S. K. MAL LODHA, J. - (1.) THE question involved in this writ petition is whether the Judge, Industrial Tribunal, Jodhpur, was not right in reviewing the award under his inherent powers.
(2.) INITIALLY the material facts may be noticed. Non-petitioner No. 2 Madanlal was employed with the petitioner Kalusingh, who is the proprietor of New Light Art Works, behind Minerva Cinema. M. G. Hospital Road, Jodhpur. He was removed from service by the employer. Non-petitioner No. 2 raised an industrial dispute that he was wrongly removed from service. According to the petitioner, he was not removed but he absented intentionally from work. A reference by the State Government was made to the Industrial Tribunal, Jodhpur, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Tribunal' ). The Tribunal gave an award (Anx. 9) dated July 30, 1982, holding that non-petitioner No. 2 was wrongly removed from service by the petitioner and, therefore, he was entitled to all the back wages from August 11,1978 and that non-petitioner No. 2 will be considered to be in continuous service of the petitioner. The petitioner applied for copies of the award. The case of the petitioner is that he had come to know that non-petitioner No. 2 was employed with the Rajasthan State Electricity Board. He obtained information from the Board and moved the review petition before the Tribunal. That review petition was under inherent powers. It was dismissed vide order Anx. 10 dated April 12, 1983 on the ground that the petitioner cannot invoke inherent powers under s. 151, C. P. C. for the amendment of the award Anx. 9 dated July 30, 1982. The petitioner has prayed that the award (Anx. 9) and the order Anx. 10 dated April 12, 1983 dismissing the petition for reviewing the award, may be quashed. I have heard Mr. M. D. Calla, learned counsel for the petitioner. Mr. Calla submitted that the Judge, Industrial Tribunal had power to amend the award on the review petition filed by the petitioner. The Tribunal has stated that after the making of the award, it has no inherent powers to amend or qualify the award. In these circumstances, the question that crops up for consideration is whether the Judge, Industrial Tribunal, was right and justified in refusing to review the award (Anx. 9) dated July 30, 1980. Chapter IV of the Industrial Disputes Act, (No. XIV of 1947) (for short 'the Act' herein) deals with procedure, powers and duties of authorities. Sec. 11 of the Act, which finds place in this Chapter, deals with procedure and powers of conciliation officers. Sec. 11 (3) of the Act reads as under:- " (3) Every Board, Court, (Labour Court, Tribunal and National Tribunal) shall have the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit, in respect of the following matters namely:- (a) enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath; (b) compelling the production of documents and material objects; (c) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses; (d) in respect of such other matters as may be prescribed; and every enquiry or investigation by a Board, Court, (Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal), shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Ss. 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code. " Sec. 11 (3) confers the same powers, exercisable under the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 for trying a suit in regard to the matters mentioned therein. The powers mentioned in s. 11 (3) are exercisable by a Tribunal when the proceedings are pending before it. There is no power conferred on the Tribunal under sec. 11 (3) after the proceedings pending before it have terminated.
(3.) SEC. 36a of the Act deals with powers to remove the difficulties. This sec. empowers the appropriate Government to refer any question to the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal if the said Government is satisfied that any difficulty or doubt arises as to the interpretation of any provision of an award or settlement made by any of the aforesaid authorities. It further lays down that when such a question is referred to the Industrial Authority, it shall after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, decide such question and its decision shall be final and binding on all such parties. While considering the scops of s. 36a of the Act, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have observed in Kirloskar Oil Engines, Ltd. , Kirkas, Poona and its workmen (1) as under:- "it is thus clear that the scope of the enquiry under s. 36a is limited to the decision of the difficulties or doubts arising as to the interpretation of any provision in the award. If the words used in any provision of an award are ambiguous or obscure and it is not reasonably possible to interpret them, the difficulty arising from the use of such embiguous or obscure words may be resolved by moving the appropriate Government to make a reference under S. 36a. It is obvious that any question about the propriety, correctness or validity of any provision of the award would be outside the purview of the enquiry contemplated by the section. If a party to the award is aggrieved by any of its provisions of the merits, the only remedy available to it is by making an appeal, say for instance under Art. 136 of the Constitution, to this Court. A grievance felt by a party against any provision of the award can be ventilated only in that way and not by adopting the procedure prescribed by S. 36a. Thus, the enquiry permissible under s. 36a is limited to the question of the interpretation of the provisions of the award in question and more. " It is thus clear that any question about the propriety, correctness or validity of any provision of the award would be outside the purview of the enquiry contemplated by Sec. 36a. The proceedings under S. 36a of the Act is not intended to enable the Tribunal to review or modify its own order. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the Judge, Industrial Tribunal has emple jurisdiction to review its own order and by declining to entertain the petition and dismissing it by order Anx. 10 it has failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in him by law. It is well setlled that a right of review does not exist unless conferred by law or by necessary implication. Even on the basis of s. 141, C. P. C. , it cannot be said that a right of review in proceedings under special enactments has been conferred, for such a right is a substantive right and not a mere matter of procedure. The power of review is not inherent in any court or tribunal, it must be conferred by statute. ;