PRASAD, J. - (1.) HEARD the learned counsel for the parties.
(2.) LEARNED counsel for the petitioners submits that where there is no prescription of the period for acceptance of voluntary retirement, the period prescribed in the notice of voluntary retirement should be deemed to be the period for accepting the voluntary retirement and communicating the reasons. He places reliance on Tek Chand vs. Dile Ram' wherein, Hon'ble Supreme Court was dealing with a case where the rule provided for acceptance of the application within the period prescribed in the rule. Admittedly, there is no such rule in the statute book which will govern the case which is being decided by the present judgment. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that where there is no prescription of limit in the rule, the respondents cannot be permitted to inflate the time period for an unlimited period. There has to be some reasonableness in the process. There has to be a reasonable time gap in between notice and its acceptance. There had been a total lack of concern by the respondents in dealing with the application and it was only after a period of two months that the application was rejected after citing reasons as communicated to the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that as and when there is no prescription of time for voluntary retirement and where, it is seen that employee has a right to retire, then in reciprocity, it should be seen that there is a right vested in the employee to fix a date on his own volition and that fixed date should be respected by the employer and his action should circumscribe by that date alone. The employer should not have the liberty of stretching and extending the date beyond the date fixed by the worker. He places reliance on a case of Dinesh Chandra Sangma vs. State of Assam & Ors. The case relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners refers to a fundamental rule of recognizing the right in reciprocity. In the instant case, there is no such fundamental rule or rules applicable. Therefore, the citation referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner is based on interpretation of a particular set of rules and would not govern the facts of this case. Learned counsel emphasises that in the instant case, though rule is there, but there is no prescription of time, therefore, it inhers in itself a provision that as and when a party prescribes, that should be read into the rules and therefore, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the date prescribed by the petitioner should be the date for defining reasons which are required to be given in the rules to the employee. I have considered the argument and I am of the opinion that such reading of words in a rule is not known to the statutory interpretation because if the party concerned is permitted to add certain words in the rule, every concerned would give its own providence and as and when rule will be read, it would be read in the context of that person. The generality of the rule will be lost. It is not a correct way of interpreting a statute. A rule has to be considered in generality and not specifically enacted for a particular individual, which is sought to be canvassed by the learned counsel for the petitioner.
(3.) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner has relied on yet another case of Hon'ble Supreme Court `union of India & Ors. vs. Sayed Muzaffar Mir' LEARNED counsel for the petitioner when read the case, it made a mention of a statutory period prescribed in the rules itself. In the instant case, there is no prescription of any period in the rule, therefore, the facts of the case are not similar to the facts available on record. Therefore, this case will not govern the facts of the present case. Learned counsel further assailed that the reasons were furnished to him after notice of the present writ petition was served on the respondent department. This only reflects that the respondent wanted to pre-empt the case of the petitioner by furnishing reasons and refusing retirement so as to deprive him of his rights. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner does not go beyond any reasoning because service of notice was in no way concerned with the right of the employer to furnish reasons in the light of the rules. If the employer was duty bound by the rules to communicate refusal to the petitioner, it was bound to communicate reasons and it can only be seen that statutory obligation was discharged by the employer which cannot be seen to be in any way triggered by the fact of service of notice. ;