PANWAR, J. - (1.) BY the instant writ petition, petitioner seeks quashing the impugned suspension order dated 1-7-2002 (Annex. 1 ).
(2.) THE facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that while working as the District Transport Officer, applications were made on 30-9-95 by Mr. Shamsher Khan and Hafix Mohammed for assignment of new registration mark in respect of motor vehicles, i. e. buses. According to the petitioner, all the requisite documents were produced by the applicants and he sent telegrams to the Registering Authority, Delhi for verification of genuineness of the No Objection Certificates stipulating 15 days time for reply but no reply was received and as such, after expiry of 18 days therefrom, he assigned new registration marks to the vehicles. An FIR was lodged in such matters on 3-3-97 against the petitioner and co-accused Sarvashri B. L. Meena, D. T. O. , Giriraj Kumar Gupta, Motor Vehicle Inspector, Norat Mal Agarwal, D. T. O. for the offences under Sections 467, 468, 481, 482, 420 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code. His grievance is that vide impugned order Annex. 1 dated 1-7-2002, he has been subjected to selective suspension as co-accused named above have not been put under suspension. His further grievance is that he had acted in accordance with the rules and there is no legal or procedural error committed by him still he has been suspended for an incident which took place on 30-9-1995 and FIR of which had been lodged on 3-3-97. Hence this writ petition. Refuting the averments made in the writ petition, raising certain preliminary objections and high-lighting the illegalities and irregularities as well as the offences committed by the petitioner, the respondents have filed a detailed reply. The respondents have also pointed out the conclusions arrived at by the investigating agency throwing light upon the offences committed by the petitioner. A rejoinder-affidavit has been filed by the petitioner, by which he tried to rebut the averments made in the reply. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. The first contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that after perusing the documents filed by the applicants, the petitioner sent a telegram to the Registering Authority at Delhi to verify the genuineness of the No Objection Certificates and after expiry of 15 days as stipulated in the telegram, he acted in accordance with rules and procedure and passed the order "may Assign as per Rules. " His further contention is that the petitioner was not expected to make an enquiry as held by a Division Bench of this Court in Shri Ratan vs. State Transport Authority (Appellate Authority), Jaipur (1), wherein the Division Bench of this Court held that Section 31 does not contemplate any enquiry in to the question of transfer by the Registering Authority before recording the transfer and if the registration certificate of the vehicle is produced by a person who alleges to be the transferee, the Registering Authority has no option but to record the transfer. He has also placed reliance upon another Division Bench decision of this Court in Regional Transport Officer & Anr. vs. Pradeep Kumar Jain (2), wherein the Division Bench held that if No Objection Certificate has not been issued though six months passed and no objection for non-issuance of new registration mark has been taken then the certificate shall be deemed to have been issued. However, in the instant case, the record reveals that the petitioner had assigned new registration marks without physical verification of the motor vehicles and in absence of any reply to the telegram sent by him to the Registering Authority, Delhi. He was expected to satisfy himself with the genuineness of the documents produced by the applicants but he hurried up in assigning new registration marks on the pretext that no reply was received from the Registering Authority, Delhi after expiry of stipulated period of 15 days. Thus, the decision in Shri Ratan's case (supra), does not come to the rescue of the petitioner. Likewise, the decision in Pradeep Kumar Jain's case (supra), also, does not come to the help of the petitioner as the investigation revealed that the No Objection Certificates produced by the applicants had never been issued by the Registering Authority, Delhi. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that no such suspension order has been passed against the co-accused named out in the FIR and one Mr. Devi Lal, LDC and as such there is selective suspension which is unsustainable in view of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in K. Sukhendar Reddy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr. (3), wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court held that selective suspension is impermissible. There cannot be any dispute to this settled legal position. The facts of each case requires consideration on its own merit and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in K. Sukhendar Reddy's case (supra), is applicable in an identical fact-situation. In the instant case, so far as Mr. Devi Lal, LDC is concerned, his Disciplinary Authority is the respondent Department whereas the Disciplinary Authority for the petitioner is the State. Petitioner has been put under suspension vide Annex. 1 after obtaining necessary sanction Annex. 2 from the State. Thus, there is no case of selective suspension so far as petitioner and Mr. Devi Lal are concerned.
(3.) HOWEVER, so far as other co-accused named out in the FIR are concerned, the question of selective suspension cannot be considered as those persons have not been made party-respondents by name. HOWEVER, the question of suspension is a matter of discretion of the Competent Authority arrived at after subjective satisfaction. There is limited scope of interference by this court in such matters. Even otherwise, if suspension orders have not been passed against co-accused, petitioner cannot seek relief on this ground because Article 14 is not meant to perpetuate an illegality. Yet another contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the impugned suspension order Annex. 1 is unreasonable, arbitrary and illegal and as such liable to be quashed. It is settled legal proposition that during suspension, relationship of master and servant continues between the employer and the employee. However, the employee is forbidden to perform his official duties. In certain cases, suspension may cause stigma even after exoneration in the departmental proceedings or acquittal by the criminal court, but it cannot be treated as a punishment even by stretch of imagination in strict legal sense. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in R. P. Kapur vs. Union of India & Ors. (4), observed that the Authority entitled to appoint a public servant would be entitled to suspend him during pendency of the departmental enquiry into his conduct or pending a criminal case. ;