BALIA, J. - (1.) THIS second appeal is directed against the judgement and decree dated 26. 5. 1993, passed by learned Addl. District and Sessions Judge, No. 2, Jodhpur; affirming the judgment and decree passed by learned Addl. Civil Judge No. 2, Jodhpur on 20. 03. 1993.
(2.) THE respondent had filed the present suit for eviction against the appellant, on the ground he has defaulted in payment of rent within the terms of Sec. 13 (1) (a) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1950' ). It was the further case of the plaintiff that the defendant having already obtained the benefit of provisions of Sec. 13 (6) of the Act of 1950 in the previous suit No. 122/77, which was also founded on the ground of default, is not entitled to benefit of Sec. 13 (6) in the present case. Both the courts below found that the; defendant has committed default and, this being a second default; he is not entitled to benefits under Sec 13 (6) of the Act of 1950. Hence decree for eviction was passed. The only ground which the learned counsel for the appellant has urged against the judgement and decree of the courts below, is that in the previous suit, the decree was based on a compromise between the parties and the court had not recorded any finding that the defendant had committed default, therefore, it cannot be said that the defendant has obtained benefit under Sec. 13 (6) of the Act of 1950 in the earlier suit. He contends that unless a finding of default against the defendant was recorded by the court, there cannot be any occasion for availing benefits under Sec. 13 (6) of protection against eviction. Having carefully considered the contention of learned counsel and the documents comprising settlement in the earlier suit, I am of the opinion that the contention of learned counsel is not sustainable. It is well established now, that even where a decree for eviction is based on terms of compromise, the decree must be founded on one or more of the grounds envisaged under sec. 13 of the Act of 1950 or, other relevant law. It is also well established that such satisfaction of the court about the existence of grounds for eviction can be inferred from the admission of the parties, contained in a deed of compromise. In the present case, though the earlier decree was not a decree for eviction the agreement between the parties clearly states that suit is based on ground of default and the defendant is entitled to benefits under Sec. 13 (6), that is to say, both the parties agreed that in view of provisions of Sec 13 (6) of the Act of 1950, the defendant is entitled to protection from a decree for eviction under the Act, and therefore, the plaintiff got the suit dismissed in terms of settlement on the ground alone. It is not disputed that in the earlier suit, the court had determines the amount of rent under Sec. 13 (3) and therefore, the defendant had deposited the said amount in the court and the compromise was arrived only thereafter.
(3.) IN the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it cannot be said that the defendant had not taken the benefit of Sec. 13 (6) of the Act of 1950 in that earlier suit. If the be so, both the courts below were right in holding that the defendant is not entitled to benefit under Sec. 13 (6) a second time. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed summarily. Learned counsel for the appellant prays that the appellant may be allowed some time to vacate the suit shop. Learned counsel for the respondents states that the respondent-decree-holder will not execute the decree for a period of one year. Accordingly, appellant is allowed one year's time to vacate the suit shop, from today, provided he furnishes an undertaking to the effect that he will hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the suit shop, on or before 18. 08. 1994; and, further that he will not part with or deliver the possession of the suit shop to any other person than the landlord. The appellant shall further undertake that he will pay to the landlord mesne profits for use and occupation of the premises at the rate at which rent was payable in respect of suit premises, regularly, month by month, until he physically delivers the vacant possession of the suit shop to the landlord-plaintiff. The appellant is allowed to submit undertaking within one month from today in the executing court. ;