V. K. SINGHAL, J. - (1.) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner has submitted that there is no period of limitation prescribed in sub-section (6) of section 15 of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954 for filing review of the order of the High Court and, alternatively it is submitted that the petitioner has reasonable cause, inasmuch as he was of the view that since no limitation was prescribed, therefore, delay was liable to be condoned on account of bona fide belief. The provisions of section 15 (6) of the Act provides that "subject as aforesaid, any person considering himself aggrieved by an order under sub-section (4) may apply for a review of the order to the High Court and the High Court may make such order thereon as it thinks fit". This provision has given a further remedy to the assessee for filing review application. The procedure which has to be followed is under the Rules and Regulations of the High Court. Section 2 (9) of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the "judgment" means the statement given by the Judge of the ground of a decree or order. Section 2 (14) defines "orders", means formal expression of any decision of a civil court, which is not a decree. From a combined reading of both the provisions, it would be evident that if the order is given by a Judge, it would be a judgment. Though there is a distinction between the words "judgment" and "order" as reproduced above, but the order which is by way of statement given by the Judge is also a judgment and, therefore, in accordance with the provisions of section 15 (6), the orders which are being passed by this Court would be considered to be falling with the broader ambit of judgment in spite of the fact that the word "order" has been used in section 15 (6 ).
(2.) NOW coming to the point of applicability of limitation, the period of 30 days is provided for review of judgment by a court other than the Supreme Court and this time runs from the date of judgment or decree. It has been so prescribed in the Schedule attached to the Limitation Act and, therefore, the period of 30 days would be applicable for filing of review application. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the provisions of the Limitation Act are not applicable, is not in accordance with law, inasmuch as section 29 (2) provides for a contingency where different limitation is prescribed under the Limitation Act and the other Act. If no limitation is prescribed in the other Act then the limitation so prescribed under the Limitation Act would be applicable. The judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Vidhyacharan Shukla v. Khubchand Baghel AIR 1964 SC 1099 has been relied on this proposition. In this case the provisions of section 116a (2) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, were considered and it was observed that "appeal under section 116a (1) by fiction is equated with an appeal filed under the Code of Civil Procedure in the matter of not only the exercise of the power, jurisdiction and authority but also in the matter of procedure to be followed from the date of receipt of the appeal to its final disposal". It is thus an appeal in respect of which the Limitation Act has prescribed a period of limitation under section 156 of the First Schedule. But the Special Act, namely, the Act of 1951 has prescribed by section 116a (3) a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the First Schedule to the Limitation Act within the meaning of article 29 (2) of the Limitation Act and so, section 12 of the Limitation Act is attracted and the appellant is entitled to exclude the time taken by him for obtaining copy of the order. It was also considered that even assuming that article 156 of Schedule I to the Limitation Act did not prescribe a period of limitation for the kind of appeal under consideration, the question arises whether sub-section (2) of section 29 of the Limitation Act would not be applicable if no period was prescribed by the First Schedule for an appeal created by a special law, but the special law prescribed a period of limitation for the same. The history of this provision throws some light on this question. The First Limitation Act was passed in the year 1859 (Act No. 14 of 1859 ). Section 3 of the Act provided : " When, by any law now or hereafter to be in force, a shorter period of limitation than that prescribed by this Act is specially prescribed for the institution of a particular suit, such shorter period of limitation shall be applied notwithstanding this Act. " The provisions of the Act of 1859 were repealed by the Limitation Act 9 of 1871. Section 6 of that Act, which is relevant to the present inquiry, read : " When by any law not mentioned in the Schedule hereto annexed, and now or hereafter to be in force in any part of British India, a period of limitation differing from that prescribed by this Act is especially prescribed for any suits, appeals or applications, nothing herein contained shall affect such law. " The Limitation Act of 1871 was replaced by Act No. 4 of 1877. Section 6 of this Act read : " When by any special or local law now or hereafter in force in British India, a period of limitation is specially prescribed for any suit, appeal or application, nothing herein contained shall affect or alter the period so prescribed. " The same provision was retained in the Limitation Act 9 of 1908 but it was amended in the year 1922 in the present form. Before the amendment of 1922, there was a difference of view on the following question, namely, (1) whether the general provisions of the Limitation Act, where the word "prescribed" alone without reference to any Act, was used or even where that word was not used, would be applicable to special or local laws, and (2) whether the general provisions of the Limitation Act did not apply at all to the periods of Limitation prescribed by special or local laws. Decisions holding that the general provisions of the Limitation Act did not apply to the periods of limitations prescribed by other laws relied upon the expression "affect or alter" used in the section as it then stood. Section 29 of the Limitation Act was amended to remove the conflict with a view to make the general provisions applicable to the period of limitation prescribed by the special or local laws. A comparison of the phraseology of the earlier sections shows that while section 3 of the Limitation Act of 1859 used the words "shorter period", section 6 of the Act of 1871 used the expression "differing", and section 6 of the Acts of 1877 and 1908 removed both the expressions. The result was that section 6 of the Act of 1871 saved all the special or local laws which prescribed a special period of limitation from the operation of the provisions of the Limitation Act. As the section then stood, it applied to all special or local laws prescribing a period of limitation whether the Limitation Act prescribed any period of limitation or not for suits or appeals similar to those governed by special or local laws, or where the period of limitation so prescribed by special or local laws was shorter or longer than that prescribed in the Limitation Act. Can it be said that by the amending Act of 1922 a conscious departure was made by the Legislature to impose a condition for the application of sub-section (2) of section 29, namely, that a period of limitation should have been expressly prescribed by the First Schedule to the Limitation Act in respect of a suit or appeal governed by the special or local law ? There was no occasion for such a departure. To put it in other words, apart from resolving the conflict, did the Legislature intend to exclude a particular category of proceedings governed by special or local laws from the operation of the benefit conferred by sub-section (2) of section 29 ? No justification was suggested for such a departure and we find none. From a reading of the entire judgment it would be evident that the provisions of the Limitation Act would be applicable and none of the observations of the apex Court suggest that provisions of section 29 (2) are not applicable to a case where the limitation is not prescribed by special Act.
(3.) IN the present case since no limitation has been prescribed under section 15 (6) of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act for filing of review application, therefore, the provisions of Limitation Act would apply for such an application for review and it cannot be considered that the review application can be filed at any time and no limitation is prescribed therefor in the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act. The provisions of Limitation Act have been made applicable in accordance with the provisions of section 29 (2) and, therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is not in accordance with law. The application for review has been filed after expiry of 30 days and, therefore, the objection of the Registry that it is delayed by 81 days is correct. Now coming to the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that he was of the view and was under bona fide belief that since no period of limitation is prescribed, therefore he can move an application for review at any time, I am of the view that this is no reason and there being no sufficient cause, the review petition is dismissed as barred by limitation. Petition dismissed. .;