GOYAL, J. - (1.) THIS first appeal by the appellant-tenant is filed against the judgment and decree of eviction passed on 5. 9. 1983 by learned Additional District Judge No. 3, Jaipur City, Jaipur in civil suit No. 211/1981
(2.) THE plaintiff-respondent filed a civil suit in March, 1981 with the averments that house No. C-127 situated in Tilak Nagar, Jaipur was let-out to the defendant No. 1 for the use of office of the defendant No. 2 in April, 1978 at monthly rent of Rs. 1,000/ -. THE plaintiff sought eviction on the grounds of default in payment of rent, material alterations in the premises, change in use for the purpose it was let-out and reasonable and bonafide requirement. The defendants in written statement while admitting the tenancy denied all the grounds of eviction with a further plea that monthly rent agreed upon was Rs. 850/ -. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, issues were framed. Evidence of the parties was recorded. Vide judgment dated 5. 9. 1983 learned trial Judge decided issues No. 1 and No. 2 in favour of the plaintiff that agreed monthly rent was Rs. 1,000/- and that the plaintiff's requirement is reasonable and bonafide and comparative hardship would also be caused to him. Issues No. 3 & 4 relating to material alteration and change in use of the premises were decided against the plaintiff. While deciding issue No. 5, it was held that the plaintiff may raise construction over first floor. Issue No. 6 was decided in the manner that the rent determined under Section 13 (3) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950 (in short the Act) has already been deposited. In result the decree of eviction. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. The first point raised by learned counsel for the appellants is that the suit for eviction was not maintainable as per Section 14 (3) of the Act. Section 14 (3) of the Act is as under :- 14 (3) Restriction on eviction :- Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or contract, no suit for eviction from the premises let out for commercial or business purposes shall lie against a tenant on the ground set forth in clause (h) of sub- section (1) of Section 13 before the expiry of five years from the date the premises were let out to the tenant. It is not disputed that suit house was let out to the appellants for the use as office in April, 1978 and the present suit for eviction was filed in March, 1981 i. e. before the expiry of a period of five years from the date the house was let out to the tenants.
(3.) LEARNED senior counsel Sh. Agarwal contended that the suit property was not let out for commercial or business purposes, hence Section 14 (3) of the Act would not apply. He referred clause (4) of the Constitution of the Indian Council For International Amity, Jaipur (appellant-defendant No. 2 ). Consideration of this document was objected by learned counsel for the appellants on the ground that this document has been filed in this appeal along with an application under Order 41 Rule 27 C. P. C. without showing any reason as to why this document was not filed during the trial. LEARNED senior counsel Sh. Agarwal, in reply submitted that since no such objection under Section 14 (3) of the Act was raised in the written statement and no issue was framed, hence the respondent-plaintiff was not required to produce this document during the trial and secondly the appellants have not denied this document to be the document of Constitution of the appellant No. 2. On the basis of the submissions made by learned senior counsel Sh. Agarwal, this document is taken into consideration. Clause (4) of this document is reproduced as under :- Clause (4) :- It's a non-political, non-commercial and non- sectarian body of all those who are sincerely devoted to the promotion of Cultural Welfare of all Humanity. It shall be the duty of the Executive Committee to preserve its independent and non-partisan character, and to ensure that it exists solely for philanthropic purposes and not for any purpose of profit. A bare perusal of this clause goes to show that the appellant No. 2-registered society exists solely for philanthropic purposes and not for any purpose of profit. Now question arises is as to whether such use of the rented premises comes within the purview of Section 14 (3) of the Act ? Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that use of premises for office purposes amounts to use for business purposes and element of profit is not required in such use. He placed reliance upon a few judgments. In The Model Town Welfare Council vs. Bhupinder Pal Singh (1), while dealing with the E. P. Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 it was held that the term "business" means an affair requiring the attention and care, that which occupies one's attention and labour. The activity of maintaining and running a school by engaging teachers as also some other ministerial staff comes within the scope of the term business even if there is no profit motive. In para 27 of this judgment, it was held that the word business in Section 2 (f) and Section 13 (3) (a) (ii) of the Act need not necessarily be commercial business carried on with a profit motive. The word includes within its scope a charitable business or a dealing in the interest of the public or a section of the public. In Gunnabatula Papachari vs. The Country Tobacco Merchants Association by its President Vijayawada (2), the Andhra Pradesh High Court while dealing with the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act observed that a registered association formed to render aid and assistance to its members and also to afford facilities to their customers amounts to carrying on business activities. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in S. Mohan Lal vs. R. Kondiah (3), dealing with the same Rent Control Act of Andhra Pradesh held that the expression `business' is used in wide sense to include practice of profession of advocate. In Shri Mohan Lal vs. The Haryana State, through Collector (4), Punjab & Haryana High Court dealing with the provisions of East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act held that premises occupied by the police department for use as office amounts to use for business purposes. A similar view was taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Badrilal Jagannath vs. Digambar Jain ;