SHARMA, J. - (1.) THE petitioner Dr. Girendra Pal is Principal of Dr. Madan Pratap Khutenta Rajasthan Homoeopathic Medical College, Jaipur (for short, Homoeopathic Medical College) since the year 1977. THEre are various authorities of the University of Rajasthan under Sec. 17 of. the University of Rajasthan Act, 1946 (for short, the Act) and one of those authorities is Syndicate. THE Syndicate is executive body of the University and as per Section 21 of the Act and as provided thereunder it consists of the persons named; therein and under its sub-section (l) (vi) it also consists of two Principals to, be nominated by the State Government. As the petitioner was the Principal of Homoeopathic Medical College, he was nominated to the Syndicate of the University of Rajasthan by the State Government for a period of three years under order dated March 16, 1991. THE said order was withdrawn by the State Government under order Annr. 1 dated February 26/27, 1993. THE said order dated February 26/27, 1993 reads as under: - " Shri Girendra Pal, Principal, Homoeopathic Medical College, Jaipur was nominated as a Member of the Syndicate of the University of Rajasthan, Jaipur for a period of three years under Sec. 21 (l) (vi) of the University of Rajasthan Act, 1946, vide Government order F. 3 (kha-12) Edu. IV/80 dated the 16. 03. 1991. Since information has been received in respect of Shri Girendra Pal that he has association with organisation-banned under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, the State Government does not consider it appropriate 'to continue him as a Member of above mentioned Syndicate, and as such the nomination of Shri Girendra Pal made vide above mentioned order dated 16. 03. 1991, is hereby withdrawn with immediate effect. " THE petitioner has challenged the aforesaid order under which his tenure of three years as a Member of the Syndicate has been reduced/curtailed, inter alia on the grounds that there is no provision to curtail he tenure of a Member nominated to the Syndicate; the above extracted order does not disclose as to with which material that the petitioner was a member of any banned organisation has been placed before the Court and even the so-called intelligence report on the basis of which the petitioner has been dubbed as a Member of the banned organisation has been filed and that there has been violation of the principles of natural justice.
(2.) LEARNED Advocate General who has appeared for the State of Rajasthan has supported the impugned order primarily on the ground that the nomination of the petitioner to the authority of the University, i. e. , Syndicate, was made by the State Government and it was always at the pleasure of the State Government and in exercise of the pleasure the impugned order has-been made. Reliance in this connection has been placed on Section 18 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act, 1955 (for short, the Act of 1955) and according to the learned Advocate General in view of the aforesaid provision the authority which has the power to make appointment has also the power to remove the person appointed by it in exercise of those powers. It is further the case of the respondent that it was on the basis of intelligence report to the effect that the petitioner is associated with the activities of RSS, a banned organisation, that the impugned order of withdrawing the nomination of the petitioner has been made. In such a case where the appointment/nominations are made and are always at the pleasure of the State Government, the State Government has a right to withdraw it and the principles of natural justice are not attracted and no opportunity of hearing was necessary to be given to the petitioner. The State has gone even to the extent that the nomination of the petitioner was political in nature and therefore, the State Government could withdraw the same. The petitioner has filed rejoinder wherein it was denied that he was ever associated with RSS which is a banned organisation under Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (for short, the Act of 1967 ). A perusal of the provisions of Section 17 read with Section 21 of the Act would show that the Syndicate is an authority of the University and is its chief executive body and consists of various persons including some elected members from amongst teachers, and so far as its sub-section (1) (vi) is concerned, the State Government has power to nominate two principals to the Syndicate. There is no provisions" for removal of a member nominated or elected to the Syndicate, but under Section 39 of the Act a person nominated or elected to be a member of the Syndicate or for that matter any authority of the University specified under Sec, 17 in his capacity as the member of a particular body or as the holder of a particular appointment shall hold office so long only within the period of office prescribed by the Act or the statutes thereunder for the members of such Authority as he continues to be the member of that body or the holder of that appointment, as the case may be. Therefore, so far as two Principals nominated by the State Government to the Syndicate in exercise of the powers under Sec. 21 (l) (vi) of the Act are concerned, they will continue for the minimum period of three years or till such time till each of them continues to hold the office of the Principal, whichever is earlier. Prior to the nomination of the petitioner, the Principal of Homoeopathic Medical College, to the Syndicate under Section 21 (l) (vi) of the Act for a period of three years under order March 16, 1991, the then State Government had nominated the petitioner, the Principal of Homoeopathic Medical College as a member of Syndicate under the aforesaid provisions for a period of three years w. e. f. March 15, 1988 to March 14,1991. The concerned file was sent for and it will be seen that in view of the change of jurisdiction of the University of Rajasthan it was considered to nominate as Principals, of affiliated colleges and because, Shri S. R. Mehta, the then Principal of S. M. S. Medical College had already been nominated to the Syndicate in exercise of the aforesaid power, Shri B. D. Calla, the then Minister in the Government of Rajasthan ordered that Dr. G. Pal, Principal, Homoeopathic Medical College be nominated as a member to the Syndicate and thus the petitioner was nominated as a member of the Syndicate. It is well known that it was then a Congress Government and Shri B,d. Calla was Minister in that Government and he still continues to be the General Secretary of the Provincial Congress Committee of the Rajasthan. After having been nominated as aforesaid for a period of three years, the petitioner was re-nominated for a further period of three years under order dated March 16, 1991 when the BJP Government was in office. The first question is as to whether how far the pleasure doctrine is attracted in a case of nomination like the present one and another question is also as to whether or not the nomination of the Principal of affiliated college which is affiliated to the University of Rajasthan, to the Syndicate is political in nature as stated by the respondent in its reply. A reference has already been made to Sec. 21 (l) (vi) of the Act in the earlier part of this order and it will be seen that two Principals are to be nominated by the State Government under Sec. 21 (l) (vi) of the Act to the Syndicate. There are various colleges affiliated to the University of Rajasthan and any two Principals of the colleges so affiliated have to be nominated to the Syndicate. I fail to understand as to how can the nomination be political in nature. Only one or other Principal of an affiliated college not exceeding two in number can be nominated to the Syndicate by virtue of their holding office of Principal and therefore, I am of the opinion that the nomination is not political in nature in so far as two Principals of the colleges are nominated under Sec. 21 (l) (vi) of the Act, is concerned. Learned Advocate General while elaborating Ms argument on the pleasure doctrine referred to Sec. 18 of the Act of 1955 and said that it is in exercise of the aforesaid power that the nomination of the petitioner to the Syndicate was withdrawn. There can hardly be any dispute that the power of removal/termination is a necessary adjunct of the authority to appoint and its exercise is incidental or natural consequence to the power of apppointment. The Apex Court in the case of Bool Chand vs. Kurukshetra University (1) was dealing with a case of Vice Chancellor of Kurukshetra University appointed under the Kurukshetra University Act (12 of 1956) and the court said that the power to appoint implies the power to determine the employment. Referring to Section 14 of the Punjab General Clauses Act, 1818 which is parimaterial to Sec. 18 of the Act of 1955, the Apex Court referred to the well settled rule of interpretation and said that the power of appointment implies the power to determine the employment. In the case of Om Narairi Agarwal & Ors. vs. Nagar Palika Shahjahanpur & Ors. (2), on which reliance has been placed by learned Advocate General, the Apex Court was dealing with a case of nomination of two women members made by the State Government under UP Municipalities Act, 1916, r/w UP Ordinance No. 2 of 1990 r/w Ordinance No. 8 of 1990 r/w UP Act No. 19 of 1990 and the notifications issued thereunder. While cancelling the nomination of two women members earlier made, the State Government had nominated two women members to Shahjahanpur Municipal Board and a 4th proviso was added to Section 9 of that Act which provided that the nomination of the two members was at the pleasure of the State Government. The Apex Court examined the matter in the light of the pleasure doctrine which was advanced before if and while dealing with curtailment of the period of nominated/elected members of the Municipal Board, said that - "in respect of a nominated member, power of curtailment of term has now been given to the State Government under the fourth proviso to Section 9 added after the third proviso through the amending Act of 1990. In the cases before us, we are concerned with the removal of nominated members under the fourth proviso to Section 9 of the Act we are not concerned with the removal as contained in Section 40 of the Act. The right to seek an election or to be elected or nominated to a statutory body depends and arises under a statute. The initial nomination of the two women members itself depended on the pleasure and subjective satisfaction of the State Government. If such appointments made initially nomination are based on political considerations, there can be no violation of any provision of the Constitution in case the Legislature authorised the State Government to terminate such appointment at its pleasure and to nominate new members in their place. The nominated members do not have the will or authority of any residents of the Municipal Board behind them as may be present in the case of an elected member. In case of an elected member, the Legislature has provided the grounds in Section 40 of the Act under which the members could be removed. But so far as the nominated members are concerned, the Legislature in its wisdom has provided that they shall hold office during the pleasure of the Government. It has not been argued from the side of the respondents that the Legislature had no such power to legislate the fourth proviso. " To my mind the aforesaid case is not applicable to the facts of the instant case because in that case the nomination of earlier two women members holding any office was and could be on political grounds. So far as the, instant case is concerned, the nomination of two Principals to the Syndicate under Sec. 21 (l) (vi) of the Act, as said earlier, cannot be said to be political and one can only be nominated under the aforesaid provision if he is the Principal of a College. That apart, the fourth proviso to Sec. 9 of the UP Municipalities Act had been added which provided that the nomination of two women members was at the pleasure of the State Government and it was in exercise of that statutory power which was held to be valid that the nomination of earlier women members was withdrawn/cancelled and fresh nomination of two women members was made. I need not go into the question whether or not in the case of present nature the principles of natural justice are attracted and before the nomination of the petitioner under Sec. 21 (i) (vi) of the Act could be withdrawn a reasonable opportunity of showing cause should have been given to him as the nomination has been withdrawn on the ground that the petitioner is a member of banned organisation. In other words, the petitioner has been dubbed as a member of banned organisation and on that ground his nomination has been withdrawn. The order withdrawing the nomination of the petitioner' has been extracted in the earlier part of this order and a reading of the 'same will show that it has not been mentioned therein as to with which banned organisation the petitioner has been associated. On the basis of some information said to have been received that the petitioner is associated with a banned organisation the State Government has withdrawn the nomination of the petitioner and it was only in reply that the respondent has come out with a case that the petitioner was associated with RSS which is a banned association. It is well settled that the order is to be supported on the ground made and no other ground. Firstly, as said earlier the impugned order does not speak/say, and even does not give an inclination as to with which banned organisation the petitioner was associated and even the necessary material has not been filed on the basis of which it could even be said that the petitioner was even remotely in any way associated with any banned organisation. The court sought information as to whether the petitioner was/is associated with RSS or any other banned association, and it is worth-mentioning that a perusal of the concerned file will show that the only information which is said to have been received is available at page 339 and it is undated, and unsigned and a reading of it will show that all that has been stated therein is that the petitioner is an active member of RSS and has been taking active part in RSS activities. I fail to understand, as to how such an undated and unsigned report could be acted upon by the State Government. Such like reports can be procured for any reason against any body and the practice of securing such report and acting thereon should be deprecated. I will hasten to add that I may not be misunderstood to say positively that this report has been procured, but the circumstances in which report has come the possibility of its being procured cannot be excluded. That apart, it further appears that a decision was taken on February 1/2, 1993 to get information in respect of antecedents of the petitioner and others who had been nominated to the Syndicate of the University of Rajasthan and it was on February 6, 1993 or earlier thereto that the aforesaid intelligence report is said to have been received in respect of the petitioner. What was the basis of intelligence report is not known. Therefore, there is no material whatsoever that the petitioner was ever or is associated with RSS, moreso when even in the Congress regime the petitioner was nominated to the Syndicate for a period of three years and he became a member of the Syndicate in the capacity of his holding office of the Principal of Homoeopathic Medical College. Thus, there is no material whatsoever even remotely to connect the petitioner with the RSS, a banned organisation. Under these circumstances as said earlier I need not go into the question if the petitioner would have been associated with RSS his nomination could have been withdrawn/cancelled without giving him opportunity of showing cause. The Tribunal constituted under the Act of 1967 has not up-held the ban on RSS and therefore also even if the petitioner would have been associated with the activities of RSS, as alleged, with which as said earlier he is not associated, his nomination on this ground could not have been withdrawn. In the case of Bool Chand (supra) as said earlier, the Apex Court was dealing with a case of removal of the Vice Chancellor. In para 8 the court said that it is unable to hold that a person appointed as Vice-Chancellor is entitled to continue in office for the full period of his appointment even if it turns out that he is physically decrepit, mentally infirm or grossly immoral. Absence of a provisions setting up procedure for determining the employment of the Vice-Chancellor in the Act or the Statutes or Ordinances does not lead to the inference that the tenure of office of Vice Chancellor is not liable to be determined. The Apex Court referred to its earlier case of State of Ortssa vs. Dr. (Miss) Binapani, (3) and after extracting the relevant part of that judgment said that - "the power to appoint a Vice-Chancellor has its source in the University Act; investment of that power carries with it the power to determine the employment; but the power is coupled with duty. The power may not be exercised arbitrarily; it can be only exercised for good cause, i. e. in the interests of the University and only when it is found after due enquiry held in manner consistent with the rules of natural justice, that the holder of the office is unfit to continue as Vice-Chancellor. " It will therefore be clear that even assuming that the power of removal is adjunct to the power of appointment as incorporated in Sec. 18 of the Act of 1955 or under Sec. 16 of the Central Act the said power can only be exercised reasonably and not arbitrarily. In the instant case the power of withdrawing the nomination before the expiry of three years as a Member of Syndicate of the University of Rajasthan has been exercised arbitrarily for no reason whatsoever on the non-existing ground that the petitioner was and continues to be a member of RSS which he does not appear to be associated, there being no material whatsoever to that effect. Even assuming that in accordance with the principles incorporated under Sec. 18 of the Act of 1955 the power of removal being adjunct to the power of appointment, the nomination could be withdrawn without reasonable opportunity of being heard having been given, about which I express no opinion, so far as present case is concerned, the said power has been exercised arbitrarily and it is colourable exercise of that power that the impugned order has been made and the State Government has acted arbitrarily and, therefore, the impugned order is liable to be set aside and quashed.
(3.) CONSEQUENTLY, I hereby allow this writ petition and quash the impugned order Annr. 1 dated February 26/27, 1993, of the State Government withdrawing the order dated March 16,1991 and declare that the petitioner shall be deemed to be nominated as a Member of the Syndicate for the remainder period of three years and direct the respondent to allow the petitioner to function as nominated member of the Syndicate for the remainder period of his term. The petitioner shall get Rs. 2,000/- as costs of this writ petition from the respondent. .;