsequent purchasers did not become a party on an appropriate application under Order 22 Rule 10 C.P.C., they are liable to suffer - -Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, on account of any order passed in the pending proceedings. Mr. Singh has further submitted that a reading of the impugned judgment and decree dt. 01.11.2012 indicates that the suit for specific performance had come up before the Lok Adalat where the matter had been compromised and attested and it was on that attested compromise before the Lok Adalat that the impugned judgment and consent decree dt. 01.11.2012 came to be passed. Counsel submits that an order passed by a Lok Adalat is not open to challenge under Sec. 21(2) of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 which provides that every award made by a Lok Adalat shall be final and binding on all the parties to the dispute, and no appeal shall lie to any Court against the award.
(3.) HEARD the counsel for the parties and perused the impugned judgment and decree dt. 01.11.2012.;