- (1.) This writ petition is directed against the order of termination dated 3.11.1988 Annex. 8 whereby the services of the petitioner were terminated by the Manager of the Branch of R.F.C., Chittorgarh. The facts necessary to be noticed for the disposal of this writ petition briefly stated are that the petitioner was initially appointed on the post of 'Chowkidar' on daily wages of Rs. 11/- per day to look-after M/s. Vineet Marbles Industries which was taken over by R.F.C. His services were brought to an end vide Annex. 2 dated 30.9.86 and thereafter he was ordered to be reappointed vide Annex. 3 dated 3.10.1986 with effect from 4.10.86 for the same purpose i.e. on the post of 'Chowkidar' to look-after M/s. Vineet Marble Industries on daily wages of Rs. 11/-per day. The daily wages of Rs. 11/- were raised to Rs. 14/- per day vide Annex. 4 dated 11.8.87. Thereafter this industry M/s. Vineet Marble Industries was sold by R.F.C. and, therefore, the services of petitioner were terminated vide Annex. 5 dated 26.7.88. The petitioner raised the dispute before the Asstt. Labour Commissioner and Conciliation Officer, Chittorgarh and there it was agreed by the Deputy General Manager of R.F.C. that the petitioner will be taken back on duty w.e.f. 7.9.88. The period of absence between 26.7.88 to 7.9.88 will count for continuing in service, but no payment of wages will be made to him of this period. Thereafter, it was alleged that the petitioner's services were terminated vide aforesaid Annex. 8 dated 3.11.88 on the ground that truck No. RGH-7185 has been sold. This termination is against the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, and, therefore, the petitioner has submitted that it is liable to be set aside and petitioner deserves to be reinstated in service. He has also claimed equal pay for equal work. A reply has been filed on behalf of respondents in which it has been submitted that petitioner was not an employee of corporation, but was an employee of private unit i.e. M/s. Vineet Marble Industries. This unit was taken over by the corporation and, therefore, the petitioner's services were availed to look after this unit and his salary was charged against this very industry as per the provisions of Section 29 & 30 of the State Finance Corporation Act, 1951. The services have been terminated on account of efflux of time. It was claimed that M/s. Vineet Marble Industry is a necessary party and without impleading it the writ petition must fail. It has been claimed that writ petition should be dismissed.
(2.) I have heard Shri Jagdish Vyas, appearing on behalf of the petitioner and Mr. M.R. Singhvi, appearing on behalf of respondents.
(3.) Mr. Singhvi, has taken a preliminary objection that R.F.C. is a corporate body and comes under the Companies Act and till R.F.C. itself is not impleaded as party, the writ petition is not maintainable. In this respect he placed reliance on the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court rendered in Ranjeet Mal Vs. General Manager, Northern Railway, New Delhi & Ors, 1977 AIR(SC) 1701 wherein it has been held that real employer of the person concerned is Union of India and, therefore, even if he is working under any division of Railway, he was servant of Union of India and, therefore, the Union of India was the necessary party. This case does not relate to Industrial Disputes Act. It was a case of civil appeal where civil rights were to be determined and, therefore, it was essential to implead Union of India as party. This case has no application of the facts of the present case wherein the dispute under the Industrial Dispute Act has been raised and the Industrial Dispute Act requires an employer to be made a party. Section 2(g) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 defines the 'Employer' as under :- 2(g) : (i) In relation to an industry carried to by or under the authority of any department of (Central Government or the State Govt.), the authority prescribed in this behalf, or where no authority is prescribed, the head of the deptt.: (ii) in relation to an industry carried on by or on behalf of social authority, the chief executive officer of that authority;;