- (1.) THIS petition has been filed by the Rajasthan State Electricity Board for challenging the order dated 3. 8. 93 passed by the Munsiff and Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Dausa, in an application for injunction filed by respondents No 3.
(2.) FACTS of the case are that the Rajasthan State Electricity Board issued an advertisement, on 26. 1. 93 inviting applications for recruitment 41 vacant posts of Assistant Engineers (Electrical ). Last date fixed for the receipt of the application was indicated as 25. 2. 93. In terms of advertisement issued on 26. 1. 93 persons having qualification of B. E. (Electrical) awarded by a University established by law in India or any degree or diploma awarded by Foreign University or institution declared equivalent by the Government or by the Board was eligible. Persons working in the service of the Board in Electrical Engineering who had diploma to their credit and who had served for 7 years were also treated as eligible. Thereafter, a notification was issued by the Board on 7th April 1993 making Junior Engineers-I (Electrical) and (Mechanical) with two years service as on 1. 4. 93 eligible to appear in the examination. These persons were to be considered against 1/3 vacancies of direct recruitment quota. The Board also announced schedule of examination vide notice dated, 9. 7. 93. The examinations were scheduled to take place between 5th and 8th August 1993. Respondent No. 3 filed a suit in the Court of Munsiff and Judicial Magistrate, Dausa on 29. 7. 93 seeking declaration and injunction against the Rajasthan State Electricity Board. In the said suit Assistant Secretary (Recruitment) RSEB, Jaipur and Executive Engineer (O & M) RSEB, Dausa have been impleaded as defendants. An application for temporary injunction was also efiled alongwith the suit. Notice of the application for temporary injunction was issued by the learned Munsiff on 30. 7. 93 and the next date was fixed as 3. 8. 93. Reply to the injunction application was filed on behalf of the petitioner Board on 3. 8. 93 with a request that application for temporary injunction be considered immediately because the examinations were scheduled to commence from 5. 8. 93. According to the petitioner Board even though a request had been made to the trial Court to heesr the application on 3. 8. 93, the learned trial court did not consider it proper to hear the matterue Instead, the application was taken up for consideration between 3. 30 to 4 p. m. and after observing that he was busy on account of the work in connection with the Lok Adalat and it was not possible for him to decide the injunction application, the learned Munsiff adjourned the case to 5th August 1993 but, at the same time, directed the parties to maintain the status-quo. Respondent No 4 has filed separate civil suit in the court of Additional Munsiff, Magistrate No. 2, Jaipur City on 30. 7. 93 on the same subject matter and he fixed the case for hearing of temporary injunction application on 4. 8. 93. Petitioner has questioned the legality of the order dated, 3. 8. 93 passed by the Munsiff and Judicial Magistrate, Dausa and the proceedings on suit in the said Court as also the suit filed in the Court of Additional Munsiff Magistrate No. 2, Jaipur City. The case of the petitioner is that the learned Munsiff and Judicial Magistrate, Dausa had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit because no cause of action or part of cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the Munsiff and Judicial Magistrate, Dausa and that' the learned Munsiff has passed the impugned order without application of mind. Further case of the petitioner Board is that suit has been filed with oblique motive in order to frustrate the examination being held by the Board and also that respondents No. 3 and 4 were aware of the fact that the Board has filed caveat in the High Court and to avoid a contest they filed civil suits. Shri A. K. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, strenuously argued that the learned Munsiff and Judicial Magistrate has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit filed for declaration and permanent injunction and that on account of the order passed by the learned Munsiff and Judicial Magistrate on 3. 8. 93 irreparable injury has been caused to the petitioner Board. Shri A. K. Sharma submitted that filing of the civil suit in such matters must be barred by this Court because it will be impossible for the petitioner Board to defend the cases at different places and the process of selection may never be completed. Shri P. K. Sharma, learned counsel for respondent No. 3, argued that this Court must not entertain the writ petition because of the failure on the part of the petitioner Board to avail statutory alternative remedy of appeal available to it under Order 43 Rule 1 (r) C. P. C. Shri P. K. Sharma vehemently argued that the writ petition filed by the petitioner Board is an abuse of the process of the Court. He submitted that instead of approaching the High Court directly the Board should have filed an appeal before the District Judge. Dausa whose court is situated within Dausa City and the Presiding Officer was very much available at Dausa on 3. 8. 93 and 4. 8. 93.
(3.) BOTH the learned counsel admit that after this Court had passed order on 4. 8. 93 staying the operation of the order dated, 3. 8. 93 passed by the Munsiff Magistrate, Dausa, examinations have been conducted by the Board and the result is awaited. The present one is a case in which it is clear that learned Munsiff Magistrate has acted in total disregard of the basic principles applicable for exercise of power under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2. The manner in which the learned Munsiff and Judicial Magistrate has passed order for status quo leaves much to be desired. Learned Munsiff has completely over-looked the fact that the advertisement had been issued by the Board in January 1993 and the Schedule of examination was also examined in July 1993 and that suit had been filed just before the commencement of the examination. No explanation has been offered by the respondent No. 3 for his having kept silence till 30th July 1993 before filing the suit. If the respondent No. 3 felt that the section of the Board in holding the examination was contrary to the statutory regulations or the constitutional provisions, he ought to have approached the court immediately after issue of advertisement or in any case, immediately after the publication of the schedule of examination. His failure to take steps for vindication of his rights immediately after the publication of the schedule of examination was by itself sufficient to disentitle him any relief by way of temporary injunction. That apart, it is more than evident from the record that the learned Munsiff has completely over looked two important principles namely, that order for temporary injunction is to be passed only when irreparable injury is going to be caused to a party and when balance of convenience is in favour of grant of injunction. While passing the impugned order of temporary injunction learned Munsiff, Dausa has failed to apply his mind from the standard of a man of ordinary prudence. He has completely lost sight of the fact that in pursuance of the advertisement a number of applications had been received by the Board. A large number of individuals had spent their money, time and energy for the making of preparations for impending examinations and the order of stay would result in preventing all the candidates from taking examinations. The learned Munsiff also ignored the fact that so far as the plaintiff (respondent No. 3) is concerned, he was not even an applicant for the examination and therefore, he could hardly suffer irreparable loss by holding of examination. By stopping the examination schedule to commence on 5th August 1993, learned Munsiff had brought the entire process to a grinding halt. There is no doubt that the civil courts have wide powers to grant injunction in different matters under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 C. P. C. but the very fact that wide power has been vested on the civil court to grant injunction imposes an onerous duty on these courts to apply themselves to the basic principles evolved by the Judge made law during the last many decades and pass orders of injunction only when it becomes necessary to prevent irreparable injury and injustice. Injunction orders cannot and must not be passed merely for asking. In matters relating to recruitment and other service conditions, Civil Courts must be extra cautious in passing injunction orders where rights of third parties, who are not before the Court, are affected. In matters like termination of service or reversion an individual employee is by and large affected. He has a lis with the employer and therefore, others are largely not affected by grant of temporary injunction. But in cases relating to appointments, seniority, promotion, confirmation a large body of persons is usually affected. Where recruitment is held by inviting applications from open market, injunction order restraining employer from holding the test should be passed in rarest of the rare cases. In such matters, appropriate order which the Civil Court can pass after having felt satisfied with a strong prima-facie case and irreparable injury is that the plaintiff is allowed to participate in the examination or the test. There is absolutely no justification for passing a restraint order against the holding of the examination itself. Such order causes irreparable injury not only to the employer but to all those who are applicants for recruitment. The public interest suffers immensely by passing of such injunction order. The entire machinery of the Government or the Public Sector Organisation is brought to a grinding halt by such injunction order. Grant of stay against the recruitment test resultt in frustrating the entire process which itself consumes sufficiently long time. The Courts cannot also ignore the fact that in such matters appropriate reliefs, if any , can be given by the Court only while making a final adjudication of the dispute. Thus, grant of temporary injunction which results in frustrating the holding of examination/test must be avoided. ;