- (1.) THIS revision arises out of an order passed by District Judge, Churu as Appellate Officer, under section 9 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 rejecting the petitioners' appeal against the order passed by the Estate Officer on 21. 4. 84 directing the eviction of the petitioner from the disputed public premises under section 5 (1) of the Act of. 1971.
(2.) THE Appellate Officer has held the appeal to be barred by time on the ground that the order under section 5 (1) was made on 21. 4. 84. Under section 9 of the Act appeal has to be filed within 12 days. THE appeal was presented on 2. 1. 88. THE notice of order. . . . . was issued in the name of petitioner was served on him and there was no sufficient cause for the petitioner to have filed the appeal in 1988 long after expiry of period of limitation. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the Appellate Officer has over-looked the provisions of section 9 of the Act of 1971 and has proceeded on assumption that the starting point of limitation for filing from the date of order the appeal is the date of order. If the appeal is not filed within 12 days from the date of order the same cannot be entertained, unless the appellant shows sufficient cause for late, filing of the appeal. This is apparent from the fact that by referring to service of notice of the order passed by the Estate Officer on the appellant, it has come to the conclusion that there is no sufficient reason for not filing the appeal even after service of notice. Learned counsel contends that the Appellate Officer has examined the issue as if it was considering the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, for condoning delay. According to him under the provision of section 9 of the Act of 1971, the period of limitation commenced from the date of publication of the order in accordance of section 5 and not from the date of order or from the date of personal communication of the order to the petitioner. Learned counsel for Union of India urged that the purpose of publication of the order is to inform the aggrieved party, of an adverse order. Therefore, the service of notice on the petitioner must be considered as the publication of the order. I have carefully considered the rival contention and examined the order. It will be appropriate to reproduce sections 5 and 9 of the Act, 1971, so far as relevant for the present purpose. Sec. 5 : Eviction of unauthorised occupants : (1) If, after considering the cause, if any, shown by any person in pursuance of a notice under section 4 and (any evidence produced by him, in support of the same and after personal hearing, if any, given under clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section (4), the Estate Officer is satisfied that the public premises are in unauthorised occupation, the Estate Officer may make an order of eviction, for reasons to be recorded therein, directing that the public premises shall be vacated, on such date as may be specified in the order, by all persons who may be in occupation thereof or any part thereof, and cause a copy of the order to be affixed on the outer door or some other conspicuous part of the public premises. (2)If any person refuses or fails to comply with the order of eviction (on or before, the date specified in the said order or within fifteen days of its publication under sub-section (1) whichever is later,) the Estate Officer or any other officer duly authorised by the Estate Officer in this behalf may evict that person from, and take possession of, the public premises a. 05. for that purpose, use such force as may be necessary. Sec. 9: Appeals : (1) An appeal shall lie from every order of the Estate Officer made in respect of any public premises under (sec. 5 or section 5-B) (or sec. 5-C) or section 7 to an appellate officer who shall be the District Judge of the district in which the public premises are situate or such other Judicial Officer in that district of not less than ten years' standing as the District Judge may designate in this behalf. (2) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be preferred : - (a) in the case of an appeal from an order under the sec. 5, (within twelve days) from the date of publication of the order under sub-sec. (1) of that Sec. ; (b) in the case of an appeal from an order (under sec. 5-B or sec. 7, within twelve days), from the date on which the order is com-municated' to the appellant ; Provided that the appellate officer may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the (said period) if, he is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time (and) (c) in the case of an appeal from an order section 5-C, within twelve days from the date of such order: (3) Where an appeal is preferred from an order of the Estate Officer, the appellate officer may stay the enforcement of that order for such period and on such conditions as he deems fit. Provided that where the construction or erection of any building or other structure of figure or execution of any other work was not completed on the day on which an order was made under sec. 5-B for the demolition or removal of such building or other structure or fixture, the appellate officer shall not make any order for the stay of enforcement of such order, has been given by the appellant for not proceeding with such construction, erection or work pending the disposal of the appeal. (4) Every appeal under this section shall be imposed by the appellate officer as expeditiously as possible. (5) The costs of any appeal under this section shall be in the discretion of the appellate officer. (6) For the purposes of this section, a. . . . presidency-town shall be deemed to be a District Judge of the district. From the perusal of sub-section (2) of Sec. 9 it is apparent that for appeal under section 9, period of 12 days is prescribed for preferring an appeal against the orders made under sections 5, 5-B & 7 of the Act and separate starting points of limitation of 12 days have been prescribed for appeals from orders passed under aforesaid provisions. While the limitation for preferring appeal against an order passed under section 5 commenced from the date of the publication of an order under sub-section (1) of section 5 in the case of an appeal against order under sec. 5-B or section 7 of the Act said limitation commenced from the date of the order is communicated to the appellant: Thus the legislature has clearly intended different starting point of limitation for filing of the appeal against the order under section 5 on the one hand and orders under sections 5-B or 7 on the other hand. By using different phrase 'publication' and 'communication for different purpose in the same provision. On the plain reading of the aforesaid provision, mere 'communication' to individual cannot be equated with 'publication'. In this connection it may be also noticed that word 'publication' within its ambit has an element of making it known to public at large and not merely to the occupant of the premises. Section 5 (1) provides the mode of publication of the order passed under that section. The mode of publication is that the order is to be affixed on the outer door or some other conspicuous part of the public premises. Thus the date of publication of an order under section 5 (1) is the date when copy of the order is affixed on he outer door or some other conspicuous part of the concerned public premises.
(3.) IT will not be out of place to mention here that law in this connection is well-settled that where a statute provided that an act or thing to be done in a particular manner then that act or thing can be done only in the manner prescribed and not in any other manner. In my opinion, limitation for the purpose of filing of an appeal under sec. 9 against an order under section 5 (1) of the Act of 1971 would commence from the date the order is published in the manner prescribed under sec. 5 itself. The lower appellate court has clearly acted illegally and with material irregularity in exercise of it jurisdiction in rejecting the appeal as barred by time by misunderstanding the controversy raised before it and by ignoring the specific provision governing that question of limitation for filing the appeal under the Act. In doing so it has failed to exercise its jurisdiction vested in it day law. Petition is, therefore, allowed. The order dt. 23. 1. 88 passed by the Appellate Officer is set aside and the Appellate Officer (District Judge, Churu) is directed to decide the question of limitation afresh in accordance with law by keeping aforesaid observation in mind. ;