SHARMA, J. - (1.) AT the very outset it will be proper to state the question which arises for determination in this case and it is as to whether the Tribunal constituted under the Jaipur Development Authority Act, 1982 (for short, the JDA Act) has power to punish for disobedience of its orders? The above question arises in the following circumstances.
(2.) THE petitioner, Santosh Sharma claims to be the member of National Housing Co-operative Society Ltd. and his case is that he was allotted a plot by the said housing society and the number of the plot is SB-2 situated just opposite the building of Officer Tribunal School (OTS) on the Jawaharlal Nehru Road, Jaipur. Before the land of Khasra No. 22 situated in Jhalana Doongari came to be in possession of the housing society it belonged to one Triloki Nath Sahney and according to the petitioner the said land is not in any acquisition proceedings and Shri Sahney had obtained the permission of the Revenue Authorities for construction of a residential house in accordance with the provisions of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act in the year 1964. Plot No. SB-2 which is said to have been allotted to the petitioner by the housing society is the place where the house is said to have been constructed by Shri Triloki Nath Sahney. THE petitioner is said to have completed his house in the year 1983 and according to the petitioner the Jaipur Development Authority (for short, the JDA) started interference in his possession over the land and demolished certain old construction in contravention of the provisions of Section 32 of the JDA Act without giving any notice to him. THE housing society filed a civil suit against the JDA. It also filed an application for temporary injunction in the civil suit No. 7/1986. Learned Addl. Civil Judge under his order dated July 26, 1986, restrained the JDA from interfering in the possession of the housing society over the land. Yet another interference was made by the JDA in the year 1990 in the possession of the petitioner specifically over his plot No. SB-2 and against the aforesaid intended action of the JDA the petitioner filed a civil suit for permanent injunction against the JDA from restraining it from interfering in his possession over the said plot and demolishing the house. A application for temporary injunction was also filed and the JDA was restrained and was directed to maintain status quo. THE JDA issued notice to the petitioner asking him to remove the verandah allegedly on the ground that the said verandah has been constructed in contravention of the order regarding maintaining status quo. THE petitioner filed an appeal before the Tribunal and the Tribunal under its order dated February, 7, 1991, restrained the JDA from demolishing the construction and the said order was confirmed on February 25, 1991. One Shri P. P. Upadhyaya, Chief Judicial Magistrate, in the JDA, was appointed as Commissioner and he inspected the site and submitted his report. In short, so far as present controversy is concerned the case of the petitioner is that the JDA has been restrained by the Tribunal from demolishing any part of the building, but it demolished the verandah on June 20, 1991. The petitioner filed an application under Section 144 and 151 for permitting him to construct the verandah and bring it to the same situation in which it was existing before the demolition of the same on June 20, 1991. He also filed an application for appointment of the Commissioner to examine whether the allegations of the petitioner were correct or not. The Tribunal under its order dated June 24, 1991 accepted the prayer of the petitioner and appointed Shri Roop Mitruka as Commissioner. The said Commissioner inspected the site and submitted his report on June 26, 1991 to the Tribunal. The petitioner filed an application under Order 39 Rules 2, 2a and (3) CPC for taking action against the respondents Nos. 2 to 8, the JDA and its officers. The said application was registered at No. 8/1991. A plea was raised on behalf of the non-petitioners including the JDA that the Tribunal constituted under the JDA Act has no right to take proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 for punishing them for violation of the aforesaid order. The aforesaid objection prevailed with the Tribunal and the Tribunal held that it has no power to punish the contemners. It was contended by Mr. Pareek, learned counsel for the petitioner that the Tribunal constituted under the provisions of the JDA Act is civil court and therefore, it has power to punish for disobedience of its orders and the said power to punish is there under Order 39 CPC. it was further contended that under the JDA Act, as it now stands, after amendment, its jurisdiction has been enlarged and though previously its jurisdiction was only to the extent of hearing the appeals against the orders of the JDA, but now it has got jurisdiction to give relief against any threatened action or injury from the JDA which affects the rights of a citizen. Thus, it is civil court in all respects and has all the powers of a civil court by virtue of sub-section (6) of Sec. 83 of the JDA Act. Yet, another contention has been raised that the JDA Tribunal at any rate can be equated with the Industrial Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the said Industrial Tribunal enjoys all the powers including the inherent power as given under Sec. 151 CPC and in exercise of its inherent powers it has power to punish for disobedience of its order. In the present proceedings, I need not to go into the question as to whether or not the construction of the house in the present form was made after obtaining permission of the JDA or before its constitution of the UIt or any other competent authority. It is the case of the petitioner that it was in the year 1964 that the then khatedar of Khasra No. 22 after obtaining the permission of the revenue authorities under the Rajasthan Tenancy Act has constructed the house. No material has been placed as to what extent the permission to construct the house was granted. No material has been placed as to what was the shape of the house when the plot No. SB-2 is said to have been allotted to the petitioner by the housing society. No material has been produced to show to what extent was in existence when Sahney had transferred the land to the housing society. It is common knowledge that in the sale deed, if one is executed, the property sold is described and the description of building if any transferred alongwith the land is also given. It is the case of the petitioner himself that it was in the year 1983 that he had completed the construction of his house. Whether he had received any permission from the UIt or JDA or any other agency under the provisions of the relevant Act for construction for improvement has not been stated by the petitioner and it cannot be said whether the construction which is said to have been made to what extent it is authorised or unauthorised. As said earlier, I will not go into this question in the present proceedings and the only question as stated earlier in the beginning of this order is about the jurisdiction of the Tribunal constituted under the JDA Act to punish for disobedience of its order.
(3.) A bare reading of Order 39 Rule 1 CPC will show that the said provision is applicable to a suit and the proceedings under the JDA Act cannot be said to be a suit and cannot be equated with a suit. But that does not end the matter. A reference to Section 141 CPC will show that the procedure provided in the Code of Civil Procedure in regard to suits shall be followed as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any court of civil jurisdiction. Therefore, if any proceedings are pending or are taken in any court of civil jurisdiction, then by virtue of Section 141 CPC the procedure provided in the Code of Civil Procedure shall be followed and in that case even the provisions of Order 39 Rule 1,2, 2a CPC in my opinion will be applicable. This court is of the opinion that the power to punish for contempt is a different power than the power to punish for disobedience of the order made under order 39 CPC, because so far as power of this Court to punish for contempt is concerned, it is confined to punish for contempt of the order of this court, civil as well as criminal contempt, as well as to punish for the contempt of the order of the courts subordinate to it. In the present case, this court is not concerned with the power of this court to punish for contempt in so far as offence of contempt, if any, committed in relation to. the order made by the Tribunal and as said earlier, a limited question involved in this case is as to whether or not by virtue of Order 39 Rule 2a CPC the Tribunal has jurisdiction to take action for disobedience of its stay order which was issued and confirmed for maintaining status quo. In my opinion, if the JDA Tribunal can be said to be a court of civil jurisdiction by virtue of Section 141 CPC, the provisions of Order 39 Rule 1,2,2a CPC will be applicable and for the disobedience of its order it can take action against the persons who have disobeyed the order made by it. It was said in the application filed before the Tribunal that the order to maintain status quo was issued and was confirmed. The Tribunal has not made any inquiry whether or not as alleged by both the parties, the JDA and the petitioner herein, or anybody had disobeyed the order to maintain status quo, but the Tribunal held that it has no power to punish for contempt and it dismissed the application filed by the petitioner herein before the Tribunal. The petitioner had filed an application under Order 39 Rule 2a CPC (Annr. 12) wherein it has been prayed that the stay order of the Tribunal that status quo will be maintained has been disobeyed and it was also prayed that the respondents Nos. 2 to 8 may be punished and they may be sentenced to three year's imprisonment and their property be attached and fine may also be imposed on them. It will be seen from a perusal of the aforesaid application that it was filed under Order 39 Re. 2a CPC and it was for taking action for the alleged disobedience of the stay order by the respondents and it was not for taking contempt proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 against the respondents. A look at the order of the Tribunal dated December 3, 1991 (Annr. 16) will show that the Tribunal has said that there is no statutory provision in the JDA Act to punish for contempt and therefore the application is not maintainable. It will be seen from a perusal of the impugned order of the Tribunal that the Tribunal has only said that the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioner that the Tribunal has power under Order 39 Rule 2a CPC has no force because of the provisions of Article 323-B (3) of the Constitution of India where there is the specific provision that unless a specific power to punish for contempt is conferred on the Tribunal, the Tribunal has no such power. The Tribunal did not examine as to whether or not the proceedings before it were civil proceedings and whether by virtue of Section 141 CPC the procedure contained in the Code of Civil Procedure including Order 39 will be applicable or not? A reading of Section 141 CPC will show that the words used therein are "the procedure provided in this Code in regard to suits shall be followed. . . . in all proceedings in any Court of civil jurisdiction. " The Tribunal has been created under Section 83 of the JDA Act and it will be seen that the under its sub-section (6) the Tribunal has same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in respect of hearing and deciding of an appeal or any dispute referred to it. Not only this, Section 99 of the JDA Act excludes the jurisdiction of a civil court and under that section save as otherwise provided in the JDA Act, no civil court shall take recognizance of any matter which is required to be or may be decided by the JDA Executive Committee, Jaipur Development Commissioner Functional Board, any body thereof the Tribunal or the State Government, under the JDA Act. That apart, by virtue of Sub-section (8) of Sec. 83 of the JDA Act the decision of the Tribunal has been made final and binding on all parties thereto. In the definition of "court" as given in Section 3 of the Evidence Act all Judges and Magistrates and all persons except arbitrators, legally authorised to take evidence, are included. In the case of Brijnandan Singh vs. Jyoti Narain, (1), the Apex Court said that the definition of "court" in Section 3 of the Evidence Act, is not. exhaustive. In para 18 the court further said that in order to constitute a court in the strict sense of the term, an essential condition is that the court should have, apart from having some of the trappings of judicial tribunal, power to give a decision or definitive judgment which has finality and authoritativeness which are the essential tests of a judicial pronouncement. A reference to the relevant provisions of the JDA Act has already been made and it can be said that the Tribunal has not only to take evidence, but has power to give a decision or definite judgment which by virtue of sub-section (8) of Section 83 of the JDA Act has been made final. In my opinion, it cannot be disputed that the proceedings before the Tribunal are proceedings in a court of civil jurisdiction and therefore the provisions of Order 39 which includes its rule 2a will be applicable and in case the Tribunal has passed a stay order which has been disobeyed, the Tribunal will have power to take action under rule 2a of Order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This court is further of the opinion that a reference to Article 323-B (3) of the Constitution of India by the Tribunal was unnecessary because as said earlier power to punish for contempt is limited under the aforesaid provision and they are separate power than the power to punish for disobedience of the order made by a court of civil jurisdiction in the proceedings before it. As said earlier, the Tribunal has not said, whether or not its order was disobeyed by the respondents and it has dismissed the application filed by the petitioner and also the application of the JDA made before it under rule 2a of Order 39 CPC holding that the same is not maintainable. I will not go into this question on merits and it is for the Tribunal to decide whether or not its order was disobeyed by any of the parties. ;